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THE INTELLECTUALS IN THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW STATES*

By EDWARD SHILS

I. The Political Significance of Intellectuals in Underdeveloped Countries

THE gestation, birth, and continuing life of the new states of Asia and Africa, through all their vicissitudes, are in large measure the work of intellectuals. In no state-formations in all of human history have intellectuals played such a role as they have in these events of the present century.

In the past, new states were founded by military conquest, by the secession of ethnic groups led by traditional tribal and warrior chiefs, by the gradual extension of the power of the prince through intermarriage, agreement, and conquest, or by separation through military rebellion. In antiquity, the demand that subjects acknowledge the divinity of the Emperor was no more than a requirement that the legitimacy of the existing order be recognized.[1] The interests of dynasty and kinship group, the lure of majesty, considerations of power, aspirations for office, and calculations of economic advantage have been the components of political decisions and the grounds for pursuit of power in the state. It is only in modern times in the West that beliefs about man's nature, his past, and his place in the universe, and about the ethical and metaphysical rightness of particular forms of political order—the concerns of intellectuals—have played an important part in public life.

In the West in modern times, however, politics—particularly civil politics—have never been a preserve of the intellectuals. Well-established aristocrats and landed gentry with ample leisure have provided much of the personnel of politics, both oligarchical and democratic; clergymen and high ecclesiastical officials and, above all, businessmen—the former earlier, the latter more recently—have likewise added to

* This article is a revised version of a paper presented at a conference on political modernization held under the auspices of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council at Dobbs Ferry in June 1959.

[1] The maxim of the Peace of Augsburg: *Cuius regio, eius religio*, was the beginning of the specifically modern view that a political order must be based on articulately affirmed beliefs. It too, however, was more concerned with the protection of dynastic interests and the guarantee of public order. The substance of the religion was less important than its acceptance, and in this way it differed from the more intrinsically ideological orientation toward politics that is characteristic of the modern intellectual.

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the pool. Retired army officers, trade unionists and, of course, mere professional politicians of diverse occupational backgrounds have also been among the incumbents of or contenders for political office and the leaders in the agitation surrounding selection and decision. Intellectuals, too—professors and teachers, scientists, journalists, authors, etc.—have had a substantial share in all these activities. Radical, much more than conservative, politics have been their province, but there too they have had to share the territory with politicians and trade unionists who were not intellectuals. Modern revolutionary politics have been a domain very much reserved for intellectuals; even those who were not intellectuals by training or profession have been almost forced into becoming so by the ideological nature of modern revolutionary politics.

The prominence of intellectuals in the politics of the new states of Asia and Africa arises in part from the special affinity which exists between the modern intellectual orientation and the practice of revolutionary or unconstitutional politics, of politics which are uncivil in their nature. But even in the small space allotted to civil politics before the new states' acquisition of sovereignty and in its larger area since then, intellectuals have had a prominent position. They have not had to share their political role to the usual extent with the other participants in the building and ruling of states.

It was the intellectuals on whom, in the first instance, devolved the task of contending for their nations' right to exist, even to the extent of promulgating the very idea of the nation. The erosion of the conscience and self-confidence of the colonial powers was in considerable measure the product of agitational movements under intellectual leadership. The impregnation of their fellow-countrymen with some incipient sense of nationality and of national self-esteem was to a large extent the achievement of intellectuals, both secular and religious. The intellectuals have created the political life of the underdeveloped countries; they have been its instigators, its leaders, and its executants. Until Gandhi's emergence at the end of the First World War, they were its main followers as well, but this changed when the nationalist movement began to arouse the sentiments of the mass of the population.

One of the reasons for the political pre-eminence of the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries is a negative one. There was practically no one else. In so many of the colonial countries, the princely dynasties were in decay, their powers and their capacities withered, even before the foreigners appeared. Chiefs and princes squirmed under

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foreign rule; they intrigued and schemed, and at times even resorted to arms, but they organized no political movements and they espoused no ideology. They sought only, when they protested, to retain or regain their own prerogatives. There were no great noble families producing, in generation after generation, courtiers and ministers who with the emergence of modern forms of public politics moved over into that sphere as of right, as they did in Great Britain from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. The traditional intellectuals, the custodians of sacred texts, usually—with a few great exceptions like al-Afghani—had no political concerns. They were interested in keeping their traditional culture alive, and this traditional culture had little political content other than to recommend leaving authority to those who already had it. They were ready to adapt themselves to any ruler, native or foreign, who left them alone to carry on their scriptural studies, their traditional teaching, and their observances.[2]

Moreover, there was generally no military force either to fight against the foreign ruler once he was established or to supply the educated personnel for a modern political movement.[3] There was no military officer class except for a few subalterns in the jealously guarded army of the foreign ruler. There were many professional soldiers, but they were non-commissioned officers and other ranks and had no political interest whatsoever. The movement instigated in 1881 by the Egyptian Colonel Ahmed Orabi Pasha[4] had no counterparts until the tremors and tribulations of independence began to be felt. There was no profession of politics which men entered early, usually from some other profession, and remained in until final and crushing defeat or the end of their lives. There were very few merchants and industrialists who out of civic and "material" interest took a part in politics on a full or part-time scale—although many of them contributed substantially to the financial support of the nationalist and even the revolutionary movements. Prudence and the narrowness of their concerns kept businessmen out of politics. The "foreignness" of many business enterprisers in underdeveloped countries has further diminished the

[2] The religious reform movements like the Brahmo Samaj, Arya Samaj, the Ramakrishna Mission, and the Muslim Brotherhood which contributed so much to national consciousness were primarily movements for the purification of religious life, and for the reform of social institutions. Their political significance was either indirect or an afterthought.

[3] The practitioners of the guerrilla warfare and terrorism which have been carried on in various parts of Asia and Africa against the European rulers have always included a significant admixture of intellectuals.

[4] It was, in any case, more of a protest against unsatisfactory service conditions than a political movement.

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significance of this class as a reservoir of political personnel. There was and there still is scarcely any endogenous trade union movement which produces its own leaders from within the laboring class, and there have been practically none of those self-educated workingmen who helped to give an intellectual tone to the European and American socialist and revolutionary movements in their early years. There was no citizenry, no reservoir of civility, to provide not only the audience and following of politics but the personnel of middle and higher leadership. In short, if politics were to exist at all in underdeveloped countries under colonial rule, they had to be the politics of the intellectuals.

The intellectuals did not, however, enter into the political sphere merely because other sections of the population forswore or abdicated their responsibilities. They entered because they had a special calling from within, a positive impetus from without.

II. The Intellectual Class in Underdeveloped Countries

What Is an Intellectual? We deal here with the modern intellectuals of the new states—not with traditional intellectuals. Whom do we regard as modern intellectuals in the new states? The answer, in a first approximation, is: all persons with an *advanced modern education*[5] and the intellectual concerns and skills ordinarily associated with it. For a variety of reasons, the present definition of the intellectuals is a less selective or discriminating one than we would use to designate the intellectuals in the more advanced countries. This is in no way condescension toward the new states. It is only an acknowledgment of the smaller degree of internal differentiation which has until now prevailed within the educated class in the new states, and the greater disjunction which marks that class off from the other sections of the society. It is also a recognition of a means of identification employed in the new states by the intellectuals themselves and by others.

[5] This definition is ceasing to be adequate because the extension of opportunities for higher education is changing the composition and outlook of the group of persons who have availed themselves of these opportunities. Furthermore, the increase of those with an advanced technical or scientific and specialized education is creating a body of persons whose interests are narrower than their predecessors' in their own countries, and whose contact with the humanistic and political tradition of the hitherto prevailing higher education is becoming more attenuated. They themselves will not merely be different from the conventional political intellectuals of the colonial or recently colonial countries, but will also less frequently identify themselves as "intellectuals." This will make a considerable difference. In this respect, the underdeveloped countries will begin to approximate the more advanced countries.

This definition is not intended to deny the existence of a class of traditional intellectuals, largely religious in their concerns. Nor does it seek to obscure the influence of traditional intellectuals in political life (like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Darul Islam, etc.) or of traditional ideas on modern intellectuals.

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In the new states, and in colonies which are shortly to achieve independence, the intellectuals are those persons who have become modern not by immersing themselves in the ways of modern commerce or administration, but by being exposed to the set course of modern intellectual culture in a college or university. Passage through this course of study is the qualification for being regarded as an intellectual, just as the possession of the diploma is regarded as a qualification for practicing a profession which is the prerogative of the intellectual. The "diplomatization" of society to which Max Weber referred, although it exists on a smaller scale than in Germany or Great Britain because there are fewer posts available, is as impressive in underdeveloped countries as in the advanced ones. It is not, however, the diploma which makes the intellectual. It is his prolonged contact with modern culture[6] which does so. The diploma is only an emblem, however valuable, of a part of his outlook which he and others regard as vitally important. The possession of a *modern intellectual culture* is vital because it carries with it a partial transformation of the self and a changed relationship to the authority of the dead and the living.

The Occupational Structure of the Intellectuals: The professions of the intellectuals in underdeveloped countries are civil service, journalism, law, teaching (particularly college and university, but also secondary-school teaching), and medicine. These are the professions in which intellectuals are to be found and which require either intellectual certification or intellectual skill. (There are other professions with similar qualifications of certification and skill, such as engineering and accounting, which have usually been regarded as marginal to the circle within which the intellectuals dwell.)

The occupational structure which intellectuals enter in the underdeveloped countries is notably different from that of the more advanced countries. The occupational distribution of the intellectuals in underdeveloped countries is a function of the level of economic development and of their having only recently been colonial territories. Because they were impoverished countries, they lacked a fully differentiated middle class. They lacked and still lack a stratum of authors who could live from the sale of their literary products.[7] They have only

[6] This does not mean that all intellectuals in underdeveloped countries who possess diplomas are intellectually equal, or that all intellectuals possess diplomas. There are a few who do not.

[7] By very rough methods I estimated that there might be as many as one hundred professional literary men in India who are able to maintain themselves by their writings. The Director of the *Sahitya Akademi* thinks that there are only about fifty. Think then of the size of this stratum in Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt, or the Sudan!

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a very meager class of technical intellectuals (electrical engineers, technologists, industrial chemists, statisticians, accountants). They have lacked the higher levels of scientific and humanistic personnel, the physicists, biologists, geneticists, historians, and philosophers who carry on the intellectual work which is the specific manifestation of the modern intellectual outlook.[8]

They lacked nearly all of these latter professions under colonial conditions, and most of the underdeveloped countries still lack most of them today under conditions of independence. In the colonial era, they lacked them because poverty and the absence of a significant development of industry prevented the emergence of demand for technical intellectuals, because illiteracy prevented the emergence of a market for literary products, and because the higher levels of modern intellectual creation and enquiry received no indigenous impulse and were too costly for poor countries to maintain. As a result, persons trained in those subjects found little opportunity for employment in their own country, and few therefore attempted to acquire these skills.[9]

Under colonial conditions, the underdeveloped countries lacked the effective demand which permits a modern intellectual class, in its full variety, to come into existence. Persons who acquired intellectual qualifications had only a few markets for their skills. The higher civil service was by all odds the most attractive of these, but opportunities were restricted because it was small in size and the posts were mainly preempted by foreigners. (In India in the last decade of the British Raj, there were only about 1,200 such posts in the Indian Civil Service and, of these, a little less than half were filled by Indians. In other countries, the number of posts was smaller and the proportion held by persons of indigenous origin was also much smaller.)

Journalism, as a result of generally widespread illiteracy, was a stunted growth and provided only a few opportunities, which were not at all remunerative. Journalism under colonial conditions was much more of an unprofitable political mission than a commercially attractive investment, and most of it was on a rather miniscule scale.

The medical profession was kept small by the costliness of the course

[8] India is a very partial exception. It is practically alone in its possession of a large corps of intellectuals, a fair number of whom work at a very high level. This is partly a function of the much longer period that modern intellectual life has existed in India. The British stayed longer in India and exercised greater influence there than any other European power did in its colonial territory, and as a result many more modern intellectual institutions came into being.

[9] There are other important reasons, growing out of the culture of these countries, which precluded interest in these fields. We do not deal with them here since our interest lies primarily in the political sphere.

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of study, the absence of an effective demand for medical services, and the pre-emption of much of the senior level of the medical service by the government and its consequent reservation for foreigners.

Teaching at its lower levels was unattractive to intellectuals because it involved living in villages away from the lights and interests of the larger towns, and because it was extremely unremunerative. Nor were there many opportunities in it. On the secondary and higher levels, opportunities were also meager. Of all the underdeveloped countries, only India had an extensive modern college and university system before 1920; after that date, the additions to the Indian system of higher education came very slowly until the eve of the Second World War and the chaos which accompanied it. Outside of India there were at most only a few thousand posts available in institutions of higher learning in all of colonial Asia and Africa, and some of these were reserved for Europeans (and Americans, in the two American colleges of the Middle East). Thus opportunities for teaching on the upper levels of an extremely lean educational system were few. Where the authorities sought to maintain a high standard, they were very particular about whom they chose to employ. (It should be added that political considerations, at this time of nationalistic, anti-colonialist effervescence, likewise restricted the chances of entry, since many able young men disqualified themselves by the high jinks of adolescent politics during their student days.)

The Legal Profession: For these reasons, many of the intellectually gifted and interested who also had to gain their own livelihood entered the course of legal study and then the practice of the profession of the law. Entry to the legal profession was not restricted on ethnic grounds, the course of study was short and inexpensive and could be easily undertaken. There was, moreover, a considerable effective demand for legal services.

The colonial powers were concerned with order and justice and, in their various ways, had attempted to establish the rule of law in the colonial territories. The wealthy landowning classes and the newer wealthy merchants were frequently engaged in litigations in which huge sums were involved and the possibility for lawyers to earn handsome fees gave an éclat to the legal profession which only the higher civil service otherwise possessed.

Furthermore, in countries like India, Egypt, or Nigeria, for example, what else could a university or college graduate do with his qualifications if he did not wish to settle for a clerkship in the government or in a foreign commercial firm? The law schools were therefore able

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to attract throngs of students. Once the legal qualification had been obtained, the young lawyer went into the nether regions of the bar, where he had much time for other interests. The leisure time of the young lawyer was a fertile field in which much political activity grew.

This existence of a stratum of underemployed young lawyers was made possible by their kinship connections. The aspirants to the intellectual professions in the underdeveloped countries almost always came from the more prosperous sections of society. They were the sons of chiefs, noblemen, and landowners, of ministers and officials of territories in which indirect rule existed, and of civil servants and teachers in countries under direct rule. In some countries, they occasionally came from prosperous mercantile families, though seldom in large numbers.

These social origins, against the background of the diffuse obligations accepted by members of an extended kinship system, meant that even where the income gained from a profession was inadequate to maintain a man and his immediate family, he could still continue to associate himself with the profession. The deficiencies in his earnings were made up by his kinsmen. Unlike teaching, the civil service, and most journalism, where membership in the profession is defined not merely by qualification and intermittent practice but by actual employment, a person need not earn a living by legal practice in order to be a lawyer. This is why the legal profession in nearly all the underdeveloped countries has been, before and since independence, crowded by a few very successful lawyers and a great number of very unsuccessful ones.

These are also some of the reasons why the legal profession supplied so many of the outstanding leaders of the nationalist movements during colonial times, and why the lawyer-intellectuals form such a vital part of the political elites of the new states.

Students: No consideration of the intellectual class in underdeveloped countries can disregard the university students. In advanced countries, students are not regarded as *ex officio* intellectuals; in underdeveloped countries, they are. Students in modern colleges and universities in underdeveloped countries have been treated as part of the intellectual class—or at least were before independence—and they have regarded themselves as such. Perhaps the mere commencement of an adult form of contact with modern intellectual traditions and the anticipation—however insecure—that acquisition of those traditions would qualify one for the *modern* intellectual professions conferred that status on university and college students and, derivatively, on secondary-school students.

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The student enjoyed double favor in the eyes of his fellow-countryman. As one of the tiny minority gaining a modern education, he was becoming qualified for a respected, secure, and well-paid position close to the center of society, as a civil servant, teacher, or lawyer. As a bearer of the spirit of revolt against the foreign ruler, he gained the admiration and confidence of those of his seniors who were imbued with the national idea.

Formally, the student movements in the colonial countries began their careers only in the 1920's, but long before that the secondary schools, colleges, and universities had been a source of personnel for the more ebullient anl aggressive nationalistic movements. Since the beginning of the present century, students have been in a state of turbulence. This turbulence flowed more and more into politics, until the students became vital foci of the national independence movements. The secondary schools, colleges, and universities attended by the students of underdeveloped countries became academies of national revolution. It was not the intention of the administrators and teachers that they should become such; rather, the contrary. Nonetheless they did, both in their own countries and in the metropolitan centers of London and Paris, where many of the most important architects of independence were trained, and where they found the intellectual resonance and moral support which sustained them in lean years.

The London School of Economics in particular has probably contributed much more to the excitation of nationalistic sentiment than any other educational institution in the world. At the School of Economics, the late Professor Harold Laski did more than any other single individual to hearten the colonial students and to make them feel that the great weight of liberal Western learning supported their political enthusiasm.

However, it was not only in the universities of London and Paris, but in shabby clubs and cafés, cheap hotels and restaurants, dingy rooming houses and the tiny cluttered offices of their nationalist organizations that the colonial students were educated in nationalism, acquired some degree of national consciousness, and came to feel how retrograde their own countries were and what they might be if only they became their own masters and modernized themselves. Personalities like Mr. Krishna Menon, Dr. Nkrumah, and Dr. Banda were themselves formed in these milieux, and in turn formed many of those who were to play an active part in the movement in their own countries

The political propensities of the students have been, in part, products of adolescent rebelliousness. This has been especially pronounced

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in those who were brought up in a traditionally oppressive environment and were indulged with a spell of freedom from that environment—above all, freedom from the control of their elders and kinsmen. Once, however, the new tradition of rebellion was established among students, it became self-reproducing. Moreover, the vocational prospectlessness of their post-university situation has also stirred the restiveness of the students.

The Unemployed Intellectual: In most underdeveloped countries during the colonial period, the unemployed intellectual was always a worry to the foreign rulers and to constitutional politicians, and a grievance of the leaders of the independence movement. He still remains a problem in the underdeveloped countries which have had a higher educational system for some length of time and which are not rapidly expanding their governmental staffs. In Ghana or Nigeria, there is a shortage of intellectuals and all graduates can find posts; in Pakistan, which inherited only a very small part of the higher educational system of British India, the government has tried to restrict entrance to the universities, especially in "arts" subjects. In India and Egypt, however, despite rapid expansion of opportunities for the employment of intellectuals in government, there has been a more than proportionate expansion in the number of university graduates and the problem remains as acute as ever.

Yet the difficulty is not so much "intellectual unemployment" as under- and mal-employment. Most of the graduates, sooner or later, do find posts of one sort or another, but they are not posts which conform with expectations. They are ill-paid, unsatisfying in status and tenure, and leave their incumbents in the state of restlessness which they experienced as students.

III. The Political Outlook of the Intellectuals

Intense Politicization: The nature of the political movements which preceded independence and the indigenous traditions of the underdeveloped countries both forced political life into charismatic channels. Charismatic politics demand the utmost from their devotees.

When the intellectuals of the colonial countries were ready to engage in politics at all, they were willing to give everything to them. Politics became the be-all and end-all of their existence. Those who were not restrained by fear of the loss of their posts in government schools and colleges or by the material and psychological advantages of their jobs became highly politicized. Some of the intellectuals who graduated in the years of nationalistic fervor did not even attempt seriously to

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enter upon a professional career but went directly into agitational and conspiratorial politics. Their middle-class origins and the economy of the extended family system, together with the relatively few needs of charismatically sensitive intellectuals, helped to make possible this consecration to politics. For these reasons and because an autonomous intellectual life in the modern sense had scarcely taken root in any of the underdeveloped colonial countries, politics of a very intense sort had the intellectual field largely to itself.

The high degree of political involvement of the intellectual in underdeveloped countries is a complex phenomenon. It has a threefold root. The primary source is a deep preoccupation with authority. Even though he seeks and seems actually to break away from the authority of the powerful traditions in which he was brought up, the intellectual of underdeveloped countries, still more than his confrere in more advanced countries, retains the need for incorporation into some self-transcending, authoritative entity. Indeed, the greater his struggle for emancipation from the traditional collectivity, the greater his need for incorporation into a new, alternative collectivity. Intense politicization meets this need. The second source of political involvement is the scarcity of opportunities to acquire an even temporary sense of vocational achievement; there have been few counterattractions to the appeal of charismatic politics. Finally, there has been a deficient tradition of civility in the underdeveloped countries which affects the intellectuals as much as it does the non-intellectuals. Let us consider each of these aspects.

The intellectual everywhere is concerned with his relations to authority. In underdeveloped countries, where authorities have tended on the whole to be more unitary, and where alternative authorities, and the authority of alternative traditions, have not yet emerged because of the small size of the primordial community and its relatively low degree of internal differentiation, the preoccupation of the intellectual with authority is all the greater. It is difficult for him to escape from a sense of its presence and a feeling of dependence on it. Such continuous presence, and the unindulgent attitude of traditional indigenous authority, once childhood has passed, breed resentment and antipathy which are submerged but not dissolved in the obedience required for the continuance of daily existence in the primordial community.

The external air of submission hides a deeper and unceasing enmity. Distant authority which has force at its disposal, which is impersonal, as bureaucratic authority must be, and which is not suffused with any

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immediately apprehensible charisma, provides an easy target for this enmity.

When one shares in authority, when one "is" authority, as a leading politician of the ruling party or as a civil servant, the antagonism toward authority is curbed by the counterbalancing need to be absorbed into it. For an intellectual in an underdeveloped country, authority is usually something into which he must be absorbed or against which he must be in opposition. It is seldom something about which he can be neutral while he goes about his business. The very structure of the underdeveloped countries, both in their primordial and in their wider aspects, both during the colonial period and during independence, is such that one can never be indifferent about authority. It cannot be overlooked, one's "business" cannot be carried on without regard to it.

Distant authority carries with it none of the compensations and urgencies of immediately present and permeative authority. Distance does not make for indifference among the politicized, among those whose passions are strong and no longer bound down by the weight of primordiality and tradition. The distance of authority renders revolt against it psychologically more practicable. Distant authority is "alien" authority. Even when it is ethnically "identical" with those over whom it rules, this "alienation" exists in those societies which are used to being ruled by visible and proximate authorities. (When distant authority is also ethnically alien, whether it be of the same general racial and cultural stock or as alien in color, cultural tradition, provenience, and physical appearance as the colonial authorities were, the impulse to revolt is all the stronger.)

The revolt against authority cannot, however, be complete and unequivocal. The need, from which no human being can ever wholly liberate himself, to be a member of an authoritative, transcendent collectivity remains. The individual, striving to emancipate himself from his primordial collectivity, must feel himself a part of some other more congenial, alternative collectivity. It must, moreover, be an authoritative one, a charismatically authoritative one. Where, in an underdeveloped society, with its relative churchlessness, its still feeble professional and civil traditions, and in the face of persisting particularistic loyalties, both subjective and objective, can the modern intellectual find such an authoritative collectivity? It is really only the "nation" which is at hand, and that organized body which represents the "nation"—namely, the "party of national independence."

This is one reason why the intellectual immerses himself, at least for a time, in intense political activities; it is why he seeks a "cause,"

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an encompassing ideal. It is also the reason for the oppositional character of the politics of the intellectuals who themselves do not share in the authority. The belief in the efficacy of political action and in the political sources of evil and the remedies of evil also finds some of its explanation here. This is why the relatively unpolitical intellectual, or the intellectual who is indirectly connected with political affairs, the more specialized intellectual who wishes to work within his own professional intellectual tradition and to exercise his influence in the public sphere over the longer run and beyond the immediate disputes of the parties, is regarded as not being a "genuine intellectual" and even as a traitor to the ideals which the intellectual is properly called to serve.

The intense politicization of the intellectual is accentuated by the provision, through politics, of opportunities for individual effectiveness and achievement. In a society where status is traditionally determined by such primordial qualities as kinship connection, age, sex, and rank order within the family, the possibility of achievement, of making a mark on events by one's own actions, is minimal. In the larger society of the underdeveloped countries, although the narrower primordial determinants of status are to some extent transcended, the possibilities of achievement remain small. The opportunities for the satisfactory employment of an educated person under conditions of colonial rule were meager as long as the most authoritative positions in the civil service and in commerce were reserved to foreigners. They remain small under conditions of sovereignty as long as the economy is backward and posts integral to the modern part of the economy are relatively few, and as long as opportunities for specifically intellectual employment or the sale of the products of creative intellectual work are restricted.

The educated person acquires some degree of emancipation from the predominantly primordial tradition of status-determination. The content of this modern education, and its dissolution of the hold of traditional cultural standards and the traditional patterns of life, arouse in him the need to determine his status and his self-esteem by his own achievements. Where can such a person make his mark in a society which gives him little room to do so?

The political movement with its demands and challenges is almost the only arena open to him. A political movement, unlike a business firm or a university or a government department, can absorb as many people as apply to it. It can give him tasks to perform and it can thereby offer him the possibility of seeing the effects of his actions. By shooting,

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demonstrating, marching, agitating, threatening and bullying, fighting, destroying, obstructing, helping to organize, running errands, distributing handbills and canvassing, he can see some effects and can believe in the importance of his deeds in thwarting or coercing a distant impersonal bureaucratic authority, or in serving the will of the new charismatic authority to which he gives himself.

Especially during the period of late adolescence and youth, when the impulses of self-assertion and the striving for individuality and creativity are at their height, and before the traditional system of status has reasserted its empire over him, politics seem to be the only field in which he can act with some expectation of satisfying effectiveness.

Once independence has been attained, the need for effectiveness and achievement does not die away. Politics remain a major alternative to apathetic idiocy or regression into the acceptance of the traditional pattern of life. Politics will in fact remain a major alternative open to the intellectuals for achievement and for absorption into a wider, no longer primordial collectivity as long as the underdeveloped societies remain underdeveloped. Only when they have become more differentiated occupationally, and when they have developed a sufficiently large and self-esteeming corps of professional intellectuals, carrying on the specifically intellectual professions with their own corporate traditions and corporate forms of organization, will the passionate sentiment and energy flow into channels other than the political.

Nationalism: The nationalism of the intellectuals usually made its first appearance alone, free from the complications of socialist and populist ideas. Only in those underdeveloped countries where the nationalist movement has come more lately on the scene has it been involved in other ideological currents which are not necessarily integral to it.

The nationalism of the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries emerged at a time when there was little sense of nationality among the peoples whose nationality the intellectuals were proclaiming. Its first impetus seems to have come from a deepening of the feeling of distance between ruler and ruled, arising from the spatial and ethnic remoteness of the foreign rulers, and the dissolution of the particularistic tie which holds ethnically homogeneous rulers and ruled together. The identification of oneself as a subject of an unloved (however feared and respected) ruler with others who shared that subjection was one phase of the process. The discovery of the glories of the past, of cultural traditions, was usually but not always an action, *ex post facto*, which

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legitimated the claims asserted on behalf of that newly imagined collectivity.[10]

The assimilation of modern culture, which, historically, was a foreign culture, was an essential element in this process. The first generation of constitutional politicians in most underdeveloped countries were relatively highly "Westernized." The usual antagonism toward the older generation made the next, younger generation more antagonistic toward Western culture, and encouraged their rudimentary attachment to the indigenous traditional culture to come forward a little more in their minds. This provided a matrix for the idea of a deeper national culture and, therewith, of the nation which had only to be aroused to self-awareness. It was neither a simple attachment to their indigenous culture nor a concretely experienced love of their fellow-countrymen which made the intellectuals so fervently nationalistic. These would have presupposed a prior sense of affinity, which for many reasons was lacking and often still is. In fact, however, "fellow-countrymen" became so to the modern intellectuals primarily by virtue of their common differentiation from the foreign ruler. Fierce resentment against the powerful, fear-inspiring foreign ruler was probably a much more significant factor than either a sense of affinity or a conscious appreciation of the traditional culture.

The resentment of the modern intellectual grew from several seeds: one of the most important was the derogation implied in the barrier against entry into or advancement in the civil service. The other, closely related to this, was the feeling of injury from insults, experienced or heard about, explicit or implicit, which the foreign rulers and their businessmen fellow-nationals inflicted on the indigenous modern intellectuals. Lord Curzon's derogatory remarks about the educated Bengali in his famous Calcutta University Convocation Address were only among the more egregious of an infinite multitude of such slights, injuries, and denigrations. The belittlement extended into every sphere of life, cultural, intellectual, religious, economic, political, and personal. A sense of distress and of anticipated insult became part of the indigenous intellectuals' relationship with foreigners for a long time. Even now in independence, the alertness to insult and the readiness to perceive it persist. They were at their height in the early period of nationalism.

The situation was rendered all the more insufferable by the genuine

[10] The stirrings of religious reform and the effort to rehabilitate the dignity of the traditional religious culture became political only when there was an alliance of religious leaders with a politicized modern intelligentsia.

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and positive appreciation which the native intellectuals often felt for the foreign culture, and their feeling of the inferiority of their own in comparison with it. Nationalism of an extremely assertive sort was an effort to find self-respect, and to overcome the inferiority of the self in the face of the superiority of the culture and power of the foreign metropolis.

It was therefore logical that prior to independence the politics of the intellectuals, once the movement for constitutional reform had waned, should have been concerned with one end above all others: national independence. It was generally assumed by most politicized intellectuals that any other desiderata would be automatically realized with the attainment of that condition. The actual attainment of independence and of a condition in which the tasks of political life have become as demanding and as diversified as they must inevitably become in a polity where the state takes unto itself so many powers and aspires to so much, has not greatly altered the situation. Nationalism still remains one of the greatest of all motive forces;[11] it underlies many policies to which it is not really germane and serves as a touchstone of nearly every action and policy.

The socialistic and the populistic elements in the politics of the intellectuals of underdeveloped countries are secondary to and derivative from their nationalistic preoccupations and aspirations. Economic policies have their legitimation in their capacity to raise the country on the scale of the nations of the world. The populace is transfigured in order to demonstrate the uniqueness of its "collective personality." The ancient culture is exhumed and renewed in order to demonstrate, especially to those who once denied it, the high value of the nation. Foreign policy is primarily a policy of "public relations" designed not, as in the advanced countries, to sustain the security of the state or enhance its power among other states, but to improve the reputation of the nation, to make others heed its voice, to make them pay attention to it and to respect it. The "world," the "imperialist world," remains very much on the minds of the intellectuals of the new states. It remains the audience and the jury of the accomplishments of the nation which the intellectuals have done so much to create.

Nonetheless, despite the pre-eminence of the nationalistic sensibility, it does not rest upon a *tabula rasa*, cleared of all other attachments. The intellectuals of underdeveloped countries are not as "uprooted," as

[11] Although it is by no means the chief reason, this nationalistic concentration is a significant factor in accounting for the poverty and uniformity of intellectual life of the underdeveloped countries.

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"detribalized," as they themselves sometimes assert with so much melancholy, or as, with more spite, their foreign and domestic detractors often allege. They have remained attached in many ways to their traditional patterns of social life and culture. These deeper attachments include parochial attachments to their own tribes and ethnic and caste communities, and almost inevitably seek expression in public policies and in domestic political alignments. The presence of these attachments is a supplementary generator of nationalistic sentiment. It is against them, and in an effort to overcome them—within themselves and in their fellow-countrymen—that many intellectuals in underdeveloped countries commit themselves so fervently to intense nationalism.

By a similar process, the extensive use of a foreign language in daily intellectual life also feeds the force of nationalism. The intellectuals' very large amount of reading in French and English and their feeling of continued dependence on these cultures, their continuing and still necessary employment of French or English for their own cultural creations and even for political, administrative, and judicial purposes, and their awareness of the slow and painful course through which their nation must pass before its own language becomes adequate to the requirements of modern life cannot avoid touching their sensibilities. The constant reaffirmation of their nationalistic attachment is an effort to assuage this wound.

Socialism: The socialism of the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries grows, fundamentally, from their feeling for charismatic authority, from their common humanity, and from the anti-chrematistic traditions of their indigenous culture. More immediately, it is a product of the conditions and substance of their education, and of their nationalistic sensibility.

The intellectuals of underdeveloped countries are, in general, devotees of authority, even though they may be inflamed against some particular authority. They regard the existing distribution of authority as the source of present economic and social inequities and they seek a new distribution of authority as the instrument to abolish them. Their critical view of the state as it exists at present in their own country is partly a manifestation of their distrust of impersonal authority and of their faith in a more charismatic alternative.[12] They do not believe in the capacities of businessmen to increase the well-being of the nation. They have little sympathy, conscious or unconscious, with the man who is engaged in the pursuit of wealth.

None of the great traditional cultures gives a high rank to the

[12] *Vide* the Gandhian socialists and the Bhoodan movement in India.

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merchant; even when they revolt against the traditional culture, or slip away from it unwittingly, the intellectuals usually retain that part of it which allots no high place to the businessman. In their mind, the life of the businessman is unheroic; it is untouched by sacredness and they will have none of it. Intellectuals very seldom seek careers in private business; when necessity forces them into it, they are ill at ease and restless. The intellectual who works for a private business firm lays himself open to the charge of having deserted his calling, even though he has deserted it no more than a civil servant or a lawyer. The notion of an economic system ruled by the decisions of businessmen, out to make a profit for themselves, is repugnant to the intellectuals of underdeveloped countries—even more than it is in advanced countries, where the businessman does not fare very well either at the hands of the intellectuals.

As long as the intellectuals of underdeveloped countries pursued the paths of constitutional reform and confined their attention to administration and representation, these deeper dispositions whose source was the traditional indigenous culture did not enter into their politics. They accepted most of the existing regime. When, however, they began to direct their attention to the society and the nation, when they ceased being politically "superficial" and began to touch on politically "sacred" things, the socialist potentiality of their fundamental orientation became more manifest.

These inner developments within the intelligentsia of underdeveloped countries coincided with the upsurge of socialist thought among the European intellectuals. To these, the intelligentsia of the underdeveloped countries felt drawn. The attractive power of the metropolis was enhanced by the congeniality of intellectual socialism. From the 1920's to the 1940's, the example of the late Professor Harold Laski elicited and fortified the socialistic disposition of many young intellectuals of the English-speaking underdeveloped countries; Jean-Paul Sartre has played a parallel role among the French-speaking intellectuals from 1945 onward.

The spread of socialistic ideas was aided by the large-scale migration of Asian and African intellectuals to Europe for further study and professional training. The great stream of Asians to European educational centers began in the 1890's; their intensive politicization, in the 1920's. The stream of the African students began in the 1920's and became much wider after 1945. From the end of the First World War and the Russian Revolution, the young Asians and Africans, impelled by events in the world and at home, found themselves in an atmosphere

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which gave the encouragement of a nearly universal assent to their socialist aspirations.

The association between socialism as a domestic policy and hostility toward an imperialistic foreign policy—a connection which is inherent in the postulates of socialist thought and its Leninist variant, although not all socialists have at all times shared it—made European, and especially British and French, socialism even more acceptable to the Asian and African students who came to the intellectual capitals of the European metropolis.

To these factors which made socialism appear such a bright ideal should be joined the nature of large-scale business enterprise in their own countries. In practically all instances, large-scale business enterprise in the underdeveloped countries was owned and controlled by foreign capitalists. Not just the Europeans, and latterly the Americans, owned large firms in Africa and Asia, but Chinese, Syrians, Lebanese, Parsees, Armenians, Greeks, and Italians, away from their own countries, showed exceptional enterprise. Encountering few indigenous competitors, they built up extensive organizations and ample fortunes in underdeveloped countries. The ethnic diversity and separateness of the peoples, even within large, centrally governed countries, often brought about a situation in which private businessmen who were of the same "nationality" as those in the midst of whom they lived and conducted their affairs, but who were of a different "community," were regarded as outsiders who had no moral claims on the loyalty of the intellectuals. Businessmen, by the nature of their calling, could never be part of the "people"; their ethnic distinctness was a further justification for treating them as alien to the "people."

On the other side, a socialistic economic system conducted in accordance with principles which are of intellectual origin, guided by persons who are imbued with these "principles," seems to be the only conceivable alternative to a privately operated economy. The intellectuals who dare to differ from such obvious conclusions constitute a small fraction of the intellectual classes in most of the underdeveloped countries, both colonial and sovereign.

The socialism of the intellectuals of underdeveloped countries, it should also be stressed, is a product of their pained awareness of the poverty of their own countries. The heightening of national sensibility led perforce to the discovery of the "people." Agitational activities brought them into contact with the "people"; the vague doctrine of nationalism, even in its liberal form, brought the idea of the "people" into the consciousness of the intellectuals. Often, too, on return from

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a period of foreign study where they had encountered socialist ideas and experienced a heightened national consciousness, the sight of their impoverished fellow-countrymen had a traumatic force. Confrontation with the poverty of their country evoked anguish and desperation in many intellectuals. They have been humiliated by their sense of the backwardness of their country. They have learned how gradually the advancement of the Western countries has moved, and they have heard of the speedy progress of the Soviet Union from a backward country to the status of one of the most powerful industrial nations in the world. What could be more harmonious with their present perceptions, their aspirations, and their background than to espouse a socialist solution to their unhappy problem? And if to this is added the fact that their countries have been held in subjection by capitalistic countries and the socialist countries proclaim their hostility to imperialism, the disposition toward socialism receives another impulsion.

Populism: The populism of intellectual politics in underdeveloped countries has a familial affinity to the populism of the intellectuals of more advanced countries during the past century and a half. It is a part of a universal process consequent on the emergence of an incipient and fragmentary world-wide intellectual community. It is a phenomenon of the tension between metropolis and province which arises from the trend toward that world-wide intellectual community.

The populism of the intellectuals is German in origin. It was a critique of the pretensions of a worldly, urban, and urbane authority. It was a critique of the feebleness of the petty elites of the system of *Kleinstaaterei*, alongside the grandeur of the Holy Roman Empire, and of the Germany which could emerge if the regime of the princelings could be abolished and all of Germany unified. It was a critique of the central institutional system, and particularly of the claims of the state, of the universities, and of the ecclesiastical authorities to embody what was essential in their society and of their insistence, on that basis, on their right to rule over it. It was a rejection of the urban bourgeoisie. It was a denial that the "nation" could be found in existing authoritative institutions and an assertion that the root of the future lay in the "folk."

In Russia, populism was a product of a similar situation, aggravated by resentment against a prevailing enchantment by the West, which was more pronounced than the Francophilia of the princely courts against which the first generations of romantic German populism had been a reaction. In Russia, the intellectuals had carried on a passionate love affair with Western Europe and many had been disappointed and

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had even come to feel guilty for deserting their "own" for foreign idols. Alienated from their own authorities of state, church, and university, hostile to their own mercantile bourgeoisie, disillusioned with Western European socialism after its failures in the revolutions of 1848, it had nowhere to turn except to the "people," whom it glorified as a repository of wisdom and as the source of Russia's salvation.

American populism was not very different in its general origins. It, too, was the product of a reaction against the Anglophile intellectual elite of the Eastern seaboard and the political and industrial elites who ruled the country from the Eastern cities. In America, too, therefore, it was an effort to find a firm foundation for intellectuals who were alienated from the authorities of their society and from their xenophilic fellow-intellectuals. In America also it was a phase of the struggle of province against metropolis.

In the underdeveloped countries, the process has been essentially the same. Alienated from the indigenous authorities of their own traditional society—chiefs, sultans, princes, landlords, and priests—and from the rulers of their modern society—the foreign rulers and the "Westernized" constitutional politicians (and since independence, politicians of the governing party)—the intellectuals have had only the "people," the "African personality," the "Indian peasant," etc., as supports in the search for the salvation of their own souls and their own society.

The "people" are a model and a standard; contact with them is a good. Esteem and disesteem are meted out on the basis of "closeness to the people" or distance from them. It is a common worry of and an accusation against the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries that they are "out of touch with the people," uprooted, *déraciné*, "brown" or "black" (as the case may be) "Englishmen" or "Frenchmen," etc. Many make the accusation against themselves, most make it against their fellow-intellectuals.

Factually it is usually quite untruthful. Most intellectuals in underdeveloped countries are not as "cut off" from their own culture as they and their detractors suggest. They live in the middle of it, their wives and mothers are its constant representatives in their midst, they retain close contact with their families, which are normally steeped in traditional beliefs and practices. The possession of a modern intellectual culture does remove them, to some extent, from the culture of their ancestors, but much of the latter remains and lives on in them.[13]

[13] Much of the intellectuals' self-accusation rests on the populistic assumption that the "people," not being distracted or corrupted by modern culture, are the bearers of the traditional culture in its fullness and its glory. This assumption is probably an er-

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The experience to which the allegation of being "cut off" from the "people" refers is not to any serious extent a real result of the intellectuals' acceptance of the "foreign," modern culture. It rests rather on their own feeling of distance from the rest of their fellow-nationals, which is a product of the ethnic, tribal, kinship, and caste particularism of these underdeveloped societies and of the consequent lack of a true sense of civil affinity with the rest of their fellow-countrymen. It is the resultant of the superimposition of a nationalistic ideology, which demands fellow-feeling, on a narrower particularism, inharmonious with it and psychologically contradictory to it. There is a genuine feeling of strain; all the burden of this strain is put upon the fact that they possess some elements of an exogenous culture.

The frequent reiteration of the charge testifies to an awareness of this tension, and the choice of the foreign culture as its focus is a manifestation of a desire to find a way out which will conform to the requirements of ideological nationalism. Because the intellectuals assert it and, to some extent, believe it, they often try to make amends for it by some form of nativism, which extols the traditional ways of the people and juxtaposes them with modern and thus "foreign" ways.

This nativistic reaction accentuates demagogic political tendencies, and fosters a race among contenders for the distinction of being more "for" the "people" or more "akin" to them. It accentuates prejudice against the educated and a hostility against the modern education which the intellectuals of the new states need if they are to perform intellectual functions in a productive way, and without which they would not be intellectuals and their countries would flounder and sink.

Nonetheless, despite this preoccupation with the "people," the populism of the intellectuals of underdeveloped countries does not necessarily bring with it either intimacy with the ordinary people, a concrete attachment to them, or even a democratic attitude. It is compatible with them but it does not require them. It is equally compatible with a dictatorial regime which treats the people as instruments to be employed in the transformation of the social and economic order, and their culture and outlook as a hindrance to progress.

Populism can be the legitimating principle of oligarchical regimes, as well as of democratic regimes and of all the intermediate types. The "people" constitute the prospective good to be served by government policy, and they serve as the emblem of the traditional culture which

ror; the "people" are quite unlikely to be in more than fragmentary possession of the corpus of traditional culture.

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is thus glorified even while it is being eroded and its traditional custodians disregarded or disparaged.

Oppositionalism: The populism of the intellectual is a product of opposition to the authorities who rule at home and to the foreign culture which fascinates him and his fellow-intellectuals in his own country. It is one facet of an oppositional syndrome.

The origins of this inclination to oppose constituted authority seem, at first glance, easy to locate. Practically all politics in the colonial period, once the constitutional phase had passed, consisted and still consist of root and branch opposition. Whether they took the form of conspiracy, sabotage, riots, assassination, clandestine or open journalism, public meetings, boycotts, demonstrations and processions, civil disobedience or unco-operative participation in representative institutions, opposition and obstruction of the foreign ruler were the main aims. Where it was impossible to share in the responsible exercise of authority, opposition was in fact the only alternative.

The degree of alienation from the constituted authority varied but it was almost always deeper and more drastic than the opposition which exists in advanced pluralistic societies.[14] It was the opposition of politicians excluded or withdrawn from the constitutional order, who accepted neither the rules nor the ends of the prevailing system. It was, therefore, the opposition of politicians who refused in principle to consider the problems of the government as real tasks needing resolution. It was an opposition which was convinced by situation, temperament, and principle that it would never share authority with the foreign ruler. The only authority to which it aspired was complete and exclusive control of the entire machinery of state. Until that point was reached, its only policy was opposition.

The oppositional attitude of the intellectuals has another point of origin far removed from the political experience of a colonial situation. In most underdeveloped countries the traditional character of the culture sustains diffuseness in the exercise of authority. Diffuse authority, omnicompetent in the tasks facing the society, at least according to legendary beliefs, derives its legitimacy in part from its comprehensive effectiveness. Even though the substantive actions performed by such diffuse traditional authorities are no longer respected by intellectuals, the older pattern of expectation persists. Specific, delimited, im-

[14] Its only parallel in the West is the conduct of the Irish members in the House of Commons in the latter part of the last century and of Communistic members of European parliaments when they were a small minority and did not seek a popular front. The "Irish members" had considerable resonance in India and their influence still survives, even where its origin has been forgotten.

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personal, constitutional authority gives the appearance of being a weak authority, an unloving one which possesses no inner relationship with the ruled. The diffuseness of a charismatic authority is desired, and the bureaucratic rule of the foreign power or of its sovereign indigenous successor arouses little enthusiasm or even willing acknowledgment of any deeper legitimacy. The intellectuals of underdeveloped countries, despite their immersion in modern culture and their overt acceptance of modern political principles, are at bottom averse to a relatively weak, self-limiting government, even when that government is their own, bound to them by common ethnic ties, a common culture, and comradeship in the struggle for independence.

This is one of the underlying grounds for the widespread disillusionment which overcomes so many intellectuals in underdeveloped countries after independence. It must be remembered that, whatever has happened since, practically every new state of the postwar world began as a modern constitutional regime of representative institutions and public liberties. They have all had to employ modern bureaucratic methods of administration, even when they lacked the requisite personnel. They have tried to operate the rule of law. They all began as remote impersonal machines, exercising authority without the diffuseness of charisma or tradition. Their equilibrium has depended on a great charismatic personality who, at the peak of the governmental mountain, offset the distaste for bureaucratic-legal rule.

Thus, the establishment of a tradition of opposition in political life has, as has happened so often in almost every sphere of life in underdeveloped countries, coincided with a fundamental disposition resting on an indigenous cultural tradition.

It would be wrong perhaps to claim a universal validity for a generalization which could be drawn from Max Weber's criticism of Bismarck and the paralyzing influence which his autocracy in the Reichstag exerted on the opposition parties of that body. It was Max Weber's view that the irresponsible opposition which the Bismarckian regime and its Wilhelmine successor evoked would make the opposition parties incapable of responsible, efficient rule when they were given the opportunity to govern. He also asserted—and this is more important for our present discussion—that they would become incapable of conducting themselves as a responsible opposition, working within the rules of the parliamentary game. In certain of the underdeveloped countries, this generalization does not seem to be applicable. In India, for example, certain of the intellectual politicians, and above all the Prime Minister, have shown great adaptability in turning from a condition of complete

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and irreconcilable opposition to a responsible hard-headed exercise of authority, and some of the socialists and independents conduct their opposition in a most intelligent and responsible manner. The same obtains in varying degrees in Ghana and in Tunisia. Certain intellectual politicians have shown considerable capacity to rule, even though they have not been as democratic or liberal as they once aspired to be or as Mr. Nehru has succeeded in being. Not a few firebrands of the days of the independence movement have turned out to be responsible parliamentarians of the highest order.

Nonetheless, much truth remains in Max Weber's proposition. The intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries since they acquired independence, insofar as they are not in authority, do incline toward an anti-political, oppositional attitude. They are disgruntled. The form of the constitution does not please them and they are reluctant to play the constitutional game. Many of them desire to obstruct the government or give up the game of politics altogether, retiring into a negative state of mind about all institutional politics or at least about any political regime which does not promise a "clean sweep" of the inherited order.

Incivility: Although the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries have created the idea of the nation within their own countries, they have not been able to create a nation. They are themselves the victim of that condition, since nationalism does not necessarily become citizenship. Membership in a nation which is sovereign entails a sense of affinity with the other human beings who make up the nation. It entails a sense of "partness" in a whole, a sense of sharing a common substance. This feeling of being part of the whole is the basis of a sense of concern for its well-being, and a sense of responsibility to it and for it. It transcends ineluctable divisions, softening them and rendering them tolerable to civil order, regarding them as less significant than the underlying community of those who form the nation. In political life, these dispositions form the virtue of civility.

Civility has hitherto not been one of the major features of the politicized intelligentsia of the underdeveloped countries. An intense politicization is difficult to bring into harmony with civility. Intense politicization is accompanied by the conviction that only those who share one's principles and positions are wholly legitimate members of the polity and that those who do not share them are separated by a steep barrier. The governing party in many sovereign underdeveloped states, and those intellectuals who make it up or are associated with it, tend to believe that those who are in opposition are separated from them by

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fundamental and irreconcilable differences. They feel that they *are* the state and the nation, and that those who do not go along with them are not just political rivals but *total* enemies. The sentiments of the opposition are, *mutatis mutandis*, scarcely different. These are the fruits of intense politicization.

The incivility of the politicized intellectuals has a history which precedes their birth. Traditional societies, based on kinship and hierarchy, are not civil societies. They do not know the phenomenon of citizenship, since rights and obligations are not functions of membership in a polity determined by territorial boundaries. The primordial qualities of traditional societies—kinship, age, sex, locality, etc.—are not qualities which define the citizen. In a pluralistic society they are not by any means incompatible with citizenship. In the more unitary, traditional society, they suffocate incipient civility.

The moral structure of the independence movement has enabled this uncivil tradition to persist. The independence movement conceived of itself as the embodiment of the nation, and after its victory it became and conceived of itself as identical with the state. Given the oppositional dispositions which come to the surface in parliamentary and journalistic circles not attached to the government party, there often appears to be a semblance of justification for the belief of an impatient and hypersensitive government that the opposition is subversive of the state and cannot be reconciled to it.

This does not imply that there are not civil intellectuals in every underdeveloped country, some of them in the government, some of them in opposition, and some in journalism, the universities, and the other liberal professions. They are, however, in a marked minority. The traditions by which they are sustained, although they do exist in some of the states, are frail.

IV. Three Stages in the Politics of the Intellectuals in Underdeveloped Countries

The First Stage—(a) *Constitutional liberalism*: The first efflorescence of the modern intellectual in the underdeveloped countries occurred roughly between the years when India was recovering from the trauma of the Mutiny and its repression and the First World War. In the few countries where there was anything of a class with a modern education and a certain amount of political stirring, these were the years of constitutional liberalism, eloquently and courteously argued. This first stage came considerably later to Black Africa and lasted a shorter time than

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it did in British India and the Middle East. In Southeast Asia, too, the course of development was greatly telescoped. The backwardness of Southeast Asia and Black Africa in the construction of modern cultural and legal institutions, and the smaller numbers of persons who went abroad for higher studies, resulted in a much smaller intellectual class than in India, and a later, briefer, and feebler life of constitutional liberalism. Where the intellectual class scarcely existed, politics could only be embryonic.

This was the stage of the politics of lawyers and journalists. Their politics were the politics of *honoratiores*. They were well-educated men, many of whom had studied in the metropolitan countries; they had absorbed and appreciated something of the metropolitan culture and the liberal constitutional political outlook, which, in the circles in which they moved in the France and Great Britain of that period, appeared to be almost unchallenged.

They were not revolutionaries and they did not always aspire to independence, at least, not in the immediate future. One of their main grievances in this earliest phase was the restriction of the right of entry of their fellow-countrymen into the civil service which ruled their country on behalf of the foreign sovereign. They also desired that legislative institutions should be a little more representative of persons like themselves. These two concerns could be interpreted crudely as a manifestation of a narrow class interest, but they were actually broader and better than that.[15] There were serious grounds, in their own self-image, for their claim to share in the administration of the country and for a vote in the determination of the budget.

They had been brought up in a hierarchical tradition in which the landowning classes and the learned, in their own view and that of others, were the possessors of a "stake in the country." Insofar as it was a country, they felt it to be "theirs," and "theirs" almost exclusively. Many came from families which had in the past exercised great influence and which, in the countryside, still continued to do so. It was therefore part of their conception of the right order of things that they

[15] Nor were these their only interests. They proposed the liberalization of the legal system, greater equity in its administration, and certain liberal social reforms such as the improvement of the legal position of women, the provision of more ample educational facilities, etc.

Obviously, there was some element of "class" and "self-interest" in some of their demands, such as the insistence that imported foreign manufacturers should not be allowed to enjoy any advantages over indigenously produced industrial goods. The interest of the whole society, the interest of a class and of an individual might all coincide on particular issues. This is probably the most that can be credited to the charge against the first generation made by the actors who came on the political stage a little later.

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should share in the ruling of their own country, under a sovereign whom they were not in the main inclined to challenge in principle.

The liberal constitutional ideas which they acquired in the course of their mainly legal studies fitted in with their conceptions. Europe was boiling with democratic agitation—the labor and socialist movements were in process of formation. In the main, however, the very small trickle of Africans and the larger numbers of Asians who before the First World War went to the metropolis for advanced studies did not, on the whole, come into contact with these circles. They wanted a liberal governmental and legal order in the administration of which they could share.

Since they were largely lawyers, they developed the rhetorical skills and the self-confidence in dealing with authority which are an indispensable part of the equipment of the modern politician.[16] The structure of legal practice also gave them the time and the resources to absent themselves from their professional activities. As the occasion demanded, they were able, while still continuing to practice their professions, to devote themselves to public agitation, to attend and address meetings, to write books, pamphlets, and articles for the press, to meet representatives of their rulers from time to time in order to argue their claims, and to participate in consultative and representative bodies.

Side by side with this form of lawyers' politics, a daily and periodical press struggled to come into existence, largely in the metropolitan language but also in the indigenous languages. The journalists were not professionals. They were often political lawyers who had either left their profession or practiced it alongside of journalism; there were also among them men who had been teachers, or who had aspired to join the government service, or had actually been in governmental employ. They were usually well-educated men, with the gravity of the Victorian and Continental bourgeois liberals whom they admired. All this gave dignity and decorum to the political life of that stage of political development.

As journalists, they were not following a career in the material sense of the word. They were not trying to become rich. They were not interested in being purveyors of news and diversion. They were not seeking a livelihood in journalism. Where they could not gain their livelihood from journalism or from their auxiliary professions, they unquestioningly relied on the support of their kinsmen and patrons.

[16] It seems to me not accidental that even now the highest flights of Indo-Anglian prose have the rhetorical quality of high-grade lawyers addressing a court or a parliamentary body.

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They were journalists because there was a small literate public which could be reached and rendered coherent and articulate on behalf of the ideal of constitutional government in which the best-qualified of the ruled would have some hand.

These journalists and lawyer-politicians had few followers other than themselves, i.e., like-minded men in similar stations of life, such as liberal businessmen or princes, chiefs, and landowners. Leaders and followers together constituted no more than a small group. Only in India were the absolute numbers fairly large. In the Middle East they were fewer, and in the rest of Africa and in Southeast Asia their numbers were negligible. Nonetheless they created, by their activity, the foundations of a still surviving tradition of the modern intellectuals in politics.

They did not have the field to themselves, even at the time of their greatest pre-eminence. They were being challenged by a more aggressive group, less complaisant toward their Western rulers and toward Western culture. These new rivals claimed that constitutional tactics led nowhere. They were the forerunners of the political type which came to the center of the political arena in the second stage. During the first stage, however, there was also another trend of intellectual activity which profoundly affected subsequent political developments, though it was not in itself primarily political or even political at all.

(b) *Moral renewal*: An impassioned effort of religious and moral self-renewal accompanied the development of political life of the underdeveloped countries during their colonial period. It was at first a feature of the countries which possessed conspicuous evidence of great indigenous achievements in the past—i.e., of the countries with a literary and architectural inheritance which in the midst of present degradation could remind contemporaries that their country had once been great. It was therefore also a characteristic of countries with an indigenous traditional intelligentsia made up of the custodians of sacred writings. Thus it was that in India and in the Middle East, through much of the nineteenth century, protagonists of the traditional cultures, and particularly of the religions of Hinduism and Islam, sought to purify their inheritance, to restore it to its pristine greatness or to fuse it with modern elements. Both in India and in the Middle East, the aim was to reinstate the dignity of the traditional religious culture, and the society which was based on it, and thereby to establish its worth in the face of the encroachment of Western culture and religion.[17]

[17] Movements to "re-establish" the glory of African civilization are a much later product.

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This movement to evoke a national self-consciousness, through the renewal of cultural traditions which had been allowed to decay, was not directly political. There was not much contact between the modern men who represented constitutional liberalism, and the energetic, pious traditionalists.[18] The two movements seemed to run almost independently of each other; there was no antagonism between them, often little mutual awareness.

The agents of moral renewal were not secular social reformers. They were not modern intellectuals in the sense of the word used here. They were men of the traditional culture who were sufficiently sensitive to the impact of modern culture to feel the need to reaffirm their own.[19] Their task was the cleansing of the cultural—and this meant largely religious—inheritance of their society from what they claimed were historically accidental accretions which had brought it into disrepute among modern men and allowed their country to sink in the world's esteem and in its own and, particularly, to appear enfeebled and unworthy in comparison with Western achievements. They claimed that what was essential in their religious traditions could—by restoration and cleansing or by syncretism—be reformulated in an idiom more appropriate to the modern situation, and that if this were done, it would recommend itself to their fellow-countrymen who were needlessly and even perniciously enamored of Western culture. They were not unqualifiedly fanatical enemies of Western culture. They claimed that much of what it had to offer—particularly science, technology, and forms of organization—were necessary for the improvement of their countries and the re-establishment of their greatness among the nations. They insisted, however, that their countrymen must not lose their own souls to the West. They must instead rediscover their own essential being by the acceptance of a new and purer version of their own cultural tradition.

The older generation of modern "Victorian" intellectuals did not pay much heed to these preachments, although they were not hostile. In the next stage of political development, this effort of moral rediscovery and self-renewal had very profound repercussions. When, in the second stage, constitutional liberalism seemed to disappear or to be confined in a very narrow space, the movement of moral and religious reform was taken up and developed into a passionate nationalism. Now,

[18] There were of course exceptions like al-Afghani, Mohammed Abdou, and M. G. Ranade.

[19] Their influence made itself felt, however, in both India and the Middle East, primarily among modern intellectuals. They exerted little effect on their fellow traditional intellectuals, who persisted in their torpor.

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even where the religious element in the traditional culture is passed over, praise of the essence of the traditional culture has become a plank in the platform of every movement for independence and of every new state.

The Second Stage: From constitutional liberalism and religious-moral renewal, the intellectuals of the colonial countries passed to a fervently politicized nationalism. With this shift, there also occurred a shift in the mode of political action and its audience.

India was the first of all the underdeveloped colonial countries to execute this movement; it was the one in which the traditional indigenous culture was richest and most elaborate and in which that culture had developed most systematically and comprehensively. It was also the country where the foreign rulers had been longest established in a thoroughgoing way and where the contact of the indigenous intellectuals with a metropolitan Western culture had given birth to a longer and richer modern tradition than was possessed by any other country of Asia or Africa. It was the country with the largest and most differentiated modern intelligentsia. The first long phase of fascination with the West had already begun, in the India of the 1880's, to produce from within itself a reaction in favor of more purely Indian things.

This was also the time of growing strength in the socialist movement in Europe and of the growth of anarchism. Terrorism was in the ascendancy in Russia and Ireland. Tales of the Russian underground spread in Asia, together with the repute and glory of the deeds of the "Nihilists" in Russia, the Sinn Fein in Ireland, and the Carbonari in Italy. Mazzini, Stepnyak, and Kropotkin were names well known among the younger generation of Indian intellectuals. Yeats was becoming a figure of weight among the literary intelligentsia and along with this went a feeling for the Irish Renaissance and a belief in the possibilities of a comparable Indian Renaissance. The writings of these *rishis* became known in India, imported from England; some of them appeared in Bengali translations.

The new generation which came to the surface of public life around the turn of the century was no longer content with constitutional agitation, or with such limited goals as more places in the Indian Civil Service and more consultative and deliberative institutions in which Indians would be amply represented. Indian traditional culture was being revived through the Ramakrishna Mission and the Arya Samaj, and a new Indian self-consciousness took hold of young men who, while not deeming themselves religious, were possessed by a profound resonance toward traditional Indian symbols. The Maharashtrian and

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Bengali terrorists gave no thought to the kind of social or political order which they wished to see established. They wished only to have India free of foreign rule, free to be itself, in its own Indian way.

Parallel developments a third of a century later could be seen in areas as far apart as the Gold Coast and Egypt. A half-century later, they began to appear in East Africa. The same pattern was visible in more foreshortened form in Syria and Iraq. The proportions and the tone of the movements in these smaller countries, with much smaller intelligentsias, have been roughly what they were in India.

In these smaller countries, too, there was a tendency to regard the older generation of liberal constitutionalists and piecemeal reformers as excessively subservient to the foreign rulers and as excessively bemused by their foreign culture and their foreign forms of government. The later, populistic phase of intellectual politics, which in a variety of forms continues into the present, only intensified and made more complex and luminous an already established pattern. The generally socialistic orientation of the politics of the Asian and African intellectuals, which took form after the First World War and became preponderant after the Second World War, in a similar fashion only elaborated the inherent potentiality of intense nationalism.

The intensification of political concerns was the outgrowth of the earlier political interest, in fusion with the more acute sense of nationality which the heightened awareness of the traditional indigenous culture had helped to arouse. The politics of the "second generation" touched a very much deeper chord than that which the earlier generation had reached; it is a chord which still vibrates. The greater depth of the new political movement meant also that it was more passionate, more in the complete possession of politics. The fundamental politicization of the intelligentsia of Asia and Africa led to the discrediting of the first liberal generation. The politics of cultured and urbane gentlemen, speaking French or English to perfection, interested in much else besides politics, was not for this generation.

The politics of the second generation received a further powerful impetus from its participation in a cosmopolitan movement, in which *foreign*, Western countries were involved. The intellectuals of the second generation, like those who preceded and those who have followed, were also held by their attachment to Western culture. The extremist nationalist movements in Asia and subsequently in Africa had a Western legitimation for their strivings. They drew inspiration and comfort from abroad, they felt that their actions were one with a mighty surge all over the world, a surge toward a new order of freedom,

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with possibilities unknown and unregarded.[20] This sense of being a part of the larger world infused into the politics of the second generation the permanently bedeviling tension between province and metropolis, and added, as it always does, the heat which arises from conflicting loyalties.

When the second generation was still in its youth in India, and only in conception in other Asian and African colonial countries, the Russian Revolution took place. Only a little while thereafter M. K. Gandhi established his ascendancy over the political scene in India.[21] These two events precipitated the populistic consciousness, which had been only latent in the exacerbated nationalism which had preceded them.

The early leaders of the second generation had been deferential to "ancient traditions," in contrast to the liberal, moderate, and progressive attitude of the earlier constitutional politicians, who had not given political significance to indigenous cultural traditions. The "people" had, however, not yet acquired the eminence which was later to be their due in the political outlook of the intellectuals. Now, under the guidance of Gandhi and an attenuated Leninism, they ascended to a central position.

Socialism was no further away than a step of the imagination. The preceding generation had been neither socialist nor anti-socialist. The issue had never arisen, as long as civil-service personnel policies, the extension of representative institutions, and criticism of the "drain" had been the main objects of political debate.[22] Politics now became "total politics" and its claims on those who gave themselves to it became all-embracing. Politics in colonial countries became a vocation,

[20] The role of exiles and expatriates living in the metropolitan centers of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Switzerland helped to maintain a continuous link between the revolutionary and radical tendencies in the metropolis and those in the underdeveloped countries. These exiles and expatriates provided a sort of training school for young Asians and Africans who had gone abroad to study, and they constituted a continuous representation of the interests of their countries before the public opinion of the ruling metropolis.

Like exiles and expatriates everywhere, they also were more "uprooted" than their countrymen who either stayed at home or returned home after a few years. This "uprootedness" did not, however, diminish the intensity of their politics. Rather, the contrary.

[21] And with it, he began his march toward ascendancy over the Western colonialist conscience. A skeptical attitude about the rightfulness of imperialism had already existed in the West for a long time, but it was Gandhi more than anyone else outside the European Socialist and the Communist movements who impressed it on the consciousness of the Western educated classes. As a result, a body of Western allies was formed and its existence was a reassurance and a stimulus to the politicized intellectuals who continued to stand in need of a sustaining tie with modern "Western" culture.

[22] In Africa after the Second World War, nationalism, intense politics, socialism, and populism came into life almost simultaneously, as if they were inseparably involved with each other.

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without becoming professionalized. Many came to live "for" politics, but few lived "from" politics in the way in which professional politicians live from it. The politics of the colonial intelligentsia became in a sense more profound; that is, they came into contact with the deeper layers of the intelligentsia's existence. The politics of the intellectuals became charismatic politics.

As one might expect from charismatic politics, a tremendous pull was exerted on the youth. Leadership still lay with the lawyers and a few who had once served the government as officials and clerks[23] or had been tempted sufficiently to prepare themselves to do so. A large and important part of the following, however, consisted of students—college and university students in countries with colleges and universities and high school students where these were absent. A great deal of the clamor and volatility of the politics of the second generation of the intellectuals came from the students.

The Third Stage: The third stage of intellectual politics sees the intellectuals in power in a sovereign state, ruled by an indigenous elite.

With this stage the intellectuals who have reaped the fruits of the struggle become dissociated from the intellectual class. A schism occurs in the corps of intellectual-politicians. One sector comes into power and takes to it like a fish to water. The exercise of authority—which is not identical with the efficient exercise of authority—seems to be almost as natural as breathing to those intellectuals who are in power. To an increasing extent, they see themselves as different from the intellectuals who do not share their power, and whom they chide as naggers, unreasonable critics, backsliders from the great national cause. The intellectuals in power feel themselves less continuous with the intellectual class than they did during the struggle for independence. As the burdens and challenges of office preoccupy them, and as they spend so much of their time with party bosses and machine-men who have never been or who long since ceased to be intellectuals, their own image of themselves as intellectuals wanes and they become more sensitive to the anti-political dispositions of their old companions.

This drift toward schism is aggravated by the fact that the opposition becomes the magnet which draws the intellectuals. Although within the political elite, at the peak of government there are many who were once intellectuals by education, vocation, or disposition and who have

[23] Where there were few indigenous lawyers or others with higher education, leadership was exercised by clerks with secondary or elementary education. The educated, the *évolues*—intellectuals—have kept the lead, the highly educated when they have been available, the less well-educated where the former were lacking.

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now become hardened politicians, no longer paying any attention to things of intellectual interest. Those who remain intellectuals in vocation and disposition seem to find their natural habitat on the opposite benches. There—and in common rooms and cafés—gather the intellectuals who in their outlook, in their studies and their self-identification, remain intellectuals.

The transformation of the intellectuals in power discloses the duality of the oppositional mentality. The hatred of authority is often no more than a facet of the fascination and love that it evokes. When they come to power, intellectuals who have hated it quickly allow the identification with it, against which they struggled previously, to come into full bloom. They attach to themselves the regalia of authority and feel that they and the state are now identical. Whereas during the struggle for independence, they felt that they represented the nation and that all who disagreed with them were outside the national community and had allowed their souls to be possessed by the foreigner, now when they are in power, they regard themselves and the state as identical and all those who disagree with them as enemies of the state.[24]

On the other side of the floor, where it is allowed to exist, the oppositional mentality retains all of its old forms. Bureaucratic administration is criticized as too remote and too impersonal. The government is charged with corruption; it is alleged to be "too distant" from the people, and to be the betrayer of the national idea. It is accused of damaging the reputation of the country in the world, or of turning the country over to a new form of foreign control.

The oppositional mentality of the third stage, however, possesses one feature which the second did not possess—i.e., disillusionment. Whereas the opposition of the second generation imagined an amorphously happy condition once their antagonists were removed, the oppositional mentality of the post-colonial period has no such utopian euphoria to assuage its present melancholy.

Oppositionalism, which was so involved in an intense politicization, tends among some of those who are out of power to shrivel into an anti-political passivity. It is not that politics no longer engages the attention. It still does, but among many intellectuals it has become a source of despondent inaction.

Among others, a quite substantial bloc, it flows into a more rigid

[24] Mr. Nehru is something of an exception, although he too regards the opposition as an unavoidable pestilence, as an inconvenient part of the community which remains, notwithstanding, as much a part of the community as he himself is. At the other extreme is that other intellectual in politics, Dr. Nkrumah, who regards any criticism or disagreement as *staatsfeindlich*.

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form of activistic extremism. In some instances, this extremist alternative to passivity takes on a traditionalistic guise; in others, it assumes a Leninist visage. Both of these foster the intense and total rejection of the muddled, compromising, and often compromised, incumbent government, in the name of a higher ideal.

V. The Prospects of the Intellectuals in the Political Life of the New States

Practically every new state has begun its career with a commitment to a regime of representative government and public liberties. Whatever might be the democratic and consultative elements in the indigenous tradition of government, the particular constitution which was actually chosen to give form to self-government is evidence of the role of intellectuals in the establishment of the new states. It was only through the influence of the intellectuals in contact with the modern political ideas which circulated in the larger world that this decision could have been made. This alone would be sufficient to testify to the still living inheritance of the notables who peopled the first stage of modern political life in the then colonial countries.

The fate of the new states, whether they persist and flourish as democracies, or whether they regress into more oligarchical forms of government, is as undeterminable as anything which lies in the future. As long, however, as they do not disintegrate into tribal and local territorial sovereignties, and as long as they at least aspire to be "modern," the intellectuals will go on playing a large role in the fulfillment of whatever possibilities fortune allots to their societies.

In most of the new states, the intellectuals still constitute a notable part of the ruling political elite, although their position is no longer as preponderant as when politics were a charismatic movement. Politics, as the new states were consolidated, became a profession and ceased to be a calling or a mission. The emerging professional politician, military or civilian in origin, is forced to be less of an intellectual in his outlook. The inevitability of the formation of a political machine has meant, and will continue even more to mean, that organizers with little intellectual disposition, interest, or sympathy will move into a more prominent position in the political elite. Back-benchers and party functionaries will include a very considerable proportion of place-holders, and the tasks they will have to perform will not be very attractive to intellectuals, living in the traditions of modern intellectuals.

Nonetheless, even on the government benches, if the regime con-

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tinues to be more or less democratic there will remain some readiness of the professional party leaders to receive and sponsor intellectuals. The prestige of modern education will continue to be high and any political party and government will therefore wish to draw on its beneficiaries. Furthermore, the reservoir of persons available for political leadership will continue to be limited in the foreseeable future; this will force the party leaders to look in the intellectuals' direction, however reluctantly. At the same time, however, the oppositional tendencies of intellectuals and the hypersensitivity to criticism on the part of politicians of any sort—and of the politicians of new states in particular—will add to this reluctance.

Opposition parties, insofar as they are allowed to exist, will certainly draw on intellectuals for their critical ideas concerning the government and for leadership and following. Such parties are their natural home.

If the underdeveloped countries become completely oligarchical and are ruled by a military junta or a one-party state, the role of intellectuals in political life in the narrower sense will certainly decline. The diminution of public political life will tend to narrow the area permitted to intellectuals. Even then, single-party regimes are likely, because of their ideological nature, to find a place for some intellectuals within their leading circles.[25]

Regardless of the fate of democracy in underdeveloped countries, intellectuals will undoubtedly continue to be called upon for the civil service and for higher education. There will be increasing scope for intellectuals as the governments expand the range of their activities and as the demand grows for highly qualified persons for engineering, teaching, publicity and propaganda, health and social services, and research in social and natural sciences.

If the new states avoid the fate of the Latin American countries in the first century of their independence, and progress economically and socially, then indifferently of the political regime which rules them, the intellectual classes will become larger and more differentiated, and more fully incorporated into their own cultural institutional system

[25] The professional army officer in the new states is to a certain extent an intellectual since he, especially in the technical branches, is the recipient of a modern education. In fact, the intrusion of the military into politics in the Middle East, at least, may be partly attributed to their attachment to modern ideas about order, efficiency, and probity in government, ideas which are not part of the indigenous tradition of government and which come to them through their modern training. The military *coups d'état* which have occurred in many of the new states may be interpreted as, at least in part, revolutions of the technological intelligentsia, acting on behalf of modern ideas of efficiency and progress.

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in a variety of technological, administrative, educational, and therapeutic capacities.

This incorporation of the intellectuals into their own societies will depend to a large extent on the establishment of an equilibrium between the demand for and the supply of intellectuals. If there always is such a surplus of university and college graduates that their salaries are low and many of them have to take posts which they regard as unsuitable, the process of incorporation will be obstructed. Instead the oppositional mentality will go on reproducing itself. Where a public political life is permitted, there they will be a perpetual source of unsettledness.[26]

Let us imagine that the economies of the new states develop toward greater productivity and that a measure of liberal political life survives the burdens under which the new states now labor. The intellectual classes will become more diversified than they are at present, as they find employment in applied science and technology, in governmental, industrial, and commercial administration, in scientific and scholarly research, and in the profession of letters. With this diversification, there will be less unity of sentiment, less sense of a common identity among them. The "intellectuals" will become only one part of the educated class and a situation which already exists in the advanced countries will emerge.

There will be more specialization, more philistinism, and a less general cultural sympathy in the new intelligentsia than in the old. The new intelligentsia will also be much less political in its outlook and more practical and professional. Each intellectual profession will, as it has long since done in the advanced countries, nurture its own traditions and ways of working. As in the past, these traditions will draw on the more differentiated and more elaborate intellectual traditions of the advanced countries. Creativity will come to be more ap-

[26] This, in turn, would increase the demand for an ideological oligarchy, from outside the government, and would also impel the government itself to adopt oligarchical measures.

There is also the opposite danger of a disequilibrium in the relations between the intellectuals and the central institutional system arising from an excessive demand for intellectuals in technological and administrative roles. In countries which entered upon independence with an insufficient supply of qualified intellectuals and a very scanty complement of intellectual institutions, it is definitely possible to draw practically all of the best intellectuals into executive and technological roles, leaving too few for civil and intellectual functions. The rapid growth of the public services and the general trend toward the governmental pre-emption of so many diverse functions might well result in too small a proportion of the intellectual classes being left free for independent creative work and for vital activity in that publicistic borderland between the intellectual and the political.

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preciated and one necessary condition for its realization will thus be provided. The intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries will cease in the course of this process to be as dependent and provincial as they are now. They will become, as some already are, full citizens, with completely equal status, in the intellectual community of the world.

The opportunities for fruitful and satisfying employment of the skills of the intellectuals in the various spheres of civil and economic life and the establishment of absorbing and guiding traditions of an autonomous creativity in intellectual life proper will foster an attenuation of ideological dispositions. It can never eradicate them but it can reduce the commonness of their occurrence and mollify their asperity. Many with political interests will no longer feel the urgent obligation to participate directly in day-to-day political life. More of them will be content to play an equally vital but less immediate part in the formation of the life of their countries. They will concern themselves less than they do now with the issues of the here and now, and will deal with problems which are of longer-run significance, more remote from the immediate issues of party politics and of the prospects and favors of the incumbent political elite. The indirect influence on politics which comes from the cultivation of the matrix of opinion, and from the provision of the personnel and the institutional conditions of long-term development, will bring satisfaction to a larger proportion than it now does, and politicians will perhaps learn to appreciate the equal and perhaps even greater value to the community of this kind of activity on the part of intellectuals.

Their direct participation in politics will probably continue to have a radical bent. The traditions of the modern intellectual are too deeply rooted and the tendency is too intrinsic to the exercise of intellectual powers for this to be avoided—even if it were ever desirable. The radicalism of the intellectual's politics need not however be revolutionary or ideological; it can also work within the civil order. In the espousal of this standpoint at the center of political decision, in party councils, in parliaments and in cabinets, the intellectual will continue to have a unique and indispensable role, the abdication of which cannot be compensated by purely intellectual creativity or the efficient performance of executive, technological, and educational functions. In order, however, for this possibility to exist, the political society—the civil order itself—must first come into existence.

This brings us to one of the prototypical paradoxes of political development. For the intellectuals to inherit their true estate, they must live in a political society. But this civil order cannot be achieved unless

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the intellectuals, who would be among its greatest beneficiaries, help, against the greatest difficulties, to bring it about. Some of these difficulties reside within the intellectuals themselves, within the political and cultural traditions which enter into their constitution. The outcome then depends on whether those intellectuals who speak for civility in a modern society will by their talents, virtue, and good fortune be able to outweigh their own inhibitions, the dense incivility of their fellow-intellectuals, and the rocky obduracy of the traditional order.

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WHAT INTERDEPENDENCE FOR NATO?

By MALCOLM W. HOAG*

I

IN NATO's early days statesmen spoke glowingly about subordinating national military interests to a truly international "balanced collective force," a goal similar to classic free trade in its promise of mutual gain secured at the cost of dependence upon foreigners. Naturally, in so nationalistic a field as defense, achievement fell far short of this sweeping aspiration. But we are ill-placed now to belittle either the slogan or the degree to which we realized an international division of military labor. Nowadays the slogan is "interdependence," but in practice this seems to mean performance deviating still more widely from the goal of integrated defense.

Currently, General de Gaulle supplies the dramatic examples. With France demanding greater voice in NATO's political councils and military commands, resisting integrated European air defense, bargaining stiffly over the terms for American IRBM's, refusing American-controlled nuclear stockpiles on her territory, and, above all, determined to manufacture her own nuclear weapons, the challenge to interdependence is obvious. Yet France's vainglory is understandable and even admirable up to a point, and her stubbornness must not be taken to be the sole or even the main obstacle to efficient collective defense. Other allies are merely less obviously culpable. For NATO it is better to divert troops to Algeria than never to raise them at all, a concession that puts the contributions of some others in better perspective. And Britain long ago began the costly pursuit of prestige via an independent deterrent with its own nuclear weapons and delivery systems. More fundamentally, the main obstacle to efficient collective defense lies beyond vainglory. It lies in strategic conceptions, and not least in American ones.

Whether there is much point in discussing these strategic conceptions is the first question. Sometimes American actions seem to indicate that we do not care very much about efficient collective defense and, accordingly, worry little about the obstacles that impede achieving it. Yet at the same time we claim to have great difficulty in financing a defense

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effort that would be deemed adequate. If we have such difficulty now, when the resources of the Western allies are much greater than those of the Soviet bloc, how much more difficulty will we have in the future? Faster rates of economic growth within the Soviet bloc, combined with a demonstrated willingness on its part to devote a larger proportion of resources to strategic ends, promise to make the competition rougher for us. And there is no way to reverse the technological revolution that has made the Soviet Union a thermonuclear strategic power of the first magnitude—a revolution that, no matter what we do, has doomed the United States to a far greater insecurity than formerly. Given this grim prospect, can we afford to neglect any means of getting more defense from our limited resources? Among those means, can we neglect the advantages of an economic division of labor among allies?

II

That we cannot neglect them is strongly indicated by the magnitude of possible savings from inter-allied military specialization. Even when these savings are measured only by the comparative national costs of military supplies and manpower in implementing agreed strategy—to consider briefly the relatively small economies, before turning to the possible big economies from strategic changes that are our major concern—they are not trivial. When—to take one major if somewhat academic example—the United States, the most costly producer of ships among major maritime producers, persists in building a naval fleet bigger than the fleets of the rest of the world put together, one suspects that there is gross inefficiency in the allocation of military tasks within the alliance. Where open subsidies of about one-half of construction costs are required for our merchant marine to meet foreign competition, what are the hidden subsidies implicit in the construction of our navy?

Or, to take another area of production, when the President of the United States speaks in his Budget Message of "bombers that cost their weight in gold," he refers to sophisticated planes whose enormous development costs are being spread over a very small volume of production. Such small volume and consequent high cost are not typical in this country, but would be typical abroad if each ally insisted upon building its own advanced planes or missiles for small forces. For such matériel there are enormous economies in concentrating the final expensive stages of development and production in one place in one nation. The multiplication of production sources exemplified by British

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production of no less than three V-bombers, each probably only a marginal improvement over our old B-47, is a contrasting case in point of dispersion. How much more sensible might it have been had we permitted the British to earn dollars by building naval ships for us, and had they spent the dollars buying improved B-47's from us! This observation is now only a lament. But why should the British lavish money upon a Blue Streak missile because it promises to be superior to a Thor, when, by the time the Blue Streak can be operational, they could buy, much more cheaply, say, a Titan or Minuteman missile from us that also is designed for underground shelters and has far greater range than the Thor?

It is easy to understand why such dependence upon foreign supply for prestige weapons, despite the great economies it promises, arouses strong patriotic opposition. But the extent to which this opposition can be supported by rational strategic reasons has declined. Dependence upon allied sources of supply is risky, but if all-out wars must now be fought quickly with existing stocks of arms, and if peripheral national wars can be fought with but small drains upon such stocks, the risk of relying upon foreign supply becomes small. It makes more sense to buy matériel where it is cheapest. This reasoning applies to the United States as well as to its allies. The production of many expensive items here has been defended on mobilization base and comparative vulnerability grounds, but this argument has lost its cogency as the mobilization base has been de-emphasized and America's role as the No. 1 target of enemy attack has become apparent to all.

Nonetheless, the political barriers to purchasing foreign arms remain formidable. And achieving a less grossly uneconomic division of military manpower duties within the alliance is naturally bound to be still more difficult than for arms production. Allied forces cannot be used for military purposes that one's allies deem to be unilateral—e.g., Suez—while equipment procured from abroad obviously can be. Therefore a country will not eliminate its forces and depend totally upon the forces of others, no matter how expensive its manpower compared with that of its allies. Nor, at the other extreme, will it specialize in contributing manpower, "blood rather than treasure," even though civilians as well as military personnel are potential casualties throughout the alliance these days. Accordingly, the opportunities for manpower specialization, for substituting inexpensive Turkish soldiers for expensive American ones, are limited. Yet the limits set by these opposed political considerations are broad. There is room for substituting troops, and the place to increase relative troop contributions is clear. The United States, the

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expensive supplier, has consistently maintained armed forces in about as high a proportion to available manpower as any of its allies and higher than most. Measured by economic criteria, our allies are undercontributing troops. Consequently, there is great scope for economizing by greater manpower as well as matériel specialization in the alliance, and therefore great reason for tackling the political problems that inhibit such specialization.

III

So much for the conventional and very restricted form of economic argument: take desired military capabilities of the alliance as given, and then look for cheap allied sources of supply to replace expensive domestic ones. There is nothing wrong with such an approach, and its results are important. But the really big potential economies can be discerned only by going beyond it. What military capabilities can be consolidated or eliminated within the alliance in order to free resources to do a really good job on the urgently needed capabilities?

The outstanding example of possible consolidation is supplied by strategic airpower and all its corollaries—nuclear production, radar warning networks, bases protected by both active (shooting) and passive (hardening and dispersal) defenses, striking forces on alert, and so on. The original concept of the balanced collective force in NATO left this capability to the United States. For our allies, this raised the problem of risky dependence upon the United States in its most acute form. But at the time did they have any realistic military alternative? And, now that they can contemplate little SAC's of their own, how costly and how little satisfactory do they promise to be? Some of the great efficiencies made possible by the old division of labor persist.

The need for one fundamental capability in NATO remains unquestioned. We require a high confidence in America's ability to destroy a large fraction of Soviet cities, if they be our targets, after a surprise thermonuclear attack directed at our airpower. This capability is variously referred to as "the" deterrent, or as the "passive," "minimum," or "finite" deterrent. None of these terms is fully satisfactory, but let us call this capability the passive deterrent. Nobody but the pacifist disputes our need for it. But there is plenty of argument about whether it should be supplemented by (1) American counterforce and associated "active" deterrent capabilities, (2) allied passive deterrents, and (3) allied active deterrents.

The distinction between passive and active deterrents is obviously vital. The active deterrent, as the phrase implies, is the more ambitious

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and aggressive one. It means an ability to limit damage to us because we can destroy a significant part of enemy strategic airpower before it can be launched, to disrupt any subsequent enemy attack, and to absorb the lessened impact of any such attack. Consequently it is usually, although not necessarily, appraised in strategic terms that, in a strictly military sense, are more favorable to us—namely, the contingency that we strike first at the Soviets. Because the strategic initiative is ours in this contingency, what our counterforce and associated capabilities help to deter are provocations by the enemy that stop short of enemy attack directed at our deterrent force. Hence such capabilities reinforce the deterrent to peripheral aggressions that our limited-war, tactical capabilities provide. What a counterforce capability by itself does not deter, but in fact invites, is all-out enemy attack designed to eliminate so menacing a threat to the Soviets. Hence the greater our counterforce capability, and the more threatening our brandishing of it, the greater the weight that rests upon our passive deterrent to discourage any all-out enemy attack. A truly active deterrent does not substitute for a passive one; on the contrary, it increases the need for it.

So much for the analytic distinction. For the alliance, the radical strategic prescription is no supplementing of the American passive deterrent by European passive deterrents, and no supplementing by European strategic counterforce capabilities that would require strengthened complementary European passive deterrents. The resultant great savings in military expenditures in Europe can then be further increased by associated savings in air defense. The primary function of air defense measures is to make strategic retaliatory airpower secure. If there are no passive deterrent forces tied to European bases, this function need not be performed there. This does not mean no air defense at all for Europe, but it does imply that the stringent demands that would otherwise have to be met for tight all-area radar coverage and for prompt warning and identification of even small raids can be neglected to an important degree. So the sweeping economies that result are one passive deterrent for NATO, not several; and one really tight air defense network—that of North America—not two.

This drastic proposal raises immediately the common objection against any deliberate renunciation of military capabilities—namely, that people should not and will not tolerate such skimping upon direct defense. The example of air defense serves neatly to refute this objection, because even in the United States we should and do tolerate precisely such skimping. The bankruptcy of the classic philosophy that all requirements for assured security must be met is nowhere more evident

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than in planning for air warfare. No matter how many more billions we spend, nobody can give us 100 per cent assurance that we will never be attacked, or that we could shoot down all elements of an enemy attack before bomb delivery. How far short we fall of these unattainable goals of assured deterrence, or assured 100 per cent air defense, depends upon how much we spend and how wisely we spend it, but fall short we will.

Now few military experts dispute this conclusion, but many question whether it should be publicized. Will not the admission that no feasible budget can do the complete job kill the chances of getting a reasonable budget to do a reasonable job? The best counter to this question is that no procedure is better calculated to yield an unreasonable budget than an unreasonable promise. Notice what logically follows if 100 per cent assurance of deterrence of enemy attack is promised. Any measure to mitigate civilian disaster in the event of attack then involves spending money for a contingency that one has been assured is not going to happen. So why waste money upon it? Or, if 100 per cent air defense is assured, why cannot the Russians match us in this area? If so, is not our strategic deterrent negated? Why waste money on it, why not disband SAC? These are the extremes of total reliance or zero reliance upon strategic deterrence, and the absurdity of going to either of them is recognized by practically everybody. Realism in public discussion of defense deficiencies is imperative if defense planning is to be sensible.

There are advantages in facing these central defense deficiencies squarely. For one thing, we will resist spending that—for any given Soviet threat—promises merely to take us a little closer to the unreachable goal of 100 per cent air defense. We will impose a supplementary criterion that must be met: would the proposed spending impose roughly equal or still greater spending upon the Russians if they are to offset the efficacy of our new defense measures? By rejecting measures that do not, we can prevent American air defense spending from soaring in a losing race against the Soviets.

Also, admitting that our civilians are vulnerable puts us in a better position to ask our allies to be realistic about their vulnerability. Nothing is going to make their proximity to Russia comfortable, but our being the No. 1 target for the Russians in the event of total war is nonetheless clear. Our European allies may retort that defense that is a matter of somebody else's intent is psychologically unacceptable. But if American air defenses are concentrated primarily upon the indispensable function of protecting retaliatory forces—exploiting to the full the natural advantages of protecting military targets whose response

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time can be much quicker than that of civilians, which are much more mobile than cities, and whose bases can be hardened at far less cost than cities—then Americans are being defended indirectly rather than directly for the most part also. Thus our defense also rests fundamentally upon the way our actions influence somebody else's intent—in this case, Russian intent. To ask that Europeans place their main trust in the same defense aggravates matters, for our resoluteness in defending them adds another matter of intent for them to worry about. Still, defense against air attack is primarily indirect for both Americans and Europeans under our proposed division of labor for NATO.

To digress for a moment, the logic of indirect defense and the deliberate forgoing of some military capabilities are stressed here because both are so foreign to the older nominal training of military leaders. Accordingly, some resist this logic even when their own appraisal of the future drives them to planning that accords with it. Traditional military training inculcated the maxim that you should appraise enemy capability, not intent. This philosophy avoids the obvious perils of mind-reading, and is conservative. If you prepare for the worst the enemy can do to you, you should be reasonably prepared for anything better. These are the considerable virtues in this philosophy, but they exact a price in that he who adopts it will be unable to capitalize fully upon the opportunities that arise when the enemy does less than his worst; upon the possibilities, in short, of limiting mutual loss from military moves.

This price is far too high in a world that increasingly emphasizes deterring all-out war and fighting limited wars. By definition, our deterrent power is measured by what we do to enemy intent, however difficult it is to calculate, and limited wars imply an enemy who is doing far less than his worst to us. What keeps limited wars from expanding in scope or violence is the existence of unused military capabilities that discipline behavior because of mutual fears of enemy retaliation. Assume the worst about the enemy's intent, and our only rational course is to expand the war to the limit before he does. Therefore if we contemplate fighting limited wars, as we should, and if we emphasize deterring total war, as we must, we must purge our minds of the remnants of the old philosophy. As one small example, moving anti-air missiles from protecting a city to an airbase, leaving an acknowledged gap in our defenses should the enemy choose to hit the city, is a difficult step for us to take. Yet it may be a perfectly sensible one, for deterrence may be strengthened and, should deterrence nonetheless fail, enemy attacks might be diverted from the city to a necessarily strengthened

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attack upon the better-defended airbase. Our defensive move seeks both to dissuade attack by the enemy and influence its character should he attack anyway, and these are both matters of influencing his intent rather than his capability.

So much for our digression into military philosophy. The derived concept of cultivated neglect—to return to and complete our list of drastic reductions in desired capabilities—applies sharply to NATO's sacrosanct objective, the defense of NATO territory against invasion in any eventuality. "In any eventuality" is the key phrase, for achieving this objective, like that of 100 per cent air defense, is then infeasible. One eventuality that must be considered is a Soviet surprise attack in Europe with nuclear weapons. Many claim that using nuclear weapons in a tactical theater favors the defense, and favors the West because of its greater stockpiles of fissionable material. Usually these claims are encountered in the context of a fantasy wherein, finding ourselves overwhelmed by non-nuclear attack in Europe, we redress the balance decisively by initiating the use of nuclear weapons. What makes this a fantasy, of course, is the assumption that the Russians will obligingly wait for us to be the first to use nuclear weapons massively despite our repeated affirmations that we will use them. Replace this assumption by the pessimistic one that the first Soviet aggressive move is a surprise nuclear attack, or modify it by assuming that we initiate the use of nuclear weapons very diffidently for humanitarian reasons or because of political pressures, and the military picture changes completely. Whatever merits there are in the dubious claims that nuclear weapons favor the defense or the West, they are overshadowed by the undisputed military advantage that accrues to the side that is the first to use them massively.

Concede this great advantage to the Soviets in the interests of conservative planning, and one generates formidable new requirements for protecting the capability to hold Europe. Old-style planning for NATO forces in Europe could naturally capitalize upon the great economies that arise from concentrated, soft, and only partly ready military forces and supply facilities—many airplanes to one base, not one or a few; ordinary buildings, not hardened underground installations; a few consolidated supply lines and depots, not many; one shift operation of some defense facilities rather than three and, for that matter, great reliance upon mobilizable reserves; and so on. All this left the West vulnerable to surprise assault from the air, but tolerably so for non-nuclear warfare. Staging a great many Pearl Harbor-like assaults simultaneously was beyond the resources of the enemy when

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he had no or few nuclear weapons. A resultant military build-up that discounted the possibility of a surprise attack in the theater could be much less costly and, incidentally, politically advantageous. Where each side could rely upon advance warning because sensible attack required extensive mobilization, the normally relaxed posture of each would be reassuring to the other.

Today these virtues can be retained only at the cost of admitting the vulnerability of European forces to crippling surprise nuclear assault, which means that the burden of deterring such assault must be borne elsewhere. The alternative is to revamp NATO European forces and facilities so drastically that they could absorb a surprise nuclear attack and still be able to withstand subsequent Soviet attack on the ground. This would require that the NATO holding capability not be critically dependent upon a few hundred or so soft concentrations, for destroying so few within short order is feasible for either Soviet IRBM's or bombers. To remove such dependence is a staggering task. It is not enough that a few isolated elements survive a surprise attack; most of them must survive in order to provide co-ordinated forces and supplies that can fight a sustained campaign. This is a far more challenging assignment than protecting a few installations that might merely exact punitive damage in revenge by, say, firing a few missiles into the Eastern European satellites or beyond. And it is especially challenging because NATO installations in Western Europe are exposed to much heavier weights of attack than, for example, installations in the United States. A big Soviet ICBM that is converted into an IRBM can carry a far bigger warhead and deliver it more accurately, and Soviet bombers are so close that they need give little more warning than ballistic missiles.

Given this grim prospect, the renovation of NATO's European holding capability for a strike-second nuclear environment would promise, at best, to be very expensive; at worst, infeasible. For one thing, the possible savings in European air defense mentioned above are negated if tight protection must be provided for avowedly tactical forces. At one time it was commonly asserted, to be sure, that there would be compensating economies to place against the expense of revamping NATO European facilities. The substitution of nuclear weapons for forces was supposed to provide budgetary offsets. But it should always have been clear that the substitution process would permit only relative savings in forces—that it would merely keep force requirements for nuclear war from soaring as much as they otherwise would in answer to a vastly growing threat as the enemy too acquired nuclear

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weapons for theater employment. Our military leaders have consistently pointed out that force requirements for bilateral nuclear war would probably be increased as much or more by the expectation of greater casualties from enemy weapons as they would be decreased by the substitution effect of our own weapons.

The prospect of renovating NATO's holding capability in this way is thus probably made sufficiently unattractive for Europeans by its expense alone. If not, its politico-military disadvantages compared with other expensive military alternatives will make it so. These disadvantages can be perceived by considering the damage implications of such a renovation. For deterrence the replacement of soft and obviously vulnerable concentrations is obviously most desirable if it achieves invulnerability. It is still very desirable if it merely creates serious doubt in the enemy's mind about vulnerability, or drives him to greater expense to counter our vulnerability-reducing measures than we need invest in them. But some vulnerability-reducing measures may do only the last or none of these things. For example, consider hardening a soft-point target in Europe fifty-fold. This would constitute a tremendous change, driving the enemy to perhaps a thousand-fold increase in bomb yield and to a shift from air- to ground-burst weapons if he is to retain the same high confidence of destroying the target with one weapon. Yet to do so may be possible for him only by changing his bomb, not his delivery system, which does not cost him much.[1] What does change enormously is the incidental damage to the countryside should he attack. In a similar way, protecting the soft target by making it mobile may lead to the same incidental result. Given the enormous area over which thermonuclear weapons spread low overpressures that suffice for soft targets, one promising tactic for the enemy is to compensate for uncertainty about the precise location of a target by blanketing the suspected area with big weapons. And his obvious counter to simple dispersal of targets is to multiply the number of weapons.

These considerations do not in the least mean that all vulnerability-reducing measures in Europe are of dubious or even negative utility. But they do point to one dominant conclusion: If such measures are taken only to secure NATO's ground-holding capability, they are likely

[1] An illustrative calculation is as follows: the soft target is assumed to be vulnerable to two pounds per square inch overpressures (2 p.s.i.), the bombing accuracy is measured in terms of a probability of one-half that bombs will fall one-half mile from the target or closer (C.E.P. = 2,500 feet), and the required yield for an air-burst weapon to achieve a 90 per cent probability of kill is then only two kilotons. Increase the hardness of the target fifty-fold (100 p.s.i.), leave the bombing accuracy and desired probability of kill the same, and the required yield becomes two megatons for a ground-burst weapon.

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to achieve it only at the cost of making this capability academic. The main objective of a holding capability, after all, is to protect Europe if deterrence fails. To seek to protect by measures that all but ensure total war devastation in Europe makes nonsense of this objective. The old slogan summing up European demands for an ambitious "forward strategy" that would preclude enemy occupation even if deterrence failed was "There would be no point in liberating a corpse." Today the grim addition must be that there would be no point in defending a Europe already made a corpse by initial Soviet air attack.

Europeans can be interested only in deterring such a catastrophe. Merely driving the enemy to a much greater weight of initial attack by your protective measure will, it must be admitted, strengthen deterrence. Optimistically, the greater weight required will drive the enemy to a bigger and more complicated attack that jeopardizes surprise, and this prospect may deter him. Pessimistically, it will give him pause, not because it poses serious operational difficulties, but because he shrinks from the vastly increased level of violence with its attendant chances of provoking the most extreme retaliatory action throughout NATO. These are important if inadequate deterrent effects. Yet, cannot like deterrence be more cheaply achieved in other ways, and at no greater cost in terms of making devastation greater should nuclear war come? Specifically, for a European country, the securing of a comparably protected strategic retaliatory force promises to achieve these "threshold damage" deterrent effects plus, perhaps, an enhanced threat of direct retaliation against the Soviet Union itself. And the formidable job of protecting such a force is still less severe than protecting a ground-holding capability, for surviving elements need be neither as many nor as well co-ordinated—some strategic missiles surviving at random may pose a significant threat to the Soviets.

All this certainly does not mean that a passive strategic deterrent of its own is desirable for a European country. But if such a deterrent force is rejected as infeasibly expensive, or, in view of SAC's presence, as unnecessarily expensive, how much more so must a true revamping of NATO's tactical capability appear! The one bad alternative dominates a worse one. The protection problem for a real, strike-second, nuclear tactical capability is more demanding, its fulfillment tends to ensure total war devastation in Europe in the event of war rather than protection, and its deterrent effects are less than those offered by alternative preparations. So if Europeans can be persuaded to forgo strategic deterrent forces of their own in the interests of efficient collective defense, with all the savings to Europe in terms of both air offense and

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defense that this implies, they should surely be reluctant to undertake the sweeping reconstruction of NATO's European facilities that would be required to implement the "forward strategy" of holding on the ground despite initial massive Soviet nuclear assault. Holding to this most traditional of NATO objectives for so dire a contingency is simply unrealistic.

IV

Our total list of economies is imposing, making it possible to do a really good job elsewhere in NATO in supplying other needed military capabilities. So far our "package" for NATO has assumed only one indispensable capability: an extremely well-protected and strong American passive deterrent. That this capability is not enough has been so repeatedly and ably argued by the proponents of limited war that it is necessary here to summarize only their two main themes. First, even where the threat of massive retaliation is credible, it cannot deter all aggressions and provocations that call for the use of force. It cannot deter them because they may arise by accident, miscalculation, or, more fundamentally, because the sources of conflict are inherently so ambiguous that there is often little possibility of differentiating clearly between aggressor and defender. Therefore, the threat of massive retaliation cannot reduce the probability of provocation to near-zero, and the widespread use of the threat will mean that we must either implement it at the cost of total war, or else back down repeatedly with a subsequent discounting of the threat as a bluff. Second, the credibility of massive retaliation is brought into question at the outset anyway because of the manifest disparity between the use of maximum force and the minor and unclear nature of the provocations that are supposed to invoke it, and its credibility is undermined further when its implementation would imply near suicidal results. Suppose we had only a small force of protected ballistic missiles as a minimal passive deterrent. It might be limited enough in capability so that at best all it could do would be to destroy most Soviet cities. If so, its full use would give the Soviets a maximum incentive to exact the most dire revenge while interfering minimally with their ability to exact it. Using such a force, in short, would be nearly equivalent to suicide, and confining our strategic airpower to it would further impair the credibility of massive retaliation.

These two main themes of the advocates of limited war suggest not only that a minimal American passive deterrent is not enough; they point to the two directions in which it should be supplemented. A

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limited war capability is vitally needed to meet local provocations. To avoid being overwhelmed in local theaters by massive enemy use of nuclear weapons, however, a limited war capability must be backed by a threat of strategic retaliation that is made credible enough to deter such enemy action. Its credibility is enhanced, first and foremost, because enemy mass use of nuclear weapons in local conflicts would constitute a major provocation that is clear-cut and under enemy control. The credibility of massive retaliation in response to such enemy action is further enhanced to the extent that our strategic counterforce and air defense capabilities promise to limit damage to us if we do retaliate. If we want to deter aggression in Europe and elsewhere, as we do, but concede that our tactical limited-war capabilities can be overwhelmed by nuclear assault, as we must, then we are driven to some continuing reliance upon retaliation by strategic airpower.[2] An American active as well as passive deterrent strengthens the credibility of this ultimate reliance.

How much and what kind of a limited war capability, and of an active deterrent, are the open issues. Some strategists propose essentially no active deterrent back-up for a limited war capability. They overlook the need for it or advocate the substitute of multiple passive deterrent forces under the control of our allies. In either case they properly stress the great cost, in strategic as well as money terms, of an ambitious American active deterrent. The strategic cost, which we have alluded to earlier, is twofold. First, the more aggressively we pursue an active deterrent policy, the more we reduce the attractiveness to the Soviets of all those alternatives that lie between the extreme policies of not provoking us at all and of hitting SAC directly. Clearly, we welcome this sharpening of alternatives for them insofar as it greatly

[2] Strategic retaliation need not be massive. It can be limited—e.g., hit one city in the enemy homeland a week until he gets out of Country A. Whether it should be limited is a different matter. When, as now, it is much better to strike massively first than to strike second, and when one's attempt to hit first less than massively is apt to trigger massive retaliation, a limited strategic strike might be simply the worst way to start World War III. Later, if and when strike-second strategic capabilities approach or even surpass the power of strike-first blows—i.e., each side finds no soft spots to disrupt in the enemy's entire system of retaliation and must use up, say, two missiles to destroy one on the other side—the practice of limited retaliation would become less undesirable. There remains the problem that such a practice removes the traditional (Korean) limitations of both weaponry and geographic sanctuary, and so invites a chain of retaliation and counter-retaliation that has no natural limit and culminates in—what?

As Thomas Schelling reminds me, however, neither the bizarreness nor the current undesirability of a strategy of limited strategic retaliation should stop inquiry into this or any other strategy for bolstering our vulnerable tactical capabilities. See Morton A. Kaplan, *The Strategy of Limited Retaliation*, Policy Memorandum No. 19, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1959.

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enhances the probability that they will choose not to provoke us, but even a small increase in the probability that, denied the intermediate alternatives, they will strike directly at us is a huge price to pay. Second, Soviet apprehensions that we plan to strike first at them may be increased because our preparations are consistent with that aim, and the likelihood that they will strike the first "pre-emptive" blow at us may consequently increase. If each side achieves an ambitious active deterrent capability, the difference in damage to one's own country between striking first and striking second will be widened, giving greater objective grounds for strike-first strategies. Consequently, the vicious spiral of interacting expectations—"Perhaps we'd better strike because he is likely to strike first because he fears that we are going to strike because . . . ," and so on—will be intensified. The strengthened objective grounds for strike-first strategies reinforce the subjective ones of mutual fear and suspicion that are bound to be present anyway. It is this specter, above all, that leads some to argue that we should not participate in the most fearful of arms races, but forgo an active deterrent capability.

Their case is reinforced by the prospect of great expenditures for a thoroughgoing active deterrent. The counterforce component is bound to be expensive because it demands large numbers of delivered weapons, and hence vehicles, to cover many enemy launching sites. The vehicles it demands may have to be sophisticated and costly to ensure accurate delivery of heavy pay-loads, and extensive reconnaissance may be required as well. So a SAC that pursues an ambitious counterforce capability will be expensive. Yet it is but one component of an active deterrent policy. Few would claim that in the best of military circumstances it could do so thorough a job that not even a few Soviet missiles would be launched, and it only takes a few to destroy a few cities unless our defenses can prevent it. Much of our population could be destroyed by even a small surviving fraction of Soviet forces if our cities were defended no better than they are today, with no anti-missile defenses and but little civil defense preparations. A thoroughgoing active deterrent requires ambitious complementary defense measures for cities—active (shooting) and passive (shelters and evacuation)—if its underlying objective of limiting damage to us is not to be negated. And the more we rely upon our strategic airpower rather than other military capabilities to deter provocations that stop short of direct assault upon the United States, the greater the need for these expensive complementary measures.

These expenses of a policy that, moreover, risks upsetting the bilateral

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strategic equilibrium must make anyone pause before advocating an active American deterrent. Certainly they counsel moderation in aspiration and advocacy, and a ready recognition that such a capability must not be the whole of our military power. But to forgo an active deterrent altogether is another matter. As a comparatively minor issue, the arguments of great strategic and money cost are not completely consistent with each other. If we seek an active deterrent that promises to be extremely expensive because the enemy protects his vehicles so well that many of our vehicles would be required to destroy one of his, because our knowledge about his protective measures and the location of his launching sites is very limited, and because our defenses promise to be fairly ineffective, then his fears that we might be tempted to strike first should not be increased very much. To put it the other way around, the strategic equilibrium is likely to be made extremely unstable only when an effective counterforce capability promises to be so cheap as to be readily within the grasp of either side. The expensiveness of an active deterrent policy, and its limited effectiveness for any given budget, are simply opposite sides of the same coin. Limited effectiveness here, otherwise deplorable, offers at least the consolation of aggravating only moderately the temptation for him to strike first. Of course he can never be confident that we are not confident about our capability to limit damage to ourselves if we do strike, and so on in the subjective game of interacting apprehensions that is central to mutual deterrence. But an American active deterrent need not purchase the necessary back-up for our limited war capabilities at too great a strategic cost in terms of increasing the probability that the Russians strike directly at us.

Nor need the money cost be enormous. The provision of an adequate passive deterrent, essential in any case, will go far toward meeting the demands of an active one. In the first place, the vehicles can serve dual purposes. Ballistic missiles, for example, are relegated by some strategists to city attacks because they are deemed too inaccurate and their warheads too small for counterforce attacks. But they can play a vital role in counterforce attacks also because, at the very least, their speed enables them to disrupt and pin down enemy forces before slower bombers can reach those forces. More generally, some of our vehicles can and should have a counterforce capability for the case when we strike second, which automatically provides more of this capability in the militarily favorable strike-first situation. Those who find no utility in trying to hit enemy forces when we strike second must ponder about how we propose to end a war on terms as favorable to

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us as possible. Terminating a war when both sides retain some residual striking power, but when each has suffered great force losses by enemy attack as well as by attrition in one's own attack, is a much more favorable proposition for us than when it is only our forces that have been dissipated and destroyed. If, moreover, our retaliatory power has been expended upon the enemy's cities, leaving no enemy cities as continuing hostages, our bargaining power will be essentially zero. In terms of whatever control remains relevant, the world is his. Some retaliatory counterforce capability is highly desirable, if only to avoid this worst of all contingencies.

Thus in terms of types of vehicles and related capabilities, an adequate passive deterrent will yield some counterforce capability as a by-product. There remain the questions of its size and of both the nature and the size of complementary air defense measures. These are open questions that require quantitative specifications of alternative mixes of capabilities that go far beyond the scope of this article. Yet a few remarks may help to establish a sense of proportion. Many now speak of a vast "over-kill" potential of our strategic forces, and imply that our passive deterrent can be made smaller. Sometimes, however, their calculations of "over-kill" are pertinent only to the absurdly academic situation in which the enemy has obligingly interfered not at all with the process of converting our kill potential to actuality. Realistic calculations must allow for sizable force losses before we deliver our weapons, and our retaliatory forces must be big enough to absorb the losses that cannot be avoided by protective measures that would be cheaper than expanded forces. Furthermore, the blows that our surviving forces can inflict must grimly promise to be heavy enough to counter enemy passive as well as active defenses. When one has allowed for these factors, the illusion disappears of deterrence on the cheap because only a few small missiles are needed to match a few large enemy cities. Somewhat similarly, one comes to suspect air defense on the cheap because it concentrates solely—rather than primarily, as we advocate—upon indirect defense via protecting our deterrent forces rather than upon direct defense of civilians. Nobody can guarantee deterrence even when our defensive measures strengthen its prospects; and elementary prudence suggests that we insure against its failure by measures that will mitigate disaster. So a full-fledged passive deterrent may go far toward providing an active deterrent by-product capability in terms of type of force, size, and complementary air defenses. But perforce, to repeat, we leave open the question: how far?

Our argument has conceded the strategic and economic costs of an

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active deterrent, but countered the claims that exaggerate them. These costs cannot be eliminated without impairing the credibility of the retaliatory threat that backs our limited war capabilities. But they can be held to reasonable levels if our goals for limiting damage to the United States are realistically modest and—the big if—the Soviets do not push us into an intensified strategic arms race. Whether they will do so, or alternatively permit a slackening in the race, will be very hard to determine in the event, let alone to predict. Only exceedingly comprehensive inspection schemes could furnish assurance on this score, and such schemes are, to say the least, unlikely. Still, there is one important, if inconclusive, indicator that should be apparent. Suppose the Soviets began a much intensified civil defense program, one whose design appears tailored to limit damage to tolerable proportions in the event that they strike first. Their efforts to remove their population from hostage status could hardly pass unnoticed. Since we cannot count on their not doing so, our research and development efforts in civil defense should be thoroughgoing. Otherwise the long lead-times involved in a crash program might preclude our competing technologically in a civil defense race. But because we can hope that they will not initiate such a race, perhaps we ought not precipitate it. In this case, our expenditures on the civil defense and other components of our active deterrent, while increasing, need not soar as they so obviously could.

In sum, an admittedly incomplete but still potent American active deterrent need not be prohibitively expensive. And its strategic cost in terms of the risk of inciting rather than deterring an all-out attack upon the United States can be held low. If we combine obviously modest expectations of limiting damage to us as the goal of an active deterrent policy, even if we do strike first; great emphasis upon protecting our strategic forces as, in any case, the *sine qua non* of our passive deterrent; and a limited war capability adequate to meet assaults that fall short of massive nuclear attacks in overseas theaters—all these lower the strategic cost to the tolerable minimum that is consistent with a credible massive retaliation threat to buttress our vulnerable limited war forces. A modest active deterrent goal will be unlikely to incite the Russians much; a well-protected retaliatory threat should discourage them from attack even though they are incited to some extent; and a limited war capability will permit lesser threats to be met without invoking the threat of massive retaliation, and therefore will lessen the mutually reinforcing apprehensions of surprise massive attack on both sides.

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V

We are left with the questions of the kind and amount of a limited war capability in Europe. We propose that the European theater capability should be designed both in structure and in deployment primarily for non-nuclear warfare, with nuclear capabilities relegated to a secondary status, rather than the other way around; and that the forces should be big enough to hold without using nuclear weapons against even massive non-nuclear Soviet assault. This prescription is a retreat to old orthodoxy in both respects. The new orthodoxy, which arose out of despair that the NATO nations would make adequate force contributions, sought to rationalize smaller forces by designing them primarily for nuclear warfare. But, as we have seen, this course is tremendously expensive if the design is for bilateral nuclear warfare in which we are prepared to strike second; and in any case bilateral nuclear warfare makes a mockery of the underlying objective of protecting Europe.

Our proposal, otherwise expensive in terms of size of forces, economizes in two major respects. It forgoes as futile a renovation of NATO Shield forces for a true strike-second nuclear capability, and it minimizes the addition of forces to the Shield because they are appropriately tailored to non-nuclear holding action. With nuclear tactical capabilities relegated to secondary status, it does not make sense, for example, to provide those guided surface-to-surface missiles that are so expensive and inaccurate that they are absurdly inefficient for non-nuclear warfare. It does make sense, however, to add auxiliary bomb racks for nuclear weapons to dual-purpose airplanes, and to provide other nuclear delivery capabilities that can be inexpensive adjuncts. The nuclear capabilities would be useful either for strike-first purposes or for retaliating against enemy nuclear blows in the theater that, for political reasons, would be so limited as not to preclude such response.

Even with these economies, the prospect of force goals reminiscent of, if by no means precisely equivalent to, the never-achieved Lisbon goals of 1952 will strike many as futilely ambitious. One can only reply that strategically acceptable alternatives are unlikely to be any cheaper. Our economies can be extended, for example, by postulating for any fighting in Europe a code of weapon limitations that is slanted greatly in our favor: "The critical determinant of the size of the NATO shield, then, is this capability—a defensive force which, using tactical nuclear weapons to the extent necessary, could clearly break up and defeat a

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maximum Soviet *non-nuclear* attack."[3] Given this criterion, our military planners are free to substitute nuclear weapons for troops to the extent that comparative costs indicate—and that is likely to be a great extent. Accordingly, only small forces will be needed, and they will tend to be designed for the unilateral nuclear warfare that so markedly favors the side that indulges in this fantasy. Some military planners and most finance ministers will welcome such a proposal for obvious reasons. Strategists should not, for why should the Soviets acquiesce in so palpably one-sided a weapon limitation? Why, indeed, should they not counter with proposals for asymmetric limitations that are comparably biased for them? Are Russia's strategic bargaining power, ruthlessness, and vital interest in the European theater any the less than ours? And if both sides propose such limitations, which are incompatible, either non-nuclear force however provoked will be met with non-nuclear force; one side will be shown to be bluffing; or, if the threats are credible, the first use of tactical nuclear weapons by either side will trigger general war. If we pin our hopes to non-use of nuclear weapons as the most definable of weapon limitations, and one that is roughly symmetrical in advantage, we must be able to respond in kind to combat that observes this limitation. The resultant force estimates for the NATO Shield will not be small.

An adequately big and primarily non-nuclear Shield is not beyond our means, especially if we economize in other military areas as suggested above. NATO, after all, has greater production and even greater manpower than the European Soviet bloc, and the satellites may even contribute negatively to the Soviets. Our greater potential is especially important for the non-nuclear warfare that may permit some reserve forces and other resources to be mobilized in time. And, beyond the arguments of our greater potential, preparation for such warfare capitalizes upon most of our existing military assets. The conventional criticism of the time-phasing of our past NATO preparation—that it was oriented to World War II and thus ill-designed for the future—is perhaps well founded in its appraisal of our foresight, but nonetheless beside the point. However accidentally inspired, a largely conventional military preparation very roughly fits modern, non-nuclear, limited war aspirations. In contrast, had NATO European forces been designed from the outset for bilateral nuclear warfare, we would have

[3] Lincoln Gordon, "NATO in the Nuclear Age," *Yale Review*, XLVIII (March 1959), p. 326; italics added. The crucial point of difference with Gordon's analysis is identified here. There is much else that is admirable, notably his insistence upon the continued need for strength in Europe that is, moreover, firmly rooted in transatlantic rather than merely European interdependence.

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chased the will-of-the-wisp of invulnerability to the still greater neglect of non-nuclear limited war capabilities. Perhaps we should be grateful for some lack of foresight. In any case, it is surely sensible to model our current strategic pretensions to conform in the main to the assets that we have, whether these assets were well- or ill-planned.[4]

The economic feasibility of such a limited war capability is enhanced because we can settle for considerably less than meeting the Russians division for division. The prepared defense has some advantage over the offense in non-nuclear war, and this numerical advantage may be considerably reinforced if we devote sufficient ingenuity and effort to devising novel means of non-nuclear defense. The guided missile, for example, is commonly associated with nuclear warheads. But small guided missiles, even with conventional warheads, can still have revolutionary impact upon the battlefield. Specifically, the anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles hit at precisely the offensive vehicles that overwhelmed prepared defenses in World War II. Can these not be exploited to favor the defense, especially in a non-nuclear environment where the chance is greatly increased of the defensive battalions surviving to fire? Much more generally, can renewed vigorous research and development directed toward the neglected area of non-nuclear defense contribute other such examples? And, if we counter current apathy by providing a rationale for such defense as the relevant contemporary purpose of the NATO Shield, may we not hope to stimulate such research, especially in the European scientific community now least tapped by the Western defense effort? As the question marks suggest, all these are but possibilities, but they are not possibilities that we can afford to neglect.

Once again our proposal can be summarized in terms of competing military philosophies. It rejects the extreme view that we must prepare only for the worst contingency, that of general war. On the other hand, it rejects the vacuous view that we must somehow be equally prepared for all military contingencies, which if it means anything

[4] Our broad and sketchy argument necessarily avoids specifics, and hence omits vital examples where our preparations have seriously compromised our non-nuclear capabilities. These are likely to become more grievous unless the unorthodoxies advocated here become accepted. On the current dominance of nuclear over non-nuclear war planning, and for an amplification of other points in this section, see my chapter, "The Place of Limited War in NATO Strategy," in *NATO and American Security*, ed. by Klaus Knorr, Princeton, N.J., 1959.

It may well be objected that a NATO Shield designed primarily for non-nuclear war will be able to contribute less in the event of general war. To this I reply that the general war contribution of European NATO forces promises to be small anyway; cf. "NATO: Deterrent or Shield?" *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVI, No. 2 (January 1958), pp. 278-92.

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in practice, usually means that we are to be comparably ill-prepared for any contingency. We must compromise among preparations for nuclear tactical war and for non-nuclear, but we propose that the compromise be weighted heavily toward the latter in order that this capability be strong. Given this tactical capability to handle even large non-nuclear conflicts, nuclear retaliation can be reserved for the comparatively clear-cut case of enemy nuclear assault. And for massive enemy nuclear attack, this retaliatory threat would be posed by the strategic forces that can promise to implement it effectively rather than by European-based tactical forces.

VI

These, then, are the great diseconomies of our proposal: a big Shield for Europe, and a continued reliance to a degree upon an American active deterrent. Against these must be placed the great economies made possible by concentrating NATO strategic airpower and attendant enhanced air defenses primarily in North America, and by abandoning any renovation of European tactical capabilities so sweeping that it seeks the ability to hold even after large enemy nuclear assault. On balance, the proposal is at least as economically realistic as any of its competitors, save, of course, for those that deny the need for military strength or cling to illusions that our nuclear monopoly can be recreated by fiat.

Whether our proposals are politically realistic is a different and open question. They rest fundamentally upon an appraisal that now, since Soviet military power has grown so formidable, we can afford less than ever to forgo the efficiencies of a truly collective defense. Yet collective defense acknowledges mutual dependence, especially of Europeans upon the United States, to which there is obvious great resistance. And the craving for equality of status in the alliance—understandable especially for those like France where tradition feeds the craving, even though geography, resources, and capacity for sacrifice do not—generates a *mystique* about sharing modern weapons that wars against our proposals. The current trend is toward both a primarily nuclear Shield for NATO and independent strategic retaliatory forces. We might get the worst of all worlds. At the cost of gravely impairing our non-nuclear combat capability, great resources might be diverted toward a strike-second tactical nuclear capability that nonetheless does not get protected enough, and toward European strategic forces. These strategic forces might well be inefficient in retaliation, because they were so vul-

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nerably exposed to nearby Soviet attack; of still more dubious credibility in pre-emptive attack than SAC, because their use would be near-suicidal, given comparative smallness of forces and weakness of complementary air defenses; and of questionable net deterrent value, because their presence weakened the presumption that the big American deterrent would be invoked in European defense.

Even given current trends, the picture need not, of course, be this black. The real dilemma is whether unstinting advocacy that runs counter to current trends will aid or hinder attempts that are content to ameliorate them. Is it better for us to help Europeans get good nuclear systems than to hinder their getting any; to settle for the second-best policy alternative in order to avoid a still worse one? To this perennial political question there can, as usual, be no confident answer. If our European allies are certain to seek nuclear systems, simple economic prudence suggests that we help them rather than have them painfully retrace the steps of our early developments. But how can we be certain when declarations of intent are used as bargaining counters to compel our help, and when the implications of a wider distribution of nuclear capabilities are so fateful for attempts to halt atomic tests and limit the spread of such weapons? We cannot be certain, and therefore the issues raised by our discussion are still pertinent. In strategic assets, the old infrastructure and even most of the required ground forces are there if we but capitalize upon them. In strategic concepts, more and more Europeans are perceiving the blind alleys into which nuclear preoccupation has led us. Perhaps it is not yet too late to settle for some modified variant of our proposed alternative.

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THE NEW FACE OF SOVIET TOTALITARIANISM

By ADAM B. ULAM

NOTHING pricks one's curiosity more than the inner operations of a power system. And in the case of Russia the incentive to speculate on "what really goes on" in the councils of the Kremlin is enhanced by the supersecrecy in which the highest level of Soviet politics is enveloped, by the dramatic shifts of policy and sudden displacements of leading personalities, and by a natural apprehension about the operations of a totalitarian regime which may at any moment threaten or transform our daily lives.

In the United States, the mechanics of power in the Soviet Union have become a matter of national interest. A television show not long ago undertook to recreate the events leading to Stalin's death. The public is frequently invited by the press to ponder the significance of the replacement of a security chief in Kazakhstan or a Party secretary in Georgia. Newspaper stereotypes of leading Soviet figures appear almost as often as those of American presidential possibilities. Who has not heard of "ebullient" Nikita Khrushchev? And we have been presented with his potential rival: the "dour ideologue" Mikhail Suslov. As if in ironic expiation of the national sin of isolationism, the American people are concerning themselves increasingly with the fortunes of the Kirichenkos, Molotovs, and Zhukovs, and the activities and motivations of those distant political figures weigh heavily upon the national consciousness.

And yet how tenuous the basis upon which we erect our hypotheses and conjectures about Soviet politics! Unlike the performers in some other television shows, actors in the drama dealing with Stalin's death could have no assurance that their lines adhered to historical truth. That Suslov is a potential rival of Khrushchev or that Malenkov and Molotov were removed because of their attachment to Stalin's policies and methods are conjectures based, respectively, upon an unverifiable assumption and upon a charge which they have been in no position to answer. We have no right to scoff at these conjectures, but we must look for more solid bits of evidence before we try to construct a realistic picture of politics in the Soviet Union.

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I

Fortunately, we are now beginning to acquire more in the way of concrete material than visitors' conversations with the Soviet leaders or the Pythian language of the official Communist pronouncements. The flow of post-Stalin politics in Russia has forced some facts to emerge from behind the closed doors of the Kremlin, some degree of deliberation or decision-making to be done in public. In a step fairly unprecedented in recent years, the Soviet rulers deemed fit to release the minutes of the Central Committee meeting (the Plenum, as the official phraseology has it) which took place in December 1958. We have in our hands not only, as in the case of the usual Central Committee meeting, the resolution and the speech of the *rapporteur*, most frequently the First Secretary of the Party, but also minutes of all speeches delivered.[1]

To be sure, our find contains no sensational revelations. The Committee met and deliberated in an atmosphere completely dominated by Nikita Khrushchev. Hence the decision to publish the proceedings. We would give a great deal for the minutes of the meeting which in 1953 removed Beria and his associates, or of the Plenum of June 1957, when Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov were disgraced and Khrushchev's supremacy was firmly established. The proceedings of December 1958 were published and widely circulated exactly because they bore witness to the consolidation and unity of the Central Committee and offered an account—not fully reliable—of the sins of the defeated oppositionists which had allegedly led to their expulsion. But if there is no lurid revelation, we are still presented with a document of great importance. The Central Committee examined *the* problem of Soviet society and politics: the development of and future plans for Soviet agriculture. From both what was said and what can be inferred, we gain an insight into the current state of Soviet totalitarianism.

Take an incident of rather secondary importance. The bulk of the Plenum was devoted to the reports of the local Party secretaries as to the conditions and prospects of agriculture in their republics and regions. Thus the secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, Musta-

[1] *Plenum TSK KPSS 15-19 Dekabra 1958, Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, December 15-19, 1958, Stenographic Report), Moscow, 1958; hereinafter cited as *Plenum of 1958*. The practice of publishing minutes of the Plenary meetings of the Central Committee is now very likely to become the rule rather than the exception. Thus, we have the minutes of the June 1959 Plenum (concerned largely with problems of automation and industrial development), and the more interesting Plenum of December 1959 is also likely to be published.

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fayev, reports on his country. All is not well with collectivized agriculture in this Transcaucasian republic. The Party satrap is embarrassed to confess that the peasants cling to private ownership of cattle, and that even special taxes are not effective in making them sell their cows, sheep, and goats to the kolkhozes. "And can't you educate them in the principles of socialist agriculture?" asks Khrushchev. "True, Nikita Sergeyevich, but we need time." "And how much time do you need? Haven't forty-one years of Soviet power been enough?"[2] Mustafayev tries to divert the discussion from his peasants and their perverse intransigence to Marxism-Leninism: rumors have reached him of a disquieting state of affairs in Soviet agronomy. Have not some professors attacked that great pioneer of Marxism in biology, Trofim Lysenko? A member of a Soviet scientific delegation to Peking even had the gall to say: "We are done not only with Lysenko's theories, but with his methods as well."[3] "It is Tsitsin who said it," remarks Khrushchev, indicating how extensive are his sources of information and how injudicious it is to be indiscreet even five thousand miles from Moscow. "Call him before a Party meeting, and ask him as a Party member how he could have said it."

Mustafayev's talents in changing the subject of conversation did not avail him for long. The Azerbaijani peasants must have persisted in their un-Marxist attachment to their cows and goats, for in June 1959 he was sacked as the boss of Azerbaijan. No lesser rising star of the Party than Semichastny, until then the head of the Komsomol, was dispatched to become the Second Secretary of the republic Party (the first secretaryship and the titular leadership went, as custom now demands, to a native)—a fact that indicates the importance which the highest circles of the USSR attach to the problem.

The incident is symptomatic of a significant characteristic of Soviet politics: the ability to tread the line laid down by the Party and personal loyalty to Khrushchev are not enough in themselves to save an important official from disgrace. What is demanded is performance. The Party has set itself an enormous task of expansion in the sector of the national economy which has lagged under the Soviet rule, agriculture. A pseudo-scientific charlatan like Lysenko is restored to favor not improbably because he promises quick and sensational results from his methods of improving breeds and increasing output. Lysenko, whose ejection from his position as the dictator of Soviet biological sciences was a logical sequence of the official denigration of Stalin and "the cult of personality," was allowed at the Plenum to denounce

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 232.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 234.

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distinguished Soviet scientists who disagreed with his methods, and if he was not restored to his previous position, he was licensed to practice his charlatanry in a new direction: livestock breeding.

But this is only one of many devices and improvisations snatched at by the Party and the regime in their haste to raise the agricultural output. Ideological and political aims have become inextricably tied up with economic ones. It is not inappropriate to compare this meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party to a meeting of the board of a huge corporation. The regional directors render their accounts, the stories of their successes, problems, and difficulties. From time to time the leading "salesmen"—the collective farmers and agronomists—are called upon to intersperse the dignitaries' speeches with reports of successful new techniques and improvisations whose adoption would raise the output and enable the USSR to outdistance the competitor. The chairman of the board is clearly in command of the whole enterprise. Nikita Khrushchev interrupts the others' speeches, cracks jokes, and deals out praise and reprimands. But even he works under the same compulsion as his subordinates. Even his position in the Party is not uninfluenced by the indices of production, or independent of the successes and failures of the campaign to expand Russia's production and consumption of foodstuffs.

The complex of problems connected with the peasant-agriculture nexus has always been at the heart of Russian politics. It has fallen to Khrushchev to confirm what the Western economists have known or suspected for a long time: at the end of the Stalin era, Soviet agriculture had reached a serious crisis. "In fact," said the First Secretary, "the country insofar as the production of grain was concerned found itself at the *same level as pre-revolutionary Russia.*"[4] After thirty-five years of socialism and twenty years of collectivization, Soviet agriculture produced for a much greater population not much more than had backward Russia of 1910-1914. A prodigious increase in industrial production; stagnation and setbacks in agriculture—such has been, to borrow a Marxist term, the inherent contradiction of the Soviet system.

What are the reasons and where is the blame to be allotted? We cannot expect the First Secretary to say that the collective system goes against the grain of the Soviet peasant, that the Soviet regime as a whole has erred in carrying the exploitation of its rural population to a point where oppression becomes not only brutal but also non-economical and self-defeating. There are obvious and convenient culprits. It is the anti-Party group, comrades ("And one's speech falters at calling them

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 13; italics added.

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comrades, though they are still in the Party," says Khrushchev), Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov, who bear the responsibility for this sorry plight, and who until their ejection in 1957 opposed every positive and helpful measure to relieve the agricultural distress. Did not Malenkov lie when he asserted in 1952 that the country had harvested eight billion *poods* of grain? He knew, since he was then in charge of agriculture, that the actual harvest was in fact 5.6 billion *poods*.[5] Did not Molotov propose to increase the quota for subscription to the national loan among the peasants, knowing full well that the peasants simply could not meet the increased quota and that the only result would be the worsening of political morale among the collective farmers? Did not the opposition as a whole scoff at and oppose every attempt to ameliorate the lot of the peasants, every attempt to open new lands for cultivation?

Thus Khrushchev. The defeated leaders are not present to give their side of the story. They take their place in the history of the Party alongside the Trotskyites, who allegedly sabotaged the First Five-Year Plan; the Bukharinites, who mixed nails with butter and slaughtered livestock to discredit collectivization; the "people's enemy," Beria, who sent thousands of innocent Communists to their death; and that half-great, half-guilty man, Stalin, who invented terror and "the cult of personality." As from Khrushchev's "secret speech," so from his agricultural report somber facts emerge about the Soviet system, no matter where the blame is laid. Thus in 1953 serious trouble was avoided only through the use of the state reserves of foodstuffs, the current production being insufficient for basic needs.[6] The state loans stand revealed as another form of taxation—which is no surprise to the foreign experts. It is officially confirmed that the Soviet statistics were often falsified, the most common method in agriculture being the substitution of the biological yield for the grain actually collected and usable. But the connection of the anti-Party group with the alleged misdeeds requires more careful examination, because, among other things, in the process we shall perceive some interesting facts about Soviet politics.

Was Malenkov in 1952 the Party official primarily responsible for Soviet agriculture? The falsified figures which Khrushchev quotes are drawn from the general report delivered at the 19th Party Congress by Malenkov in his capacity as deputy for Stalin, a report which touched on almost every aspect of domestic and foreign policies. The report

[5] *Ibid.* One *pood* equals 16.3 kilograms.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 12. State reserves apparently had to be used during 1959 in view of the unfavorable harvest.

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was made in the name of the Politburo and the Central Committee. It would be foolish to suppose that Malenkov's colleagues on those two bodies, certainly on the Politburo, did not know the real facts. Who as late as 1951 was the Politburo member assumed to be principally concerned with agriculture? None other than Nikita Khrushchev.

We shall get closer to the truth if we go back to the event which marks the real beginning in the post-Stalin development of Soviet agriculture, the Plenum of the Central Committee of September 1953. It was this Plenum which charted the new course to be adopted toward the peasant and which, incidentally, elevated Khrushchev to the position of First Secretary. It was he who delivered the report and outlined the steps to be taken in the future.[7] The story he told then was considerably different in tone, if not in substance, from the angry evaluation he was to render in 1958. No evocation of a danger of famine. No attribution of personal blame to Malenkov, who was then still the first man of the regime. No, the story of collectivized agriculture was depicted as one of progress and success. Figures were quoted warily by Khrushchev, something we can now understand. But he did quote them to assert that the commercial production of grain had grown fourfold between 1926/27 and 1952/53, and that the latter year marked a 10 per cent increase in output over 1940.

The cat was let partially out of the bag when Khrushchev came to indicating the measures needed for further and greater successes. Here the tone of urgency was unmistakable. The Party had neglected the use of material incentives in dealing with the peasant. The collective farmer's private plot had been assailed and threatened, thus further lowering his morale and his incentive to work. The concrete proposals by the *rapporteur* that were adopted by the Central Committee included an immediate rise in prices for agricultural products, a reduction in the compulsory supplies furnished by the kolkhozes to the state at fixed prices, and a considerable outlay of capital on agriculture and on improving the peasant's living conditions. A reader of *Pravda* might have been curious to know who in the past had been assailing the private plot, who had advocated solving the agricultural lag through greater centralization and discipline rather than through increased incentives and reassurances to the peasant. He would not have had to search his memory very strenuously to remember that Nikita Khrushchev had been under Stalin one of the people most directly concerned with col-

[7] The Plenum took place on September 3, 1953. The decisions were reported in *Pravda* on September 13, and Khrushchev's report was published on September 15 in the same place.

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lective-farm affairs, most active in the amalgamation of the farms into larger units, the man who in 1950 had advocated still further amalgamation into *agrogorods*—the agricultural cities. The most immediate result of the introduction of the *agrogorods*—where the peasants were to dwell in apartment houses and be driven out to the fields to work in brigades—would have been the abolition of the private plot. Even in the atmosphere of gigantomania and greater and greater centralization and compulsion which characterized the last year of Stalin, Khrushchev's proposal was deemed extravagant and impractical and was dropped by the Party. But it was the same hand which had raised the stick over the peasant's head in 1950 which was now extending a carrot, the same man who had urged the extreme of compulsion who was now castigating past harshness and exactions.

But the important thing about the Plenum of 1953, just as of that of 1958, was not the zigzag course adopted by Khrushchev or his callisthenics in shifting to others the blame for policies he himself had been largely responsible for. The important thing is to perceive how the agriculture-peasant nexus embodies the main dilemma of Soviet totalitarianism. What is the essence of the problem? Let us again listen to Khrushchev, this time in 1958. In speaking of the great progress made since 1953 in livestock breeding, he inserts the following qualification: ". . . I would like to speak about one group of regions of the Russian republic, the leaders of which have not been up to the task, and consequently those regions are not listed among the leading ones, *though they have contributed a high percentage of the increase of the production of meat by the economy of the region as a whole. Can we measure success solely by this indicator? No, we cannot.* . . . As is well known, the basic producers of meat for consumption are in our country *the kolkhozes and sovkhozes* [state farms]. . . *.Therefore, no matter how high the increase of production of meat as a whole, if the share of this increase contributed by the kolkhozes and sovkhozes is insignificant one has to say this region lags behind.* And such is the state of affairs in the above-mentioned regions. The Pskov region increased its meat production by 20 thousand tons, but its kolkhozes and sovkhozes only by 3.1 thousand tons. . . ."[8]

Here then is the classical dilemma: the peasant works more efficiently on his own, be it in his miserable plot, or with his own fowls or cow, than as a member of a team in the socialized sector of the agricultural economy. The regime cannot accept the growth of production as satisfactory in itself if there is evidence that this growth is faster in the

[8] *Plenum of 1958*, p. 41; italics added.

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private than in the socialized sector. And the problem is not confined only to production; it reflects, as Khrushchev himself amply illustrates, a basic factor of the peasant's psychology. We have mentioned Mustafayev's sad case and how the inability of socialized cows and goats to breed as quickly as their privately owned fellow creatures can handicap the career of a powerful official. Here is additional evidence: "In some regions the number of cows grows because of the increase in the number of livestock owned privately by the peasants, workers and functionaries. *At the same time, the number of cows owned by the kolkhozes or sovkhozes either remains the same or decreases.* For instance, in the Astrakhan region in 1953 there were thirty-seven thousand collectively and state-owned cows, and now there are only thirty-five thousand. But the number of cows owned by the individual peasants, workers, and functionaries has grown by seventeen thousand."[9] The First Secretary goes on to support his complaints with several similar examples, which illustrate that for all the state and Party support given to the collectivized sector, for all the meagerness of the actual acreage owned privately in household plots, for all the impossibility of an individual in the USSR owning a *considerable* number of cattle or fowls, the peasant continues to "vote" for more economic freedom, or at least a loosening of the collective structure.

The regime cannot allow him to push too far in that direction. In trying to give the peasant material and psychological incentives, the Party under Khrushchev's leadership has considerably relaxed the iron clamp of centralization (at least insofar as administration, if not policy-making, is concerned) and exploitation of the peasantry. In addition to the measures indicated above, the regime in 1958 allowed the collective farms to purchase the Machine Tractor Stations. Here is what Stalin had to say in 1952 regarding the possibility of such a step: "The result, first, would be that the collective farms would become the owners of the chief tools of production. That is, they would attain an exceptional position, such as no enterprise in our country enjoys, since as is well known even the nationalized enterprises in our country are not the owners of the tools of production. How could one justify this exceptional position of the collective farms, by what consideration of progress or advance? Could one say that such a situation would be conducive to raising collective farm property to the level of public property, that it would speed the transition of our society from socialism to communism? Would it not be more accurate to say that such a situation could only further separate collective farm ownership from public

[9] *Ibid.*; italics added.

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ownership and lead us not closer to communism, but on the contrary further from it?"[10]

Khrushchev chose to disregard Stalin's warning. The Machine Tractor Station not only provided the collective farm with machinery, but also controlled and dictated the economic activity of the kolkhoz, and its personnel not infrequently has exerted political and police supervision as well. By turning it over to the collectives, the regime no doubt has thought to give the peasants a feeling of control over their economic activities (while still retaining to a great extent its own power of direction) and more of a sense of being members of a real *collective* farm rather than state employees tilling the land. But economic freedom in agriculture, leading to a pronounced difference in status between the peasant and the city worker, is very far from being an objective of the regime. It is clear that in Khrushchev's mind even the collective farm chained and directed by the state, as it still is in many ways, is far from being the ideal form of agricultural organization. The settling and cultivation of the virgin lands have been done predominantly through the agency of the state farm, where the difference between the worker and peasant tends to be obliterated. For all the announced aims of surpassing the United States in the production of butter, milk, and meat, it is not likely that the First Secretary would listen with favor if by some miracle the Soviet economists were to say to him: "Nikita Sergeyevich, we have considered the problem and reached the unanimous conclusion that our agricultural production would double if we were to abolish state farms, loosen the remaining controls over the collective farms, and increase the size of the household plot."

The revulsion from anything which smacks of real economic freedom for the peasant, even if the price paid for this revulsion is the delay or hampering of the Party's most cherished economic goals, is deeply grounded in the Communist ideology. It is important to understand what "ideology" means in this connection. It is not because of any superstitious reverence for the letter of Marxism or Leninism that the Party will never give up collectivization and would always, ideally, prefer state to collective farms. On numerous occasions, and in many aspects of Soviet life, the original gospel has been unabashedly altered or abandoned. A keen sense of pragmatism, a freedom from fanatical dogmatism, has characterized Khrushchev's ascendance, and one has only to look at Russian society in the 1920's and mid-1930's to see that the same quality, in a different sense, was not lacking in Stalin. But

[10] J. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, quoted in *Current Soviet Politics*, ed. by Leo Gruliow, New York, 1953, 1, p. 19.

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that private property in agriculture is bad is not only something that the Party leaders have learned from Marx, Lenin, and Stalin; it is something that they feel in their bones as a threat to their power, their position, and the whole rationale of the totalitarian system which they are bent on maintaining, even if in a modified and more rational form than under their predecessor.

But almost as strong as that fear is the desire to expand production in foodstuffs. The regime is determined "to catch up and surpass" the United States not only in heavy industry but in the absolute and relative production of butter, meat, and milk. Again, in appraising the reasons for this aim it is impossible to separate neatly factors of ideology, economics, and the Soviet brand of power politics. Ideologically, the aim is to "prove" to the Soviet people that communism not only is adept at industrialization, and especially at building heavy industry, but is equally capable and solicitous of raising the standard of living. Economically, without considerable improvement in agriculture, industrial progress itself might be threatened. And politically, what more attractive "platform" could Khrushchev offer in attempting to consolidate his power, what better argument to the wavering or doubtful members of the Central Committee, than the promise of a better life for the masses—something which apart from its inherent appeal makes life easier for a Party or state administrator?

In the economic—especially agricultural—field, we thus see another of those glittering "inherent contradictions" which the Marxist masters of the USSR are wont to find in the West, but of which their own system is so full. "Socialist legality" is proclaimed to disassociate communism from the horrors of Stalinism, and to infuse the Party and the system with new vigor. But this legality may not advance to the point where something like a real rule of law is possible, for the regime is bent on maintaining its powers of repression. The area of intellectual freedom may be somewhat expanded, for again the old type of "socialist realism" and conformity were found to be stultifying and the breeders of boredom and hence dissatisfaction. But the loosening of the reins can never go so far as to permit genuine intellectual freedom, for a book like *Doctor Zhivago* with its anti-materialist message is much more of a threat to the ethos of communism than would be any out-and-out attack upon the Soviet system. Similarly in agriculture: the need to give the peasant a reassurance that he will not be arbitrarily transformed into an urbanized wage earner, and that the few vestiges of his private property in land and stock will not be seized, clashes

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with the realization that even a small degree of economic independence for the peasantry may place them in a position to threaten the absolute control of economic life which for the Communists is a matter of life or death.

It is against the canvas of these contradictions that the political game at the highest level takes place in the USSR. One of the sins attributed to the "anti-Party gang" of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich has been their unwillingness to subscribe to the slogan of surpassing the United States in the production of the basic foodstuffs. It would be hard to imagine Molotov getting up and saying, "No, comrades, it would be dangerous for us to produce more milk per head than they do in America." But as it emerges from the December Plenum, the oppositionists felt that Khrushchev's targets were somewhat unrealistic —an opinion shared by several Western economists, who presumably have no stake in or sentimental attachment to Stalinism. It is not difficult to imagine Molotov and Kaganovich decrying Khrushchev's aims as demagogic, conducive to the raising of expectations whose disappointment would threaten the regime, if not the Party, or whose fulfillment would require a diversion of resources from investment in producers' goods. If Molotov as alleged attacked the plan of settlement and cultivation of the virgin lands as uneconomic, he had as company several Western experts on Soviet agriculture. The project, a key point in Khrushchev's plan of agricultural expansion, has meant the conversion to agriculture of vast areas of Kazakhstan and Siberia, previously thought unsuitable for cultivation. In the long run, the experts and Mr. Molotov apparently agree, those lands because of the dryness and salinity of their soil and other climatic factors may not justify the effort and expense.[11]

In the long run . . . But for an ambitious and determined politician, in the USSR as elsewhere, politics consists of a series of short-run situations. If the expansion of the area of cultivation can dramatically improve the total picture for a time, as it already has, what does it matter if the reclaimed areas eventually relapse into dust bowls? Helped by a couple of bumper crops, Khrushchev has been able to confound and eject his enemies. If and when their misapprehensions become substantiated, *they* will not be in a position to challenge the First Secretary, who will have in the meantime fastened his grip more firmly upon the Party organization.

[11] After several bumper crops, 1959 was a disappointing year in Soviet agriculture and particular troubles appeared in Kazakhstan.

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II

"And now it is the turn of Bulganin to speak." Thus the chairman of the session referred without the customary prefix of "Comrade" to the man who a few months before had been chairman of the Council of Ministers and for a long time the second most influential figure of the regime.[12] Bulganin was called upon to recant, to confess his part in the activities of the "anti-Party" group which in 1957 had challenged Khrushchev's leadership, and to pledge his loyalty and willingness to work for the Party and the state in whatever humble position was entrusted to him. Equally a part of the ritual, the assembled greeted him in silence and some of the succeeding speakers found this declaration of a now broken man lacking in candor and completeness. Thus, amidst sullen hostility and vilification the erstwhile colleague and apparent friend of Khrushchev countersigned his own political death warrant. It fell to him to provide these unflattering portraits of his alleged partners in crime: "Molotov—a man who has lost contact with life and the Soviet nation . . . Kaganovich—an empty phrase-maker . . . Malenkov—an intriguer capable of any baseness."[13]

It is a bold man who would speak with confidence about what actually happened in June 1957. From the official Soviet version unreels a veritable serial story: In June Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich—and Shepilov, "who has jumped over to their side," as the official version stoutly and somewhat incomprehensibly insists—are publicly stigmatized and ejected from their high positions. In December the cast is increased by Bulganin. And in January 1959 at the 21st Party Congress, Saburov and Pervukhin are officially stamped as having been involved in the "anti-Party group" attempt, though not to the extent alleged about the other five.[14] The recent Party history, in describing the fracas of June 1957, implies very strongly that old Voroshilov, if not on the side of Khrushchev's opponents, at least did not oppose them.[15] The penalties meted out have also varied. The "Three Musketeers" of the opposition and their unfortunate "recruit" Shepilov were dismissed to unimportant posts and became the targets of re-

[12] *Plenum of 1958*, p. 337.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 340.

[14] *Vneocherednoi 21 Zyezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, Stenograficheskii Otchet* (The Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stenographic Report), Moscow, 1959, 2 vols.; hereinafter cited as *Extraordinary 21st Congress*. Pervukhin's speech and recantation, II, pp. 140-43; Saburov's speech, II, pp. 289-92.

[15] *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza* (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Moscow, 1959. The list of those who supported Khrushchev does *not* include Voroshilov; see p. 655.

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current abuse. Bulganin, a year later, was consigned to the same category. Pervukhin was retained in the highest governing bodies of the Party, though demoted to an alternate member of the Presidium and sent off to a diplomatic post. Saburov, once the head of all economic planning, is now a director of a factory. Voroshilov, probably in view of his age (b. 1881) and a certain sentimental popularity which surrounds his name, has been retained in his Party and state posts, but deprived of any real influence.

Just enough of the story is known to lead one to the most tantalizing reconstructions of intrigues and clashes at the highest levels of power. Out of insufficient data tales have been spun of the "Stalinist bloc" of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich, and the "industrial" or "managers' " party represented by Pervukhin and Saburov, collaborating to unseat Khrushchev. We have already seen how in the case of agricultural policy the ruling faction has managed to affix to Malenkov and Molotov the responsibility for the ruinous policy which as a matter of fact had rested on the shoulders of the then leadership of the Party as a whole. Similarly, in the case of the events of June 1957 we must not accept uncritically the official version, or build upon it without caution.

Why the long delay in uncovering the part allegedly played by Bulganin? Why the differential treatment applied to Saburov and Pervukhin? Possibly in June 1957 Khrushchev did not care to avow publicly how widespread the opposition to him had been, and that the majority of the then Presidium had been ranged against him. Possibly he was following one of the traditional techniques of the Soviet purge, that of a gradual rather than an abrupt demotion of political opponents, with the charges against them growing louder as their power and stature decreased. But another possibility deserves to be mentioned.

One of the supporters of Khrushchev at the June 1957 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee was the Minister of Defense, Marshal Zhukov. He was rewarded by being made a full member of the reorganized Presidium, the first time in Soviet history that a man *primarily* a soldier reached that position. Three months later Zhukov was abruptly deprived of his ministry and his Party posts. His sins? "Zhukov . . . [tried] to liquidate the leadership and control of the armed forces by the Party. . . . In the Soviet Army with the personal participation of Zhukov there began to be propagated the cult of his personality. . . ."[16] Zhukov's successor as Defense Minister, Marshal Malinovsky, referred jocularly to the whole incident as a "box on the ear" administered to

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 657.

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this "would-be Bonaparte."[17] While the Party gatherings and documents, etc., are full of references to the "anti-Party group" and their growing list of misdemeanors, Zhukov's dereliction is passed over quickly as simply a product of the megalomania of one man, unassisted by anybody else of importance, certainly by no Party figure, and something which grew and became obvious in the space of three months. In June 1957, Zhukov was a leading and rewarded collaborator of Khrushchev whose role during the war and subsequent slights at the hand of Stalin had been advertised by the Party (e.g., in Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the 20th Congress); by October, he had become a discredited megalomaniac who in a puerile fashion had sought to challenge the united authority of the Party and the state. The story is one of political naiveté, which under the conditions of Soviet politics not even a gallant soldier is likely to exhibit. It served the regime's purpose to present the trouble in the army as the result of the personal aberration of one man unconnected with any deeper political or social issue, just as the opposition in the *Party* was reduced to an alleged nostalgia for Stalinism exhibited by a few former leaders who had lost "contact with life." Yet the realities of political life in the Soviet Union are such that no attempt to secure a degree of autonomy—whether by the army, the state, or the industrial bureaucracy—is likely to be made by a man in possession of his senses unless he has received some encouragement or support from Party circles. Bulganin at one time had been Minister of Defense. During the war and after Stalin's death he had worked closely with Zhukov. The obscure references during both the December Plenum and the January Congress to the effect that the erstwhile Prime Minister was "dissatisfied with his position in the Party," and the statement in the Party history that even following the events of June 1957 he continued to intrigue (with whom and about what?), may well refer to his connection with Marshal Zhukov.

Of more fundamental interest than its mystery-thriller aspects is the shifting character of Soviet politics. Before addressing ourselves to this matter, it is well to set the problem in perspective.

Until a few years ago, most of the foreign (non-Communist) commentators on Soviet affairs viewed the USSR as a well-nigh perfect totalitarian structure. The perfection of the instruments of oppression, the ubiquity and intensity of the Communist propaganda, and the Soviet citizen's isolation from anything his rulers deemed undesirable for him had persuaded many that a system like this was almost in-

[17] *Extraordinary 21st Congress*, II, p. 21.

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vulnerable to decay or to any conceivable internal opposition (indeed, internal opposition was practically inconceivable). The only possibility of alteration was seen in the eventuality of dissension among the wielders of the instruments of power following Stalin's death, or in an external event like war. Even the few dissenting voices—e.g., Mr. Kennan's—sought the key to a possible change in the Soviet system in the *rulers* growing more enlightened and realistic, less inclined to keep their people in oppression and isolation.

A few years have passed and, in response to the post-Stalin developments, many writers on Soviet affairs have shifted their focus of analysis. We no longer conjecture about the Party apparatus struggling with the security forces or the army for control of the whole totalitarian structure. The "forces of history" have reappeared, and many an analyst will talk of the rise of the managerial class, or of the improving standard of living and education of the Soviet citizen modifying the structure that was once assumed to be cast iron and insusceptible to change.

It is almost superfluous to insist that *both* elements must be present in our conjectures about the present state and the future of the Soviet system. Stalin's death did not *make* the USSR malleable to social and economic pressures. But by removing the one man whom the most severe economic crisis or popular dissatisfaction could not have dislodged from the pinnacle of power, it did *reveal* the intensity and complexity of social and ideological issues confronting the regime. The crisis in Soviet agriculture was most acute during Stalin's last years, but the existence of the crisis or its resolution one way or another could not affect the despot's position, though it might spell favor or disgrace for this one or that one of his lieutenants. Following Stalin's death, it became crucial for whoever aspired to supreme power that *his* agricultural policy should be popular or yield quick improvements, and that former errors and exactions in that field should be ascribed to his opponents. What swung the scales in favor of Khrushchev in June 1957 when the majority of his colleagues in the Presidium were arrayed against him? His strength in the Party apparatus and skill at personal maneuverings? Certainly. But an important part must have been played by the policies with which the victorious leader managed to identify himself. A policy of economic decentralization, though this decentralization takes place mainly at the administrative rather than the decision-making level, cannot but appeal to the local Party bosses who compose the majority of the Central Committee. The Party secretary of Belorussia, for instance, becomes a person of greater consequence in controlling the economic life of his republic, even if the basic plans

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and decisions are still made in Moscow. But there are also policies which because of their over-all popularity are likely to invest their exponent with added strength within the Party. How attractive it must be to the Soviet citizen to be told that the competition with the United States is to apply not only to the heavy producers' goods which he cannot eat or use, but also to the production of butter, milk, and meat! How considerably easier must appear the task of a Party functionary if, in addition to prodding the population to further efforts and sacrifices, he can point to the tangible measures the regime is taking to improve its citizens' daily life!

But it is the last example which reminds us of the, at present, unavoidable limits of the sequence: popular policies = power within the Party. Superficially Khrushchev's gambit bears a resemblance to some of the policies associated with Malenkov's ascendance. When he was being discharged in February 1955 as Prime Minister, the gravest of the charges against Malenkov consisted of his alleged un-Leninist encouragement of the production of consumers' goods to the detriment of continued expansion of Soviet heavy industry. What other elements contributed to Malenkov's disgrace (then only partial) we can merely speculate about: personal feelings of the Party bigwigs against the man who had been Stalin's chief lieutenant during his last years, and probably his intended successor; Malenkov's weakness in the Party apparatus from which he had been removed as the price for his premiership on the morrow of Stalin's death, and so forth. But the official statement did not hesitate to ascribe his demotion to his espousal of what on the face of it must have been a popular policy with the "masses." And so Khrushchev's maneuvering, his "platform" of better living conditions for the people and a *détente* with the West, can in no sense be interpreted as the Party bowing to popular pressures; rather, it is a clever politician's gambit, supplementing his administrative maneuverings with a timely, common-sense, and popular policy. If and when the political game in Russia begins to consist *mainly* of a contest for popularity, the system will have changed far beyond its present form.

III

Soviet totalitarianism disposes of a dazzling array of instruments of compulsion and indoctrination. At the same time, it does not take much historical insight to perceive in the USSR those social pressures toward a higher standard of living, toward a modicum of security against an arbitrary act of the state, and toward professional autonomy which are

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characteristic of any modernized society. In contemplating this two-fold aspect of Soviet politics, a Western observer, remembering how often in Soviet—indeed, in Russian—history periods of liberalization and reform have been followed by a renewed wave of centralization and oppression, may somberly forecast the triumph of totalitarianism; or he may hopefully anticipate that social forces will modify the regime to the point where not democracy, but at least the basic social and institutional prerequisites of democracy, become perceptible.

The dilemma brings to mind a similar perplexing problem in historical prognostication. Karl Marx in the middle of the nineteenth century postulated the inevitable development of capitalism toward greater and greater monopolistic concentration, on one hand, and toward greater and greater impoverishment of the working masses, on the other. Half a century later, faced with the palpable non-fulfillment of that prophecy, some German Marxists developed an ingenious interpretation in order to reconcile Marxism with economic reality. While the *natural* tendency of capitalism is toward ever-sharpening economic crises and lowered standards for the workers, the *countertendency* both in the sense of conscious measures taken by the capitalists and of self-defense by the working class does in effect contribute to a temporary frustration of Marx's prophecy without invalidating the basic Marxist analysis. This interpretation has often been held, and with reason, to be a piece of sophistry and obfuscation. And yet it was not entirely so, and the example may help us to understand the problem of forecasting the future evolution of the Soviet system.

If modern history teaches anything, it is that industrialization and modernization have definite political effects. Granted a certain level of education, the satisfaction of basic economic needs of a society brings with it the demand for, at least, rudimentary political rights and protection against arbitrary acts of the state. Not far behind lie the equally "natural" demands of professional groups for a modicum of autonomy within their sphere: the intellectuals' for freedom in intellectual pursuits, the workers' for a real autonomy of trade unions and bargaining, and so forth. An industrialized and modernized society is likely to develop a certain gloss of agnosticism not only in religious but in ideological matters. The "natural" process in the case of the USSR must be one of erosion of totalitarianism—not necessarily, as is sometimes assumed, because the people become "dissatisfied" or are horrified by revelations about Stalinism, but mainly because of the logic of the people's everyday pursuits and economic functions. Not through revolts, demonstrations, or even conscious dissatisfaction, but because of the

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changing social, economic, and cultural environment is the Soviet system being pushed away from totalitarianism.

But before we adopt a kind of democratic determinism and talk glibly of the Soviet Union having entered upon the road toward parliamentarism and the rule of law, it is well to consider the *countertendency*. This is the very clear determination of the leaders of the Soviet system not to abandon their totalitarian controls to any appreciable degree and to divert the social and political aspirations of their people toward aims and pursuits which enhance rather than threaten their power. They are not blind to the social ferment within their society, and are sophisticated enough to realize the concrete if distant danger it poses for Communist totalitarianism. But they are confident that they can handle the problem. "The theorists of social democracy and the revisionists blacken [our real] socialist democracy," said Khrushchev. "According to them, 'democratization' ought to mean under socialism the abdication of the leading role of the working class and *its party*, and a *return* to the forms of bourgeois democracy. If you don't have that, then in their opinion you have neither democracy nor socialism. For them, democracy—it is the opportunity for dazzling parliamentary speeches, for playing with combinations between parties, for advertising the flowery formula of 'free elections,' behind which hides the omnipotence of capital and impotence of the working class. . . ."[18]

How ephemeral are those fruits of democracy when compared with the real facts of democratization of life in the USSR and the passing of the functions of the state to society! With apparent seriousness, Khrushchev cites the case of sports and physical culture, which the state is ready to turn over to social organizations, and of "citizen courts," which are to deal with minor cases of social misdemeanors. But that no wrong implications be drawn from this impressive account of the "withering away" of the state, he adds, "It is clear in itself that the transfer of some functions from organs of the state to social organizations does not at all mean the weakening of the role of the socialist state in the building of communism."[19]

Now it is easy to discern unconscious humor in Khrushchev's words, or something else again when he states, not once but twice, that there are now no cases of Soviet citizens being tried or imprisoned for political crimes. But it would be a mistake to see simply hypocrisy or incredible self-deception in Khrushchev's lengthy disquisition on socialism in Russia entering the stage of communism. Those are words of a man

[18] *Ibid.*, I, p. 103; italics added. [19] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

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conscious of the existence of social and economic pressures and grievances in the population, and of the need of anticipating and harnessing them to the aims of the Party rather than merely suppressing them. And if the average Soviet citizen is not likely to be impressed by the abolition of a state committee on sports, or the fact that a bothersome drunkard is to be judged by a court of "comrades" rather than a state court, it does not follow that Khrushchev's declamation is entirely naïve or obsolete. For while the passages dealing with the transition from socialism to communism in the USSR are often ludicrous, the total effect of the appraisal of the current position and prospects of the Communist camp and of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism can hardly fail to be impressive. Who, not only among his hearers but abroad, would laughingly dismiss his proud account of the enormous growth of Communist strength since the war? Who would take as an empty boast that ". . . the relationship of real strength in the world today is such that we will know how to throw back any aggression of any enemy"?[20] The inanities about the transition from socialism to communism and about the Soviet state visibly withering away do not sound nearly so absurd when coupled with the startlingly realistic account of the strength of the Soviet camp, of the growing power of Soviet economy and technology, and of the weakening position of the West.

It becomes clearer how the rulers propose to resolve the paradox of the retention of their totalitarian power over an industrialized and literate society. They stake that power on the revival of the doctrine and of the party which is its embodiment; on linking the progress and successes of the Soviet Union with Marxism-Leninism and the Communist Party. The arsenal of totalitarianism, its instruments of suppression, terror, and censorship are to be kept in readiness, but are to be used more sparingly while the regime bases its policies of the moment on its ability to persuade and demonstrate to Soviet citizens that communism is a viable and vigorous way of life which has nothing to learn from or finds nothing to envy in the obsolete democratic and liberal ideas. How chimerical are the alleged blessings of parliamentary democracy compared with the Soviet achievements in space! And the fact that one third of mankind now lives under communism is to compensate the Soviet citizen for his lack of liberty; or rather, he is told that he already enjoys greater freedom than his British or American counterpart. Politicians no more than advertising men are likely to be unduly depressed by a non-sequitur in their formulas or slogans. Rather they see the problem as one of a continuing need for dramatic

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

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improvisations and stunts. One should not, therefore, expect Khrushchev and his colleagues to admit even to themselves that the harnessing of nuclear energy and space exploration by Russia are not necessarily connected with the monopoly of power exercised by the Communist Party; one should not await the day when by reading social and economic statistics the rulers of the USSR will become persuaded to surrender the vast powers of coercion and suppression which still remain in their hands. Quite likely, in their minds there is no contradiction between what they regard as democratization of life in Russia and the continuation of their absolute powers.

To use a historical simile, Khrushchev's era has meant the introduction of enlightened totalitarianism in the USSR and a conscious effort to dispense with the pathological, uneconomic, and plainly unnecessary aspects of totalitarianism inherited from Stalin.

Can the regime pursue its chosen path for long without reverting to terror and isolation from the West, or stumbling into a situation where its totalitarian powers would in effect be threatened? It is instructive to see an example of the variety of political resources of which the Communist system disposes and that enable it to avoid those two extremes which foreign commentators with their fine sense of logic take to be the imminent choices before Khrushchev & Co. The meeting of the Central Committee which concluded 1959 bore witness to the very serious troubles which Soviet agriculture had encountered during the past year. In addition to a drought, complex economic and social factors affected adversely the farm output. Criticisms addressed to the Party organization in Kazakhstan, censure applied to its Secretary, one of Khrushchev's closest collaborators, Belyayev, may illuminate the earlier apprehensions about the hastiness and economic feasibility of the reclamation of the "virgin lands." But the year 1959 was also the year of Soviet triumphs in space exploration, and above all it was the year when Soviet foreign policy succeeded in achieving agreement on a summit meeting. And the dictator's personal triumph in being invited to the United States, of being able, paradoxically because of Soviet pushfulness on the Berlin issue, to identify himself with international conciliation and peaceful settlement, has gone far in strengthening his position, notwithstanding serious trouble on the agricultural front. This is not meant to suggest that there is a cause and effect relationship between troubles on the domestic front and Soviet pushfulness in foreign policy. But the example is instructive in showing the multiplicity of devices at the disposal of the regime, devices which can divert or block the social and economic forces impinging upon its

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totalitarian powers, forces which may also affect the position of the leader and his entourage.

"Enemies of communism claim that the growth of culture in the Soviet Union will press for change in its social system, that the Soviet people will not [long] suffer the present system. They [i.e., the enemies of communism] do not understand what real freedom for the worker, for the people, is! The champions of capitalism represent the capitalist world as . . . the world of freedom," said Khrushchev at the December 1959 Plenum.[21] And this illustrates both the Soviet leaders' awareness of the problem and their confidence, though not untinged with apprehension, that the challenge can be met. How pathetic and yet how meaningful the attempt to give the Soviet people the surrogate of democratic feeling about this meeting of bureaucrats reporting to their boss, as if it were a free meeting of a deliberative body. The story conveyed by Khrushchev to illustrate Soviet democracy again strikes one as a mixture of make-believe and sincerity, confidence and vague apprehension, so typical of his policies: the chairman of a collective farm has been promoted by the regional Party secretary to a more responsible position, but the peasants of the chairman's kolkhoz beg the satrap ineffectually not to deprive them of their leader, of whom they have grown fond. And now Khrushchev "asks" his subordinate to reconsider, to accede to the "masses' " desire and to keep the good man on the farm. This pleasant story, which with a few changed titles and circumstances, has been told about every autocracy from Harun al-Rashid's to Tsarist Russia's, is intended to illustrate the extent of real democracy in the USSR.

And the make-believe democratic paraphernalia of the oligarchs' meeting cannot conceal the resolution to solve the most pressing internal problem of Soviet communism through a feat of social engineering enforced by the state. The problems of the peasant and the agricultural lag and of the vestiges of private enterprise and spirit inherent in the collective-farm economy are still with the Soviet rulers. One of Khrushchev's chief lieutenants mentions possible solutions in terms similar to those policies which have been repudiated and condemned since 1953: amalgamation of the collective farms into still huger units; equalizing of the collective farmers' incomes; and further limitation, if not extinction, of the private plot.[22] Shades of the abuses condemned by Khrushchev in 1953 and 1958 and so convincingly attributed to Malenkov and Molotov! In his own speech the dictator urges, for the present, a more

[21] *Pravda*, December 29, 1959.
[22] Speech by Poliansky reported in *ibid.*, December 23, 1959.

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cautious approach: the education of the peasant so that he will grow to like living in an apartment house and becoming a rural wage earner with no sense of ownership of his land. And so, better than long historical and philosophical disquisitions, the dialectic of Soviet agricultural policies imparts the real problem of totalitarianism groping to retain its mastery over a changing society.

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POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS

The Basic Question*

By WILFRED MALENBAUM and WOLFGANG STOLPER

IN the underdeveloped countries—where live most of the world's people—the hope for economic progress now flames with great intensity. The new international capital facilities of the postwar period, the new programs for sharing modern science and technology, the new interest of wealthy lands in progress in the poor countries—all these present the latter with an opportunity to be rid of the poverty and squalor of their material existence. Their eyes naturally turn to the more developed countries for capital and technical knowledge, and for ideas.

The United States and the democratic nations of the West took the postwar initiative in international programs of financial and technical assistance. These countries were confident that their own vigorous progress, under the stimulus of market demand in a free society, would provide a helpful model for expanded rates of economic growth in the poorer nations. Since 1953, however, Russia and its satellites have also played an active role; they now provide a wide range of development assistance to poorer nations—including important politically uncommitted nations like India. Russia's economic history offers a different model, with programed progress in a totalitarian society. Moreover, the Communist lands, focusing attention on their own rates of economic expansion, proclaim their intention to overtake the nations of the West and thus provide unequivocal evidence to the world of how outmoded are capitalist economic systems.

Since the aspirations of the people in the poor countries as well as the urgings of popular leaders require that these nations pay heed to whatever methods and procedures promise to increase their rate of economic advance, the present competition between democratic and Communist models has inevitably given economic programs for accelerating a nation's growth a significant political dimension. Ideological alternatives are thrust upon the less-developed nations. Even where the ways

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of totalitarianism are repugnant to leaders and to traditions—as is certainly true in many such lands—domestic political pressures demand an open mind, perhaps an open door.

Leaders in the new and underdeveloped countries are bound to ask: Are totalitarian regimes more adept at initiating a process of continuous economic growth than democratic governments? If the methods of communism do in fact promise a surer or less expensive route to economic well-being, some of these nations, deeply committed as they are to a free society, may also ask: How much more economic progress in five or ten years, say, for how much less freedom? The relevance of these questions is clear. These nations need material progress; they are confronted with alternative roads differentiated on ideological grounds.

These questions may raise no problem for the Soviet policy-maker. He has been given a doctrinaire identification of means and ends. Unwittingly, perhaps, the policy-maker in the West accepts a similar pattern of thought. Preoccupied with the importance of "democratic means," he tends to identify the ends—progress—with his means—the market economy, the private sector, individual freedom of choice. It is necessary therefore to pose the more basic question: To achieve economic progress, must there be a choice of ideologically distinct routes?

I. Comparative Performance

History now provides the material for some judgment on the role of ideology in economic progress under today's conditions. In each of two pairs of comparable lands—India and China, West Germany and East Germany—there is available reasonably documented experience of some ten years of effort to achieve more rapid rates of economic growth from essentially the same starting points. India and West Germany chose paths under democracy; in both lands, government places a high premium upon private property and individual privilege. In East Germany and in China, on the other hand, the methods used can be traced directly to the totalitarian experience of the Soviet Union; in the development effort, as in other aspects of the social order, individual rights are completely subordinated to those of the state.

In 1950 both India and China had per capita incomes of about $50—lower than in any other large nation. The two countries initiated their development operations at about the same time and from the same type of economic structure. In both, at least 80 per cent of the working force was in agriculture and small-scale enterprise. If anything, India gave promise of greater progress in view of its advantages in basic

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resources per man, in transport facilities and modern industry, and in training and leadership attributes. Thus, India apparently had greater scope for using its surface water potential and for exploiting the intensive margins of agricultural cultivation. With the same relative efforts, therefore, larger returns could be anticipated in India than in China. So, at any rate, did it seem in the pre-Plan period.[1]

Yet by 1959 per capita gross national product in India was only some 12-15 per cent above its 1950 level, while in China it had expanded to about double the earlier figure. Almost half (45 per cent) of this difference in performance can be associated with the proportionately greater investment made in China; the remaining difference measures the extent to which each additional unit of capital in China was associated with larger flows of current income.

With an initial gross investment ratio just below 10 per cent, absolute real investment in China had increased by 1958 to five times the 1950 level; in India it about doubled. Foreign aid did not explain this difference: indeed, China's investment was more nearly financed from its current output than was India's. Communist methods made possible a relatively large (40 per cent) feedback of new output into China's domestic investment. But India's voluntary performance in this respect was impressive also. During favorable harvest years, marginal savings rates in India may well have exceeded those in China.

The Chinese put more effort into expanding physical output as against services; a larger proportion of new capital was allocated to agriculture and small industry; the degree of utilization of resources, and especially of labor, was increased significantly. Over the whole period, government played a much larger role in economic life in China than in India. And of course, compared with India's, China's producers and consumers had limited freedom of choice—in techniques of production, in final goods for consumption. Greater regimentation in China was accompanied by considerable flexibility on the part of government. In response to actual developments in the economy, relative emphasis was shifted away from the initial concentration on heavy industry, for example. By and large, China's economic progress has been steady. In India, government adheres to models of growth which are permissive; comparatively few restraints are imposed on individuals whose usual ways of life did not in the past generate economic expan-

[1] For an analysis of the comparative pre-Plan status and subsequent performance of the two countries, see Wilfred Malenbaum, "India and China: Development Contrasts," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXIV, No. 1 (February 1956), pp. 1-24; and *idem*, "India and China: Contrasts in Development Performance," *American Economic Review*, XLIX, No. 3 (June 1959), pp. 284-309.

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sion. There have been impressive spurts of industrial output in India's essentially private modern industry sector, as well as some record crops in years with favorable monsoons. The total performance has been less even; the degree of plan fulfillment has not increased steadily, for example.

In prewar years, East and West Germany constituted an historical, cultural, and economic whole. Their labor and other factor endowments were quite similar; their industrial and agricultural establishments were comparably modern and efficient. While actual output per man showed a slight margin for the western half of the country, there was probably little difference in the productive potential of the two parts. The west did have a real advantage in its soft coal resources and in the lower cost of water transport and water power facilities. In order to escape the effects of Allied bombings in the west during the war, industry in the east was favored. Later, while the Marshall Plan was pumping funds into West Germany, Russian reparations and levies were exacting a heavy toll—perhaps one-fourth of industrial production—from current output in East Germany. While Allied troops were basically fed from outside, the Russian occupation lived off the land. Still, Russian demands did serve to stimulate output, particularly in coal and potash, in synthetic rubber and gasoline. There is some evidence that East Germany was getting on its feet more rapidly in the years to 1948. Although it still had a significantly lower product per person than West Germany (some 40 per cent lower) in 1950, an objective appraisal suggested that, as of that date, output potential over the next decade, say, could be more rapid than in the west.[2]

West Germany expanded its gross national product about 10 per cent more than did East Germany between 1950 and 1958. In the light of the different roles of the occupying authorities, it is not surprising that West Germany was able to maintain both higher investment and higher consumption levels. More surprising is the fact that the output gain associated with each unit of investment was also greater in the

[2] For an analysis of the comparative status and performance of the two countries, see Wolfgang Stolper, *The Structure of the East German Economy*, to be published by Harvard University Press. Preliminary results have appeared in Wolfgang Stolper, "The Labor Force and Industrial Development in Soviet Germany," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXI, No. 4 (November 1957), pp. 518-45; and *idem*, "The National Product of East Germany," *Kyklos*, XII (April 12, 1959), pp. 131-66. A German translation of the *Kyklos* article has appeared in *Konjunkturpolitik*, (West) Berlin, 1959, No. 6, together with two extremely interesting critical discussions by Werner Gebauer, "Eine neue Berechnung des mitteldeutschen Sozialprodukts," *ibid.*, pp. 344-53, and by Bruno Gleitze, "Niveauentwicklung und Strukturwandlung des Sozialprodukts Mitteldeutschlands," *ibid.*, pp. 374-82.

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west, despite the opportunities which under-utilized facilities offered East Germany in 1950.

In contrast to West Germany, East Germany focused on heavy industry and self-sufficiency. There was a relative neglect of agriculture and consumer-goods output generally. Emphasis on heavy industries, especially from an uneconomic raw materials base, was costly for an area renowned for its skilled labor and the quality of its machinery output (optics, electrical goods, and fine mechanical products). The rigid system of controls imposed by East German authorities encountered heavy resistance, especially in farm areas. Major difficulties arose in meshing the complex components of a modern industrial system. All this stands in great contrast to a West Germany which gave ready scope to its entrepreneurs by maintaining a predominantly free market. The effects of these alternative approaches are most apparent in foreign trade—of basic importance in both countries. With competitive prices and market incentives, West Germany expanded its international role along the lines of its comparative advantage. Controlled prices, allocation schemes borrowed from Russia, and the inefficient bilateralism of a trade in which three-fourths of the total was dominated by Russia and the satellites meant that East Germany could not realize its industrial capabilities.

The advocates of neither democratic nor Communist methods can find in the experiences of India and China, of West and East Germany, evidence of a systematic relationship between ideology and the rate of economic progress. Leaders in the underdeveloped lands—and policymakers in the wealthier nations—cannot expect dogma to bring the growth they seek. Do the two sets of case histories permit a consistent explanation?

II. Underlying Factors

By focusing on the technical determinants of economic growth, some light can be thrown upon the apparent paradox. Let us think of the rate of growth as the product of the rates at which output per unit of capital changes and the capital stock itself expands. By committing itself to the achievement of more rapid economic expansion, a government commits itself to change the nation's savings (or investment) ratios and its capital-output ratios—usually both. There are alternative courses of action to these ends. And it is with respect to the methods, more than to the ends, that a government's action reflects its adherence to democracy or to communism. Totalitarian regimes can squeeze consumption, or can limit the increases in consumption in ways un-

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acceptable to a government dependent on the ballot box. Thus, at some time in East Germany or China, rationing has been carried to extreme levels; family life has been communalized; a large part of crop production has been procured from the peasantry under pressure at low prices for resale at high prices. While such measures permit larger allocation to investment, it may be noted that under Communist control they also permitted large appropriations to the Soviet Union, as in the case of East Germany. On the other hand, in West Germany, where there was a clear opportunity for gain by the investor, voluntary savings increased rapidly. Even in a poor nation like India, consumption habits did permit very large voluntary savings in years when there was rapid growth in income for the mass of the people.

The capital-output ratios depend upon the economic wisdom in new investment allocation as well as the vigor with which the nation's human resources are applied to already existing capital. We know well that, in free societies, individual motivations have resulted in efficient over-all performance, in large returns per unit of capital. On the other hand, the right of freedom of economic choice scarcely assures such results everywhere. Russia and China provide concrete evidence that the much larger range of centralized economic decisions necessary to achieve progress in a controlled system can be made with effective results. However, this has not always been true either; indeed, involuntary transfers of savings have been known to generate apathy and even active non-cooperation on the part of the population.

The needed changes in the savings ratios and in input-output relationships can certainly be visualized with democratic as well as Communist methods. These basic parameters have not only economic but psychological and sociological dimensions. Both Communist and democratic regimes will find the new measures more effective if they take cognizance of existing relationships in the society. This is particularly true for democratic nations, which depend much more upon voluntary cooperation and hence upon the existing pattern of motivational forces in the society. Success by Communist methods places upon government the requirement for more action and more perseverance in assuring its fulfillment; success under democracy requires action based on greater insight into the structure of the society and the economy.

These observations can be illustrated in the two sets of countries. Both East and West Germany had relatively modern, efficient, and complex industrial and agricultural organizations. The profit incentive—even modified in some measure by restraints of a government seeking social-welfare objectives—was of tremendous importance for

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economic performance. The situation in India and China was completely different. Their economies were market-oriented to only a limited degree. Custom and tradition were of pervasive importance in economic activity—especially in rural areas, where most of the population, workers, and even output are centered. Attainment of specific objectives required carefully planned governmental programs much more than reliance upon the price and profit mechanism.

The very different economic circumstances prevailing in the two sets of countries place very different sets of requirements upon governments seeking more rapid economic progress—whether by democratic or by Communist methods. West Germany's faith in the free market made obvious sense; the government's recognition of the need for change permitted it to superimpose a broad and flexible system of fiscal controls, as well as capital allocations, wherever these were necessary to make the nation's resource endowments best serve its economic needs. In this free society, state control increased; about half of all investments were directly or indirectly affected by government.

In contrast, East German planners slavishly copied the Russian model, a pattern prepared for substantially different resource endowments than prevailed in East Germany. Steel produced with Ukrainian iron ore and Polish coal was expensive. In Germany it was exceedingly difficult for government to acquire the know-how for establishing and administrating precise controls. Thus, it is hard to substitute, for example, for the consistent price system which competitive forces can mold. With the currency reforms in 1948, West Germany acquired such a system. In East Germany, it has yet to evolve. Ubiquitous government may long incur the costs of an inefficient combination of resources.

China's ties to a Russian model of rapid, large-scale industrialization did not impede early recognition of the emptiness of industrialization without agricultural advancement in a nation where most people will long remain rural; of the complementarities, rather than the competitiveness, of large industry and many types of small enterprises suitable to a heavy endowment of labor. Important deviations from Communist economic lore were soon made in the allocation of large percentages of investment resources to agriculture and the small-scale sector. A form of communal organization was created with continuous and strong guidance and controls to assure the change that the economy on its own could not generate.

The government of India's models of growth are largely derived from the patterns and relationships found in Western capitalist societies; neither the concepts, nor the values, of the multipliers relevant to

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a market-conscious economy in the throes of expansion are directly applicable in an institutionalized and static society. The major task of rural improvement and growth was placed upon a national community development and extension scheme. While this action recognized the need, especially in the initial years, of injecting into rural India a new force for change, government did not provide the programs with sustained, strong leadership. In modern industry, where the parallels between Western nations and India were greatest, borrowed doctrine was often in conflict with India's own formulation of the needs of a socialist state. India tries to allocate 50-60 per cent of all investment to the government sector while expecting the private sector to produce more than 90 per cent of total product. These contrasting ratios are not necessarily in conflict; but they do demand close scrutiny of day-to-day investment and production developments to assure that the drive to high levels of investment in the public sector does not impede continued performance and expansion in the private sector.

This examination of underlying factors permits an interesting conclusion. The two more successful nations—Communist China and democratic West Germany—operated on the same sets of technical determinants of growth as did India and East Germany. Their relative success was due to the degree to which they geared their development programs to the existing structure of their economies. Cold and objective appraisals were made of the stages necessary to achieve a state of continuing progress from inadequate starting points. Throughout, they demonstrated flexibility in selecting courses of action. Only those were finally adopted in which practice gave promise of the changes needed in savings rates and in technical input-output coefficients. In democratic India and Communist East Germany, on the other hand, governmental operations on these basic parameters have manifested much less objectivity and flexibility. Indeed, India, where growth under democracy demands a greater interplay of new and old relationships in the society, evidenced less of an experimental and flexible approach to its problem of expansion than did China.

III. Ideology and Economic Progress

Thus no simple ideologic-economic relationship exists. The West German performance means that the Communist formula does not contain the essential ingredient to more rapid progress; nor has democracy in a free society provided India with a guaranty of rapid economic achievement. Not only is economic progress not determined by the

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ideology to which a nation adheres; indeed, it can be most costly for a nation to adhere persistently to doctrines which counter indigenous economic and social relationships.

Whenever doctrine and policy are borrowed, whenever the results of foreign experience are applied, actual experience with them must be subjected to constant analysis. Only such study can indicate the changes needed to achieve effective results—whether these changes be in the knowledge or ideas imported, or in indigenous habits or relationships. It is not an ideology or an economic theory that will bring growth; it is more energetic and imaginative responses to the record as revealed by intensive study. This is especially true for democratic nations which rule out change by force; new programs must take root indigenously.

The growth record in the poorer nations over the past decade can scarcely give unmitigated satisfaction either to the leaders in the underdeveloped areas or to the policy-makers in the West. At the least, there is still room for great humility with respect to our know-how about the process of growth. The free market and private enterprise may work—as by and large they have under our conditions—but they may also have but limited relevance in the economic and social circumstances prevailing in the poorer lands. West Germany seems to have worked out a compromise between free enterprise and controls which serves its growth needs. There is undoubtedly some composite path which will provide the centralized direction and co-ordinated performance needed in India, consistent with its democratic aspirations. The specific actions to be taken can be deduced only from a full reading of the actual record of the decade. Dogma can give way to hypothesis, certainty to experimentation.

It is such a composite path—well within the extremes of permissiveness and compulsion—which nations seeking economic progress under democracy need to pursue. Given the limited growth achievements of these lands in the past decade, capital-exporting countries will inevitably provide greater assistance. It is high time that major research efforts—perhaps on a joint basis in each developing nation—be applied to discovering the actual bottlenecks which have been hindering that nation's economic expansion. A development program tailored to these specific tasks has a chance of both achieving material progress and nurturing democratic political ideals.

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AGRICULTURAL SURPLUS DISPOSAL AND U.S. ECONOMIC POLICIES

By ROBERT M. STERN

IN the four and a half years ending December 31, 1958, the United States exported close to $6 billion of surplus agricultural commodities under various foreign disposal programs, the most important being the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, known commonly as P. L. 480. These P. L. 480 exports included the barter of American surpluses for imports of strategic materials, foreign relief shipments and donations and, most significantly, sales for the local currency of importers. This last type of transaction, which is without precedent in world trade, has enabled the United States to dispose of some 3.3 billion dollars' worth of surpluses in agreements made with 28 nations, and the major part of the foreign currencies generated—that is, some $2.1 billion—has been earmarked for economic development purposes in the receiving countries. Surplus disposal thus not only has become a primary means of promoting United States agricultural exports, but has acquired a major role in our foreign aid programs as well.

In view of the magnitude of surplus disposal and the likelihood that such programs will be continued in the future, there is a need to examine, more carefully than has been done to date, the effects which surplus disposal transactions, especially those under P. L. 480, have upon the United States, other major agricultural producing and exporting nations, and underdeveloped countries. More specifically, attention must be given to the following matters: (1) the avoidance of competitive displacement of other exporters; (2) use of the surpluses to accelerate growth in the underdeveloped countries; (3) the avoidance of direct and indirect drains of dollars and other scarce currencies by the method of financing the disposal transactions; (4) whether surplus disposal is the best means of aiding underdeveloped countries; and (5) whether surplus disposal is adequate to cope with the domestic problems which underlie the accumulation of agricultural surpluses both in the United States and in the other major producing and exporting countries. Each of the foregoing factors will be discussed in turn, starting with the last-mentioned, because it is the most important.

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I

All of the surplus disposal measures adopted to date by the United States have in common the failure to achieve any notable success in reducing this nation's surplus commodity carryovers. This is because such measures are totally inadequate to get to the heart of the surplus problem, which is to be found in the way in which domestic agricultural support prices are maintained above the level of free market prices and thus encourage greater output at the same time that they discourage consumer demand. In fulfilling its statutory purpose as a price-supporting agency, the Commodity Credit Corporation has had, consequently, to acquire each year, especially since 1952, a large proportion of such basic crops as wheat, corn, and cotton. With a wedge driven between domestic prices and lower world prices, barriers have been required to keep out imports of many agricultural commodities, lest the United States find itself subsidizing foreign as well as domestic producers. And since domestic disposal is ruled out by the statutory requirements of maintaining support prices, the United States has been forced to turn increasingly to foreign outlets in an attempt to reduce its mounting carryovers, and has found it necessary, because of its high domestic prices, to resort to export subsidies and concessional sales on a large scale to bridge the gap between domestic and world prices. The agricultural price-support programs have thus required consequent modifications of United States international trade policy on both the import and the export side in a manner which is hardly consistent with this nation's foreign policy goal of increased international economic and political co-operation, and the further development of a world network of freer, multilateral trade. When viewed in this context, there can be little question that the solution offered by surplus disposal, whether in the form of P. L. 480 or some other program, is inadequate for long-run economic policy.

What is required, rather, is a review of American agricultural policy with the end in mind of changing its emphasis from price to income supports in order to avoid the continued build-up of agricultural surpluses. Although specific domestic agricultural policy measures are considered to lie outside the scope of the present article, some of the advantages of income support and related plans may be mentioned. The main point to be stressed is that these plans will avoid interfering with the determination of market prices, and by permitting expression of the forces of consumer demand and producer response to this demand, markets will be permitted to find their own equilibrium and

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to clear, thus bringing the continued accumulation of surpluses to an end. In this way, a more rational allocation of resources in both the agricultural and the nonagricultural sector will be achieved over time. Consumers will also benefit insofar as food and other prices are lowered below their present parity-influenced levels. Furthermore, income support and related plans meet generally with approbation by other nations, because they are not designed specifically to give United States products access to markets that might not be open to them otherwise. This is the case even though such plans may increase the competitive position of American farmers by enabling them to adopt additional cost-reducing or output-increasing innovations.

While the soundness of income supports is clear in principle, there has not been much enthusiasm for such an approach in Congress. This is unfortunate because it blocks the attainment for American agriculture of a long-run policy goal of maximum resource efficiency. A relatively unfettered price system, which is indispensable to this goal, should not be thought of as a sacred cow, as one is often led to do, but the malfunctioning of the present program of parity price supports, evidenced by the multi-billion dollar investments which this nation has in a few agricultural commodities, certainly makes for stronger worship of such a system.

The preceding remarks apply also to the aid-giving relationship between the United States and underdeveloped countries, and we should take especial note of two further objections to the use of surplus disposal as a long-range measure of providing economic aid in grant or loan form to such countries.

II

The first objection is that surplus disposal may not represent the best means by which income can be transferred from developed to underdeveloped countries.[1] Bilateral aid which is tied to such commodities may seriously restrict the flexibility and freedom of choice ordinarily available to an underdeveloped country, and if this aid replaces otherwise available dollar receipts, either in the form of reduced dollar loans or through the use of local currency deposits held by the United States to substitute for dollar transactions, the restrictive effects may be felt more keenly. While it is true that food and other consumption goods may be a crucial element in the success of any development plan, there is no inherent reason why these commodities should be provided by the United States if they could be obtained, in the absence

[1] D. Gale Johnson, *Trade and Agriculture*, New York, 1950, p. 135.

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of the aid program, as cheaply from domestic or other foreign sources. Indeed, it can be argued that emphasis should not be given to the import of food and related commodities, but rather to the import of capital goods, assuming that domestic supplies of capital goods are scarce relative to supplies of consumption goods, and that an undue increase in the supply of the latter could lead to an increase in population, which would, in turn, keep per capita incomes from rising. Therefore, if commodity aid is to be given by advanced countries, it might be more advantageous for the resources which are presently producing surplus agricultural commodities to be transferred to the production of simple machines and tools which could then be made available to underdeveloped countries.[2]

The second objection to the long-range use of surplus disposal to finance development is that by maintaining domestic prices in the aid-giving country at a higher level than export prices, it discriminates particularly against low-income consumers.[3] The optimum characteristics of a single-price system are familiar to most economists, and although it would be difficult to predict all of the ramifications in the event that return to such a system were possible for United States agriculture, a reduction in food and other prices from current levels would be likely. This would of course benefit low-income consumers. In addition, these consumers, as a group, would also gain to the extent that an income or other tax, used in part to finance economic development loans or grants and to make compensatory income payments to farmers (if required), was less regressive than the current incidence of the system of parity price supports.

To reject surplus disposal on the grounds of its inadequacy to deal with those aspects of the domestic agricultural price-support programs which created the entire problem to begin with, and because it is far from the best way to transfer income from the developed to the less-developed countries, is not to say, however, that it cannot play any role at all in the mechanisms of international trade and finance. It needs to be emphasized, nonetheless, that surplus disposal should be considered *within* the wider context of the search for measures which will eliminate future surpluses, for even though it makes little sense on efficiency grounds to encourage the production of more surpluses, it is a common failure not to separate surplus disposal from the more

[2] "Even though people in the backward areas have insufficient diets, it is not a safe assumption that their greatest need is more food. Compared to the United States the inadequacy of their housing, their sewage disposal systems, their roads, and their farm machinery technology is much the greater." *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[3] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 135.

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basic problem being discussed here, and consequently to make exaggerated claims for what disposal programs can accomplish.[4]

The preceding remarks should thus not be taken as a denial that surplus disposal can be useful in financing economic development, because under conditions in which *additional* investment can be matched *concurrently* with the *additional* consumption provided by the surplus commodities, it can make an important contribution. If, however, underdeveloped countries consider surplus commodity aid primarily as a means of obtaining foreign exchange relief, foreign and/or domestic producers of commodities similar or related to those received may be harmed. Consumption can still be increased by such aid without injuring other producing interests, it may be noted, but unless there is a corresponding increase in investment, the gain to the receiving country may be transitory—as, for example, through temporarily improved diets leading to increased productivity. It is thus only when the goods flowing into additional consumption are synchronized properly with the added investment expenditures that the benefits of surplus disposal will be fully realized. Failure to achieve this synchronization may, on the other hand, create serious problems of price and income instability in the recipient country.[5]

The foregoing is, briefly, the case for surplus disposal. The United States has made an important beginning in the establishment of a surplus disposal program for economic development by earmarking more than $2 billion for this purpose under P. L. 480, but it has taken insufficient account of the effects of this program upon competing exporters, and the ways in which agricultural surpluses can be best used

[4] This applies especially to the proposals made by Matthew J. Kust, "Economic Development and Agricultural Surpluses," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXV, No. 1 (October 1956), who states (p. 105) that surplus disposal not only can be a means of accelerating economic growth in the underdeveloped countries, but can effectively relieve the world's and the United States' surplus problems as well. Kust's proposals are, unfortunately, so broad as to raise many more questions than they are designed to answer. For example, he never defines what is meant by an agricultural surplus. As a consequence, his proposal (p. 110) to establish a Commodity Exchange Union to absorb and reallocate the agricultural surpluses of the underdeveloped countries for their mutual economic development would mean presumably an end or at least a serious restriction of regular international commodity sales in place of a grandiose scheme of international barter. He thus ignores the obvious fact that surpluses are part and parcel of price-raising schemes, whether in a developed or in an underdeveloped country, and accordingly does not consider the problem of efficient resource allocation. One could say that his proposals are altogether inconsistent with the attainment of an expanded world trade, and that there are better ways to achieve the goal which he has in mind.

[5] These matters are spelled out in more detail in FAO, *Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses*, Rome, 1954, esp. pp. 13-14 and 61-64. See also my article, "Agricultural Surplus Disposal as a Means of Financing Economic Development," *Economia Internazionale*, XII, No. 4 (November 1959), pp. 643-57.

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to increase capital formation and economic development in the backward areas. It is necessary, therefore, to re-examine the approach represented by P. L. 480 and to suggest further ways in which the burdensome surplus position of the United States and other countries can be relieved so that more effective consideration can then be given to policy measures aimed at the prevention of future surpluses.

III

Surplus disposal should be accomplished with a minimum of disturbance to international prices and trade, and of hardship to consuming and producing groups. This automatically rules out, therefore, such means of disposal as can be achieved by export subsidies, multiple exchange rates, and other measures which conflict with the "rules" of international trade adhered to at least in principle by most countries. It is essential, moreover, in order that disposal may not be complicated by the additional accumulation of surpluses, to introduce measures which will restrict the output of those commodities in excess supply. This can be best done by means of price disincentives, although it may be necessary in the interim to make compensatory income payments to producers who are adversely affected.[6] Price disincentives are preferable to direct acreage or marketing restrictions, which have so often proved ineffective and difficult to enforce, because they will improve resource allocation by requiring producers to alter their output mix more in accordance with existing consumption patterns. These disincentives should also not be confused with parity price supports, since the compensatory features would be separate and thus not designed to make income transfers through the price system.

There is considerable scope for surplus disposal on a purely domestic basis through such measures as the establishment of national buffer stocks and the creation of strategic and emergency food reserves out of already existing inventories, as well as the encouragement of increased domestic consumption by means of advertising or finding new uses, instituting special feeding programs, and diverting supplies to inferior uses (e.g., feeding wheat to livestock). These domestic outlets should be explored thoroughly before a decision is made on foreign disposal, for there may be savings in transport costs and from the ability to utilize existing domestic administrative machinery and storage facilities as

[6] Since price disincentives might create problems particularly in underdeveloped countries where production has been stimulated by the relatively high international prices created by the umbrella of United States price supports, a portion of United States foreign aid might be earmarked for use in cases where countries are unable to raise sufficient revenue to tide over producers who are in difficulty.

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opposed to creating new devices and facilities to handle foreign disposal. Domestic disposal may not be entirely feasible, however, if there are carryovers of surplus commodities, such as wheat, which exceed substantially the potential uses mentioned. It may be necessary in these cases to consider the possibility of foreign outlets.

When considering foreign outlets for surplus disposal, one should distinguish between the conventional sales of these goods, especially to advanced countries, and special transactions with underdeveloped countries, where the commodities are to be used for development or relief purposes. It is all too frequently forgotten in discussions of surplus disposal that Western Europe is by far the major import market for food and other agricultural commodities. In a world plagued by periodic dollar shortage and the threat of war, a number of West European countries have instituted programs designed to encourage domestic agricultural production at the expense of imports, or to increase such imports from non-dollar areas. Technological improvement in West European agriculture has been an additional factor of significance which has lessened in recent years the dependence of many countries upon imports, but protection of domestic agriculture is nevertheless still important. In view of these technological advances and the existing structure of protection, what steps, if any, could be taken to increase the volume of agricultural imports by these countries?

One of the most obvious things that could be done would be to permit world prices to move to lower levels. This would have the effect of reducing production in those areas where producers are influenced by international prices, and more importantly, by making subsidization of domestic output more expensive, it might induce importing countries to modify their domestic policies in favor of increased imports. Certain objections, however, can be made to this alternative. It might, first of all, be difficult to effect a substantial increase in the volume of West European imports in the short run, and, secondly, exporting countries might be unwilling to undergo the serious reduction in their terms of trade which would probably result from a lowering of world prices.

In answering these objections, it may be noted that the potentialities of increasing West European imports may be greater than expected as the impact of lower prices is felt more fully with the passage of time in the individual countries, and other consumption uses, such as the feeding of wheat to livestock, become economically feasible. In addition, the possibility might be considered of negotiating a reciprocal agree-

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ment, which would benefit both importers and exporters, to the effect that in return for the income transfer resulting from a lowering of world prices and the consequent worsening of the terms of trade of exporting countries, the importing countries would liberalize their import restrictions and domestic agricultural policies. Each country's share of exports and imports might be worked out on the basis of some previous representative period, and when the surplus position of the major exporters was found to have been eased sufficiently, free competition among these exporters in European markets could then be restored. This proposal may have additional merit insofar as European economic integration will carry over and thus make more permanent the import barriers and discriminatory devices adopted by a number of countries after World War II, and it also suggests the possibility of siphoning off part of the increase in incomes which would be generated by the cheaper imports, in order to compensate those domestic producers in the importing countries who are induced to curtail their output or to leave agriculture. Such a program to reallocate resources in importing countries could perhaps be called for in any event on efficiency grounds. The above suggestion may be looked upon as providing the rationale and perhaps the means for action. It may be noted, finally, that this proposal could be applied to other importing countries besides those in Western Europe.

The establishment of strategic stockpiles of food and related commodities in the NATO countries of Western Europe is another alternative for foreign disposal which has been suggested.[7] Although a beginning has been made along these lines recently by a Canadian donation of wheat, the unwillingness of the United States to retain title to any food stockpile abroad and to assume the costs of transportation, storage, and other incidentals has proven a major stumbling block to further progress. There is no reason, of course, why some compromise on these costs could not be worked out if the NATO countries were convinced of the importance and manageability of such strategic stockpiles. The existence of such stocks might be useful, moreover, in liberalizing imports as countries would perhaps feel less need to protect their domestic agriculture on grounds of ensuring self-sufficiency in wartime.

[7] See Bruce F. Johnston, "Farm Surpluses and Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, x, No. 1 (October 1957), pp. 1-23; also U.S. Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., *Hearings Before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on the Operation and Administration of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, and Its Relationship to Foreign Policy*, Washington, D.C., 1957, esp. pp. 220-23.

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IV

In the event that it proves difficult to dispose of surpluses in the short run in domestic and conventional import markets, the best remaining alternative, then, is to use these surpluses as a means of financing economic development. It bears repeating that this form of disposal should be conceived of as a short-run, temporary expedient only, and that we must distinguish, therefore, between surpluses which already exist and those which may be produced in the future. The already existing surpluses could be considered as an important windfall for underdeveloped countries because they may have no alternative uses, in the absence of other forms of disposal. But this is not true for yet unproduced surpluses, since the resources involved in their production could be used more efficiently elsewhere.

Although we should not lose sight of these long-run efficiency considerations, it is likely, in view of current political sentiments, that international surplus disposal will become even more important in the next few years than it is today, barring any unforeseen circumstances. It is imperative, therefore, that steps be taken to overcome the inadequacies of the United States P. L. 480 programs mentioned earlier—that is, attention must be given to the avoidance of competitive displacement of other exporters, the use of surpluses to accelerate economic growth in underdeveloped countries, and the avoidance of direct and indirect drains of dollars and other scarce currencies.

If there is to be no interference with the regular commercial exports to underdeveloped countries, the first two factors must be approached simultaneously. The major exporters might agree to earmark for use in economic development those portions of their commodity carryovers which cannot be absorbed either at home or in conventional export channels. Studies could be initiated in underdeveloped countries by both the country itself and some outside agency, such as the World Bank, FAO, ICA, etc., with the end in mind of using these surpluses *concurrently* with *additional* investment in order to help cover a portion of local currency costs and thus to *accelerate* economic development. It is obvious that a substantial degree of international co-operation would be needed to achieve these results, but this should not be a serious handicap, inasmuch as there are enough agencies whose experience would make them well qualified for such an undertaking.

It may also be possible to establish national food reserves in certain underdeveloped countries along lines indicated by the FAO in order to provide emergency relief in the event of crop failure or damage, to

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reduce undesirable fluctuations in food prices, and to provide additional elbowroom for economic development.[8] Difficulties may arise, however, in the financing and management of the stocks. The United States has declared its willingness to provide surplus commodities under P. L. 480, and, implicitly, to participate in the construction of storage facilities. But underdeveloped countries may feel, however much they could use such reserves, that the pressure of their need to increase capital formation and consumption will not permit them to divert any substantial portion of their resources to build up food reserves. This is especially the case since the United States, with its large stocks and the authority provided under Title II of P. L. 480, stands ready to meet sudden emergencies in countries distressed by crop damage or failure. It may thus prove necessary, if progress is to be made in establishing national food reserves, for the United States and other exporters to provide their surpluses primarily in grant rather than loan form. It is hoped that more attention will be devoted to the feasibility of creating such reserves, because their usefulness in meeting emergencies and promoting price stability could contribute greatly to the processes of capital formation and economic growth in less-developed countries.

While the United States can certainly take the lead in providing surpluses for development and the creation of reserves in underdeveloped countries, it may be somewhat difficult to convince other exporting nations that they should co-operate. Exporters such as Canada, Australia, and Argentina are themselves greatly concerned with their own problems of capital formation and growth, and thus may be unwilling to enter into any agreements which would require them to export "capital through food" to underdeveloped countries on a large scale. This unwillingness is understandable. It could be overcome, in part, if the United States agreed to finance surplus disposal from these countries by extending loans to them for some specified proportion of their carryovers. If such a scheme could be confined to a relatively short period of time, such as five years, and met with success, burdensome surpluses could be worked off and the way paved for changes in domestic agricultural price policies, particularly in the United States.

Considerable attention must be given to the means of financing the above proposals if we are to avoid the displacement of regular commercial exports to or the indirect drain of dollars and other scarce currencies from underdeveloped countries. It is necessary that international surplus disposal be thought of as *additional* foreign aid, and

[8] See FAO, *National Food Reserve Policies in Underdeveloped Countries*, Rome, 1958.

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that it not be used, as the United States has recently tended to do, to replace mutual security or other hard-currency aid which is far less restrictive in nature. Financial problems, such as those which the United States will face in deciding what to do with the future repayments in foreign currency of P. L. 480 loans, could be avoided if the surplus commodities were to be given away over a period of time in the form of outright grants in combination with the relatively unrestricted credit lines created by World Bank loans, United States foreign economic aid, and other national and international loan programs. If, however, it is decided that loans are preferable to outright grants, perhaps the best thing to do would be to establish a revolving loan fund, along the lines suggested recently by Senator Monroney, and use the resources of the fund solely for purposes of economic development. Repayments of interest and principal could be made directly to the fund in dollars or some other scarce currency, or, what is more likely, in local currency. As repayments are received, reinvestment possibilities should be explored along purely domestic lines, and also along lines which involve the combination of these funds with other foreign exchange financing. But unless there is perpetual reinvestment of repayment proceeds in the individual countries, an ultimate currency drain may be unavoidable in the absence of some commitment by the United States and other hard-currency countries to stay such drains. Such circumstances may be alleviated by time, however, as the developing country, by consequence of its economic growth, becomes better able to meet international payments. Also, there is always the possibility, in the event that repayment proves difficult, of the postponement or even cancellation of the payments by the original lenders.

A permanent capital fund of the type described would be preferable to a situation in which a number of exporting countries held foreign currency deposits and were in doubt about what should be done with them. This international fund would also remove the stigma attached to accepting surplus commodity aid, and the fears of underdeveloped countries that their monetary mechanisms would be influenced by the relatively large currency holdings of a single country, such as the United States. A fund of this kind could, moreover, provide an additional degree of long-term flexibility to developing countries in the pursuit of their growth objectives.

The road to development is an admittedly long and tedious one, and therefore all the more deserving of great emphasis and generosity on the part of the world's advanced countries. It cannot be claimed that international surplus commodity disposal is the best means available to

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traverse this road, but it may be able to make an important contribution. This contribution, in turn, could result in a permanent expansion of the international markets for food and fiber, a phenomenon which would benefit the major exporters of these commodities.

Immediate action is required in the United States to curtail the continued pile-up of agricultural surpluses, and to reduce existing carryovers to a more reasonable level relative to domestic consumption, exports, and special needs. This can be achieved only by attacking the problem of the accumulation of surpluses at its source in this nation's farm price-support programs, and by arranging the orderly disposal of surpluses in the ways discussed here. Such basic changes may then result in a domestic policy which is more in harmony than in the past with a liberal international trade policy for both the United States and the world as a whole.

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Research Note

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AS A FIELD FOR ECONOMICS RESEARCH*

By CHARLES J. HITCH

I

Problems of national security are in no sense novel for the application of economic analysis. Adam Smith, in a well-known passage in *The Wealth of Nations*, was concerned with the allocation of resources between "defense" and "opulence"—what we would call the problem of the size of the national security budget. There has been great interest among economists, especially during and following the First and Second World Wars, in problems of industrial mobilization during war, including the associated problems of economic stablization. In fact, to many economists during the past generation this set of mobilization problems constituted *the* economics of defense. Books were published with titles like *Economics of Defense* that dealt with little else.

My principal theme in this research note is that changes in the technology of war have so degraded the significance of wartime mobilization problems that these are no longer very interesting or important for economic policy research; but that these same changes in technology have brought to the fore a new set of problems that constitute an opportunity for and a challenge to economists.

I am referring, of course, to the development of nuclear weapons and advanced systems for delivering them at great distances—long-range bombers, nuclear-powered submarines, and intercontinental missiles. I will here simply state, without attempting to marshal the evidence,[1]

* This article was written at the request of the Committee on National Security Policy Research of the Social Science Research Council. It is not an attempt to provide a comprehensive or definitive outline of a program of research, but a highly personal essay which I hope will stimulate interest and have some influence on the direction of national security policy research among economists. It does, however, reflect the suggestions made at a conference on Economic Research on National Security convened by Klaus Knorr for the Social Science Research Council in New York, January 31 and February 1, 1958. I have developed some of my views at greater length in a book, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*, by C. J. Hitch and R. N. McKean, to be published by Harvard University Press this autumn.

[1] This has been done by many writers in open sources. See, for example, Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1957; and The RAND Corporation, *Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense*, Report R-322-RC, July 1, 1958.

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that either the United States or the USSR has the power to destroy the industrial mobilization potential of the other in a matter of hours, and within a few years will be able to do so in a few minutes. So may other powers.

In consequence, what matters most in all-out war is the *forces-in-being* at the outset. The initial exchange of thermonuclear blows is likely to be decisive. Even if it is not, nothing remotely like the industrial mobilization of World War I or World War II will follow.

I am by no means implying that future wars will necessarily be all-out (or "general" or "thermonuclear") wars.[2] If deterrent forces are made invulnerable, other kinds of war are certainly more likely to occur. Since the end of World War II there have been many "limited" wars of various sorts—wars in which the major nuclear powers had limited (even if important) interests and objectives, and so were willing to fight by proxy, or, if as principals, with self-imposed constraints on weapons and/or the geographical area of combat. There is every reason to expect that similar wars, like the Korean, the Indo-Chinese, and the Greek civil war, will threaten our security in the future. It is even possible that the loss of the U.S. nuclear monopoly makes serious but less than all-out military challenges more likely in the future than they have been in the past. In addition, we are currently engaged in a contest with the Soviet bloc which is appropriately known as "cold war," using diplomatic and economic weapons, with military moves restricted to threats, feints, displays, and deployments. This kind of contest also seems likely to persist for an indefinite period.

Both limited wars and cold war present important and interesting problems for economics research. These problems tend to be very different from those associated with all-out nuclear war, but are like them in not being problems of massive industrial mobilization.

What then are the economic problems of national security in the nuclear era? Or, more precisely, what are the economic aspects of national security problems?

One complication in answering this question is that no one has ever defined the content of economics to the general satisfaction of economists, and there exists in consequence some disagreement about what is and what is not an "economic" problem or aspect of a problem. There

[2] Neither, on the other hand, do I believe in what Walter Millis calls the "hypertrophy of general war." There has been an alarming amount of wishful thinking that all-out wars won't happen because they constitute "mutual suicide." The best demonstration of the fallacy of the mutual-suicide theory is an article by Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII, No. 2 (January 1959), pp. 211-34.

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have been two general classes of definitions: (1) The first relates economics to the *economy*—to a complex of producing, marketing, distributing, and consuming institutions and activities. (2) The second relates economics to *economizing*—to a certain kind of rational choosing and behaving, to making the most of one's resources in achieving one's objectives, in whatever kind of institutional framework.

Of course, there is a large area of overlap between these two classes of definitions. We assume, almost certainly correctly, that men in their wealth producing and acquiring activities are especially inclined to *economize*, i.e., to minimize costs, or to maximize the achievement of objectives with given resources, in a careful and explicit way. But people in other activities, outside the institutions of the economy as these are usually understood in the first class of definitions, also economize in this manner, or want to, or in some important sense ought to. These include people concerned with national security, and in consequence a lot of economic theory—of the analysis of economizing—can be applied, if appropriately adapted, to the solution of their problems. The design of a system for ordering and stocking spare parts for aircraft is an economic problem, whether the aircraft are owned by a commercial airline or by the U.S. Air Force, although there are important differences stemming from the fact that the services of the former are sold on a market while the services of the latter are not. So is the choice between Bomarc and Nike-Hercules: which missile (or combination of the two) will provide the most economical (i.e., efficient) air defense of the United States? So, too, is the choice between military aid, on the one hand, and a larger budget for our own military forces, on the other.

II

I will now review the major national security areas where I think economics research—research concerned with the economy or with economizing—has something substantial to contribute to the understanding or solution of national security problems.

(1) The analysis and measurement of economic strength for war

In the period between the two world wars we grew accustomed to talking of "economic war potential," meaning the fully mobilized war-production capacity of a nation. The concept of maximum wartime output is no longer very important, but economic strength is still vital for national security. It is the source of the forces-in-being needed to deter or fight a general nuclear war. It makes it possible to meet less

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than all-out challenges, and it deters limited aggression that may stimulate translation of potential into military strength. Economic capacity also provides the sinews of many of our cold war moves—including the aid program and measures to reduce the West's vulnerability to economic pressure by the Soviet bloc.

But the economic strength that is important in all-out nuclear war is not potential, but translated strength.[3] And there is no reason to presume that the relation between the two will be the same in different countries. A sizable national product is necessary, but not sufficient. The proportion of national product that a country allocates to national security will depend upon its surplus over demanded living standards, upon its comprehension of the challenge confronting it, and upon its resolution. The USSR, with a national product perhaps a third that of the United States, has been allocating a similar quantity of resources to its military forces.[4] Western Europe, with an aggregate product substantially in excess of that of the USSR, has been allocating much less.

We need a new analysis of the likely (and dangerous) kinds of wars, of the factors that are important in determining their outcomes, and of the way in which economic strength is related to these factors. We need new methods of measuring and comparing the economic strengths for war of different powers. How can the USSR maintain such formidable military power? Why cannot Western Europe? How important will it be a generation hence that Russia's rate of industrial growth today appears to be substantially greater than ours?

These questions are not purely economic; they involve considerations of science and technology, of politics and psychology. But their economic aspects are substantial, and economists are probably in the best position to design the analysis and define and assemble inputs from other disciplines. On some of the technical problems of measuring and comparing national products and the military sectors of national products, economists have recently done some pioneering research.[5] But this is just a beginning.

[3] To the extent that we may be confronted with *faits accomplis*, forces in being may be more important than potential in limited wars.

[4] Although apparently not a much higher proportion of its national product measured in rubles. The USSR has a comparative advantage in the production of military goods and services.

[5] See especially Milton Gilbert and Irving B. Kravis, *An International Comparison of National Products and the Purchasing Power of Currencies*, Paris, Organization for European Economic Co-operation, n.d.

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(2) IMPLICATIONS OF LARGE DEFENSE BUDGETS IN TIME OF PEACE[6]

Until World War II the United States had characteristically devoted 1 or 2 per cent or even less of its national product to military purposes in time of peace. After World War II we demobilized rapidly. But the Korean War, beginning in 1950, and the accumulating evidence of the Russian military threat led to national security budgets in the United States ranging from 10 to 15 per cent of national product. Now, nine years later, they are still around 10 per cent. A new international crisis could send them higher, and there is little prospect of substantial reductions.

Military budgets of this magnitude have serious economic consequences that demand analysis if we are to understand them and mitigate those that are unfavorable. Some of the consequences are simply the result of high total government expenditure—e.g., the implications of the necessary high tax rates on incentives. Others (e.g., implications for stabilization) stem jointly from the high level and the fluctuating character of expenditures. Still others are more intimately related to the fact that the expenditures are military and are made within a specific institutional framework.

Economists have, of course, done a great deal of work on the incidence and effects of different kinds of taxes. Much of this work, however, has been a relatively barren effort to deduce effects from simple, general psychological assumptions. It has long been known, for example, that even the sign of the effect of a progressive income tax on the supply of effort could not be determined by such methods; yet little empirical work has been undertaken to supply the needed answers.[7] Moreover, most economic research on taxation has been undertaken in an environment in which tax rates were much lower than now, and the assumption of low average rates, made consciously or unconsciously, reduces the relevance of the conclusions in a situation in which 25 per cent, 30 per cent, or more of national income must be collected. In particular, distortions of incentives that are tolerable with low rates or temporarily high rates (as during short wars) may seriously disrupt the efficiency of the economy when rates are per-

[6] On this and several other topics mentioned here, see Committee for Economic Development, *The Problem of National Security*, A Statement on National Policy by the Research and Policy Committee, New York, July 1958.

[7] For discussions and references, see *Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability*, Subcommittee on Tax Policy, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 84th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956; and Gershon Cooper, "Taxation and Incentive in Mobilization," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXVI, No. 1 (February 1952), pp. 43-66.

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manently high. An entirely new sort of compromise between the claims of equity and those of efficiency may be indicated.

Most economists believe that a very high level of government expenditure has an inflationary impact on the economy even if the budget is balanced by taxation. The same high level makes it easier to counter any deflationary movement by adjusting tax rates, although defense expenditures themselves, with their characteristically long lead-times, are no more promising than many civilian public works as a countercyclical device. Perhaps the more interesting and less well-understood problems involving stabilization are those resulting from large-scale and sudden changes in defense spending in either direction.

Associated with the stabilization problems are the problems of controls—direct vs. indirect. Are there any circumstances in which direct controls (of what type?) should be utilized during lengthy periods of preparedness or during periods of transition to higher or lower levels of expenditure?[8]

Finally, there are the special implications of high defense expenditures for the functioning of a free enterprise economy. One peculiarity of defense procurement, at least in this era of rapid technological advance, is the extremely limited scope for competitive bidding. There appears to be none whatever in the vast domain of research and development, and very little in the purchase of production quantities of weapons. Negotiated contracts of a "cost plus" character are the rule rather than the exception. In consequence a large sector of the American economy, including some of the most rapidly growing and technologically oriented industries, are largely removed from the guidance and incentive provided by the price system. The military departments attempt to prevent pocket lining and profiteering, in the absence of competitive bidding, by contract renegotiation and by techniques of inspection, supervision, and control that impinge significantly on what are elsewhere regarded as management prerogatives. What long-run effects will negotiation, cost-plus, renegotiation, and control have on the efficiency of the American economy, and what, if anything, can be done to find more suitable substitutes for the market mechanism?

Of course, not all effects of military expenditure are deleterious. The

[8] See Tibor Scitovsky, Edward S. Shaw, and Lorie Tarshis, *Mobilizing Resources for War*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951; Gerhard Colm and Manuel Helzner, "General Economic Feasibility of National Security Programs," National Planning Association, March 20, 1957, published in *Federal Expenditure Policy for Economic Growth and Stability*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, 85th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1958; Aaron Director, ed., *Defense, Controls, and Inflation*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1952.

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technological spillover into the civilian economy of military expenditures on research and development has been substantial, as has been the training by the military services of technicians, many of whom retire to civilian employment after their training has been completed. It would be interesting to try to compute some "net" cost of the peacetime defense budget.

(3) HOW LARGE "SHOULD" THE DEFENSE BUDGET BE?

Public and Congressional debates on this question tend to center on two relatively sterile questions: How large a defense budget do we require? How much can the economy stand? Economists could perform a considerable service here (as elsewhere on this list) by simply illuminating the nature of the problem in publications and in terminology that will have some impact on officials. Allocation problems cannot be solved, except in rare special cases, by looking at the demand side alone or the supply side alone.

What do we require for national security? To be secure again, as we were in the nineteenth century, requires more than all the income and wealth in the United States. Absolute security has become unattainable. No practicable level of defense expenditure can insure against grievous damage from thermonuclear warheads. It may be that no practicable level of expenditure can insure "winning" in a meaningful sense.

And how large a budget can the economy stand? During World War II the military budget took 40 per cent of GNP. There is no economic reason why we cannot spend much more than 10 per cent (the current level) if we want to and are willing to make the sacrifices, and are clever enough to mitigate the worst effects by appropriate tax and fiscal measures. There have been various efforts to demonstrate this thesis, and to find possible limits beyond which different types of controls would be desirable.[9]

There is no escape from the necessity of comparing *at the margin* net costs to the economy (in other goods sacrificed, in inflationary pressures, in deleterious effects on efficiency) with net gains in security. That imponderables, incommensurables, and uncertainties make it impossible to perform this comparison as an explicit economic calculus does not mean that nothing interesting and useful can be said about it.[10]

Another promising line of attack for economists to pursue is to devise

[9] See especially Colm and Helzner, *op.cit.*

[10] For a responsible and useful attempt to assess net gains in security from larger expenditures, see Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc., *International Security—The Military Aspect* (Special Studies Report II), New York, Doubleday Headline Publications, 1958.

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techniques for presenting costs and gains in more meaningful fashion to facilitate the exercise of judgment by officials, Congress, and the public. Traditional federal budget categories, which classify appropriations by such objects of expenditure as "personnel," "major equipment," "construction," etc., instead of by end-use functions, make it difficult or impossible to trace the effects on security of either cutting or increasing appropriations.[11]

(4) EFFICIENCY IN USING AND MANAGING DEFENSE RESOURCES

The Department of Defense is, in effect, an enormous firm which buys factors of production and intermediate products, subject to budgetary constraints, and produces national security or "military worth." How can we help it accomplish this task efficiently—maximizing military worth for given resources, or minimizing resources for given military worth?

This is an economic problem (of the economizing sort) that requires attack at several different levels, and with different techniques. With very large defense budgets and the steadily increasing danger and destructiveness of war, it has become a tremendously important problem. At one extreme there is need for imaginative conceptual and theoretical work on the general problem of promoting efficient use of resources in an environment in which the market pattern is incomplete. While the defense departments usually purchase factors and products in markets (sometimes highly imperfect cost-plus markets), there are no markets for valuing the outputs (military capabilities or worths) they produce, and very few for valuing intermediate products within the government structure. There is a lot of ready-made economic theory that is applicable to this problem, but it requires development and adaptation. At the other extreme there is need for a great deal of applied economic research to contribute to the solution of specific national security problems like the design of efficient (i.e., economical) systems for deterrence.[12]

The incompleteness of the market structure means that prices cannot perform their function of facilitating commensurability: the gains and costs of military expenditures are seldom commensurable in any generally acceptable way; in addition there are often diverse incommen-

[11] See Arthur Smithies, *The Budgetary Process in the United States*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1955, ch. 11.

[12] For a general discussion, see Roland N. McKean, *Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1958. For more on the role of economists and economics, see my article, "Economics and Military Operations Research," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, XL, No. 3 (August 1958), pp. 199-209.

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surable (if not imponderable) gains. This makes the selection of criteria and the design of economizing analyses more difficult than within a market economy.

There are other complications in finding efficient solutions to national security problems. There are formidable technological and strategic uncertainties in comparing, for example, alternative weapon systems. There is always an enemy to complicate our analyses as well as our lives. National security problems are not unique in any of these respects, but they provide a challenge for the development and application of decision theory, organization theory, probability theory, game theory, and operational gaming, and the relating of these to the efficient use of economic resources.[18] Economists have been slow in learning how to incorporate uncertainties in economic analysis. In defense economics, as elsewhere, dodges like "certainty equivalents" do not help.

Economists will be successful in tackling defense problems only if they accept modest objectives. Optima are unattainable in a world of incommensurables and uncertainties. But economizing does not necessarily require optimizing, in the military or in the economy. It simply requires finding *better* solutions than those that would otherwise be adopted. And this, in very many cases, is both a feasible and a practically important objective.

(5) INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO PROMOTE EFFICIENCY

In general, economists attempt to promote efficiency in that part of the economy subject to the price mechanism by suggesting improvements in the institutional environment rather than by the calculation of optimal allocations. There are somewhat similar possibilities within the military (and civil) bureaucracy that merit our attention. How can markets be simulated to advantage (as with stock and industrial funds)? Should there be more or less contracting with private industry (as opposed to "in-house" capability)? How can contracting with private industry be made more conducive to efficiency (incentive contracts, etc.)? How can budgeting and accounting techniques be improved to facilitate economic calculus? What is the appropriate role of specialized operations-research groups and of economists within them? How can perverse incentives in a bureaucracy (e.g., to spend effort in maximizing a budget instead of economizing within a budget) be reduced? What is the optimal compromise between centralization

[18] See, for example, Thomas C. Schelling, "The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, II, No. 3 (September 1958), pp. 203-64.

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and decentralization of decision-making? How can bureaucratic bargaining be made to serve an economic function?[14]

(6) MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Research and development are a vitally important part of investment in which economists are beginning to take a serious interest.[15] How much should be spent on research and development? Is there a tendency for a competitive economy to underallocate for certain kinds of research and development? How should one choose among alternative development projects? How much duplication is desirable and in what circumstances? Military-sponsored R and D is a large proportion of total R and D and poses some special management problems.[16]

(7) MILITARY LOGISTICS

Logistics is the business side of military preparedness and operations. It is concerned with procurement, spare parts supply, inventory policy, maintenance, transportation, and other aspects of business (or business-like) management. It provides an opportunity for the fairly direct application of many facets of business economics.

But there is the usual difference—the principal objective of logistics is combat capability, present or future; and since combat capability is not sold on a market, it is impossible to apply a simple profit-maximizing criterion in designing, say, an optimal inventory policy. Within limits this difficulty can be overcome, or sidestepped, by designing an inventory policy that minimizes the cost of a given combat capability; and by examining the trade-offs between the cost of such an inventory and that of other elements affecting the same combat capability, like increased maintenance or the procurement of additional operational aircraft. But we are likely to be left with subtle problems like: Is a central reserve inventory of 1½ X for two geographically separated units equal in contingency value to an inventory of X held by each

[14] On the last point, see Charles E. Lindblom, *Bargaining: The Hidden Hand in Government*, The RAND Corporation, Research Memorandum RM-1434-RC, 1955; and Alain Enthoven and Henry Rowen, "Defense Planning and Organization," a paper presented at the Universities/National Bureau Conference on Public Finance, April 1959, to be published in the *Proceedings* of that conference in 1960.

[15] A number of papers on economic aspects of research and development will be presented at the conference on inventive activity to be held at the University of Minnesota in May 1960 under the joint sponsorship of the Universities/National Bureau Committee and the Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council.

[16] See Burton H. Klein and William H. Meckling, "Application of Operations Research to Development Decisions," *Operations Research*, VI, No. 3 (May-June 1958), pp. 352-63; and Burton H. Klein, "A Radical Proposal for R. and D.," *Fortune*, May 1958, pp. 112-13, 218, 222, 224, 226.

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unit? Even problems of this kind frequently yield to economic analysis if the analyst is content with simply doing better rather than finding an *optimum optimorum*.[17]

(8) THE ECONOMICS OF MILITARY ALLIANCE

The problems of military alliance are closely analogous to the problems of international trade. What are the potential gains from taking advantage of comparative cost differentials and division of labor within an alliance, and to what extent can or should these gains be forsaken in view of the lack of perfect correspondence among the national objectives of the members of the alliance? It is important here to draw a distinction between specialization in military *function* (e.g., long-range missile force vs. infantry) and specialization in the *production* of weapons and equipment. In general, nations will be much more willing to rely on allies for supplies, even essential ones, than for essential forces, and this willingness should increase as forces in being gain in importance. It is less essential than it used to be that the "arsenal of democracy" be concentrated in an industrial nation far removed geographically from potential aggressors, since no nation is now far enough removed. But this same fact should provide increased opportunity for specialization in military production that is desirable on strictly economic grounds.

Other important politico-economic problems of military alliance relate to the sharing of the burden of defense. There have been attempts to apply tax theory to these problems.[18]

(9) ECONOMIC WARFARE AND ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICY[19]

Economic warfare, old style, was tied intimately to the notion of mobilization base. Its weapons were trade denial, preclusive buying, blacklisting, etc. The United States (and the whole West to a lesser extent) is still using trade denial and boycott against the Soviet bloc,

[17] See Stephen Enke, "An Economist Looks at Air Force Logistics," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, XL, No. 3 (August 1958), pp. 230-39; and Horst Mendershausen, "Economic Problems in Air Force Logistics," *American Economic Review*, XLVIII, No. 4 (September 1958), pp. 632-48. A great many books and articles have been written on specific logistics problems like transportation, procurement, inventory policy, etc. See, for example, Thomson M. Whitin, *The Theory of Inventory Management*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1953.

[18] As a general reference, see Malcolm W. Hoag, "Economic Problems of Alliance," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXV, No. 6 (December 1957), pp. 522-34.

[19] For research suggestions on economic foreign policy, many of which have national security implications, see Charles P. Kindleberger, "United States Economic Foreign Policy: Research Requirements for 1965," *World Politics*, XI, No. 4 (July 1959), pp. 588-613.

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particularly China, but the significance of such measures has declined and is declining. They damage the economic strength of both sides to a limited extent, and their net effect on relative strength is problematic and certainly small. They can exert powerful leverage only on countries highly dependent on external trade, not on large, nearly self-sufficient blocs.[20]

On the other hand, the competition for the support (or at least neutrality) of the uncommitted areas, and for the continued support of allies, has become of tremendous importance for the cold war and has obvious economic aspects. The principal "weapons" are aid in its manifold forms (including public and semi-public loans) and trade and investment policies.

There has been a tendency, both in the administration of aid programs and in their analysis, to distinguish military, economic, and political aspects. In fact almost all aid programs have mixed objectives, and all have mixed effects. Regardless of how the aid is parceled and what each parcel is called, we should design and judge the aid program in the light of all effects. When we give military or "defense support" aid to a country, we are likely to release indigenous resources for other purposes. When we give economic aid, we (hopefully) contribute to political stability and sometimes to military strength as well as to economic growth. Have we been overemphasizing *aid* as compared with *trade* policy? What is the relation between economic growth, political stability, and Western orientation?[21] How can we help to reduce the vulnerability of our less self-sufficient allies to economic pressure by the Soviet bloc (e.g., the threat of deprivation of Middle East oil)? Will some increase in Soviet (or bloc) trading with uncommitted areas increase or diminish their relative influence in such areas?[22] What kinds of accretion of military strength in recipient countries will contribute most to the national security of the United States? It is apparent that a worth-while analysis of our aid and trade policies requires knowledge and judgment of a wide range of national security questions.

[20] I am not denying that they have adversely affected the industrialization of China. The Chinese economy is not yet large, and in its industrializing stage is far from self-sufficient.

[21] The relation is by no means a simple one, as some economists have been prone to assume. For one attempt at a partial answer, see Charles Wolf, Jr., *Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960.

[22] See Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1945.

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(10) MOBILIZATION

I have not meant to imply that the concept of mobilization is completely outmoded. It is even conceivable that we will have a long, large-scale war, without effective strategic bombing by either side, in which mobilization potential will weigh heavily in the scales of victory, although I would argue that this contingency should be ignored in allocating the defense budget, on the ground that it is both unlikely and lacking in danger to the United States. Even this proposition, however, is important to ponder and investigate, for we are still spending hundreds of millions annually on military reserves and mobilization potential that would be useful mainly in such a contingency.

The kind of mobilization potential that would permit a very rapid build-up of forces and production for limited wars (of the Korean type) would appear to me to make much more sense. So would preparatory steps to permit rapid mobilization in crises. What kind of reserves and what kind of industrial mobilization measures would these capabilities require? What should be the composition of the stockpile? What kinds of excess productive capacity would be optimal, and how should it be provided and financed?

(11) CIVIL (OR NON-MILITARY) DEFENSE AND RECUPERATION

To date the United States has spent virtually nothing on civil defense and acquired virtually no worth-while capability. At the same time we have spent billions on active air defenses (interceptors and missiles). Since the two forms of defense are to some extent substitutes and to some extent complements, is this a sensible (economic) allocation of the defense budget?[23]

Civil defense has been justified on two grounds: that it contributes to deterrence by demonstrating our seriousness of purpose, and that it lessens the destruction of population and industry if deterrence fails and war comes. The first is a dubious argument and should be questioned and studied: deterrence may well be at a maximum when the cities on both sides are exposed and vulnerable, while the striking forces are hidden, buried, or otherwise rendered invulnerable. The second argument is sound enough in principle; the relevant question is how much destruction can be reduced by what kinds and amounts of expenditure.

The gains and costs of various possible civil defense measures (fall-out shelters, blast shelters, evacuation, stockpiling, dispersal of industry

[23] For a general discussion, see *Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense, op.cit.*

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and population, etc.) must be assessed and compared in various combinations against a range of enemy threats. This involves a sophisticated economic analysis of alternative ways of using resources to which very few persons appear to be devoting their efforts.

Economic analysis is also required to estimate the ability of the economy to recuperate following various patterns and magnitudes of attack, and ways in which its recuperability can be enhanced by pre-attack planning, stockpiling, etc.

(12) "DISARMAMENT" AND ARMS CONTROL

"Disarmament" is the term now commonly used to include all kinds of mutual arrangements with potential enemies to reduce the risk or violence of war—whether or not they involve disarming. Despite the frustrations of years of unsuccessful negotiating with the Soviet bloc, the possible payoff from success is so great, and the possible disaster from misconceived arrangements so monstrous, that the subject and its problems deserve far more intense, unemotional, and rigorous study than they have yet received.

While economic motives (budget savings) have provided a good deal of the steam behind disarmament negotiations, it is far from clear that an effective plan, e.g., to prevent surprise nuclear attack, would reduce national security expenditures and it might well increase them.

The formulation of effective "disarmament" plans is incredibly difficult because they must be *mutually* advantageous to be acceptable. While the core problem is not an economic one, it is possible that economists can make an important contribution from their studies of what causes equilibria to be stable or unstable, and of analogous bargaining and "game" situations.

III

There are difficult problems of access to data in conducting some kinds of national security research. One of the barriers is security classification. Another is privileged information—restricted to the originating firm or agency for competitive reasons. Still another is the inaccessibility of the kind of information that can only be gained from experience in or close association with a functioning organization. There is no doubt that these are formidable barriers to attacking some national security problems, and that their existence has discouraged many scholars with keen interest in the subject.

Without in any way belittling these barriers, there are two points I should like to make about them. The first is that they are much more

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formidable in some problem areas than in others. They are relatively unimportant in studying the implications of large defense budgets, perhaps most important in studying efficiency in using and managing defense resources. But even in this latter area there are relatively unrestricted subareas; for example, useful theoretical analyses of optimizing with incomplete markets may be possible with only a general acquaintance with governmental and military institutions. Information on logistics is relatively open, as is information on trade, aid, mobilization, and civil defense.

My second point on access is that the difference between national security and a good many other important areas for economics research is, if anything, a matter of degree. Once we leave the most abstract levels of general theory, research in economics is likely to require specialized factual and institutional knowledge that is difficult to acquire. There are few security classifications in the private economy or the civilian side of the government, but rules governing the use of privileged information are frequently just as restrictive. We have tried to go too far in economics on too few data and too little experience. The economist who is serious about applied research in national security or almost any other field should expect to devote much time and effort to acquiring specialized information, and preferably, if he does not already have it, some specialized relevant experience. In the case of national security, there are now several ways in which he can do this.

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* This list supplements the preceding references in the footnotes, and is intended to be suggestive, not exhaustive.

** All are published by the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., unless otherwise indicated.

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By J. DAVID SINGER

Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959, 263 pp. $5.50.

ONE of the major prerequisites of any systematic progress in a field of inquiry is the self-conscious articulation of assumptions, and it may well be that the archaic state of the study of international politics is due in part to our failure to engage in such articulation with adequate frequency and vigor. The treatise under review is a commendable exception to our tendency to "bootleg" assumptions, consciously or otherwise, into our research and teaching; as such it is a welcome and valuable addition to the literature of what many of us view as a nascent discipline. But Professor Waltz's book is more than that; it is, in effect, an *examination* of these assumptions, which find their way inevitably into every piece of description, analysis, or prescription in international political relations. These assumptions lead into, and flow from, the level of social organization which the observer selects as his point of entry into any study of the subject. For Waltz, there are three such levels of analysis: the individual, the state, and the state system. While some may complain that he omits such relevant social forms as the pressure group, socio-economic class, or political party, this reviewer cannot bemoan this omission. After all, the state is still the dominant—if not the sole—actor in world politics, and while other groups, classes, or levels of human organization may influence the course of events, they can do so only by acting upon and influencing the state itself.

What the author attempts here is an examination of the assumptions which lead an observer to select one of these three levels of analysis, and the theoretical and conceptual results which eventuate from such a selection. His major concern is that of ascertaining which level offers the most fruitful approach to answering the question: what are the sources and causes of war?

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I. The First Level: Man Himself

Waltz addresses himself firstly to those who approach international conflict at the microscopic level, and who see in the inherent sinfulness and avariciousness of man the primary cause of war; these are his "first-image analysts." To them, as long as man is as he is, war may be anticipated as a natural, recurrent inevitability. But this raises the further question of whether or not man will always be the sinful, power-seeking organism of the past and present. Here Waltz divides his human-nature theorists into two camps: the pessimists and the optimists. Among the pessimists he places such ancients as Augustine and Spinoza, and such contemporary observers as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans J. Morgenthau.[1] For them, war not only has its roots in the heart, mind, or psyche of the human beast, but, more to the point, those roots cannot be eradicated or modified; accepting man's fixed and unchanging capacity for evil, they tend to view domestic and international violence as the inevitable by-products of human existence, mitigated only by the fear of overwhelming coercive authority.

Against the pessimists, Waltz sets his optimists, dominated, as might be expected, by the behavioral scientists.[2] Whereas the pessimists of the first-image school give up on man and turn to political remedies, their optimistic counterparts, according to the author, "seeing the cause of war in men, seek to change *them*" (p. 42). For such as these, Waltz has little patience (though he devotes one of his longest chapters to a sampling of quotes on which he confidently impales these first-image optimists). Among those whom he most enthusiastically punctures are the anthropologists Alexander Leighton, Clyde Kluckhohn, and Margaret Mead; the psychiatrists and psychologists Gordon Allport, James Miller, Lawrence Frank, Otto Klineberg, Hadley Cantril, T. H. Pear, H. V. Dicks, and George Kisker; and the sociologists Fred Cottrell and L. L. Bernard.[3] This is but a sampling of the behavioral

[1] One may question the validity of associating Morgenthau with this group. Though he *does* postulate that the world "is the result of forces inherent in human nature" (p. 4), his entire theoretical structure focuses on the behavior of states (conceived as organic entities) within the state system. This reviewer would categorize Morgenthau as a "third-image analyst." See *Politics Among Nations*, New York, 1956.

[2] The behavioral sciences are meant here to include only anthropology, sociology, psychiatry, and psychology. Some would add the other social sciences: economics, history, political science, and perhaps geography; see *The Behavioral Sciences at Harvard*, Cambridge, Mass., 1954. And others might even include biology and physiology, as, for example, James C. Miller, "Toward a General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences," *American Psychologist*, x, No. 9 (September 1955), pp. 513-31.

[3] Those familiar with these names will appreciate the difficulty of categorizing them by discipline, as well as the grossness of any category encompassing figures as disparate as Miller and Klineberg, for example.

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scientists who have had the temerity to venture, untutored and unsuspecting, into our domain. Waltz finds his major source of grievance in the behavioral scientists' naiveté and ignorance of the political context within which individuals develop their values and attitudes or seek to realize their ambitions. As a result of this naiveté, the author finds their peace-making recommendations "either hopelessly vague or downright impossible" (p. 65). Thus, while not concerning himself overly with the question of man's general plasticity—an assumption from which most behavioral scientists proceed—he concludes that they have little to offer the student of international politics.

As a traditionally trained political scientist who later devoted a year to post-doctoral study in the behavioral sciences, this reviewer's response is rather ambivalent. On the one hand, I can only agree that most of the behavioral scientists have not, upon venturing into the morass of international politics, acquitted themselves too well. Relatively unaware of both the history of state interactions and the process by which they are currently conducted, they too readily succumb to the temptation to oversimplify or to seek some monistic explanation for war. But perhaps Professor Waltz commits an even greater sin than that of naive optimism and exuberance, by reinforcing this stereotype of irrelevance and incompetence in the minds of the political scientists who will constitute the bulk of his readership. Most of us are already far too prone to discount the possibility of our getting any useful assistance from our sister social-science disciplines, with the possible and occasional exception of economics or history. Too long have we tended to encourage one another in a form of intellectual smugness masquerading as tough-minded sophistication.

As a result of this tendency to parochialism, we have often overlooked some significant potentialities for international politics in the study of the behavioral sciences. The first of these potentialities lies in the most obvious direction: the utilization of these sciences' empirical findings and data where there are significant gaps in our own body of knowledge. For example, who can deny that we might comprehend more thoroughly the foreign policy of a state if we were more knowledgeable about the cultural roots from whence its decision-makers spring?[4] Or, might we not usefully apply to our studies of national capability the findings of social psychologists who have demonstrated that certain techniques of attitude manipulation, when applied by government-

[4] Not to mention the policy implications of a fuller Western comprehension of the cultural values, aspirations, and prejudices of the peoples of China, India, Poland, or Egypt.

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influenced media, have a profound impact on loyalty or morale—crucial ingredients in any power index?[5] For those who hold that the lack of empirical knowledge is itself a major detriment to the growth of theory in international politics, it should be obvious that such knowledge may be usefully acquired by a variety of scholars employing a multitude of techniques.

Secondly, the behavioral sciences seem to have adopted certain methodological habits which we in political science (and history) have only begun to appreciate. The articulation of assumptions, the spelling-out of hypotheses, the search for controllable variables, the virtues of replicability, the use of carefully selected samples of the conceptual universe, the pursuit of semantic precision, and the respect for verbal parsimony[6] are all part of the intellectual posture of a competent behavioral scientist, though they may by no means be universally adhered to.

Thirdly, there is the heuristic contribution, and while it is the least discernible, it may ultimately prove the most valuable to students of international politics. Having progressed further in the direction of theory formulation (mostly of the middle range), psychology and sociology, perhaps because of the premium placed on the attributes mentioned above, may well suggest relationships and propositions from which the political scientist might usefully analogize. Among these might be not only the familiar equilibrium model (a version of which we employ in our use of the balance-of-power concept), but coalition patterning drawn from small group studies, propositions arising from learning theory, studies of reinforcement, stimulus-response, dominance-submission, the reference group, kinship patterns, or even perhaps the Freudian model of organic development.[7] The adaptation of behavioral (and physical) science models to the study of state behavior and the state system must certainly be handled with caution, and simple-minded reductionism ought to be avoided, but the pitfalls need

[5] For example, how many of us are aware of the rather persuasive evidence that in-group loyalty need not rely upon antagonism toward an out-group? See Harold Guetzkow, *Multiple Loyalties*, Princeton, N.J., Center for Research on World Political Institutions, 1955.

[6] These last two items are particularly applicable to the author under review and to the traditional philosophers, from whom he seems to have received much intellectual sustenance.

[7] Among the sources of such analogies are the following compendia: Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, 2 vols.; Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry Murray, eds., *Personality in Nature, Society and Culture*, New York, 1948; Roy Grinker, *Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior*, New York, 1956; G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley, *Readings in Social Psychology*, New York, 1952, rev. ed.

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not be viewed as insuperable; the possibilities strike this reviewer as challenging and exhilarating.[8]

Thus, rather than belabor the fact that the "proffered contributions of many of them [the behavioral scientists] have been rendered ineffective by a failure to comprehend the significance of the political framework of international action" (p. 76), the student of state behavior and the state system might more profitably attempt to familiarize himself with the bases from which the proffered contributions arise, and then apply them himself. This is not meant to deter the psychologist, sociology, or anthropologist from entering into the mysterious preserve of international political relations, but rather to suggest that until he becomes more familiar with the body of knowledge of the international politics specialist, the latter should be willing to move in the behavioral scientists' direction; such efforts as some of us have made have been more than reciprocated.[9]

II. The Second Level: The Separate States

Turning from his consideration of those who seek the causes of war in man himself, Waltz proceeds to an examination of those who find such roots in the characteristics of certain types of nation-state. These are Waltz's "second-image analysts," proceeding from the assumption that the nature of a state's political institutions, its modes of production and distribution, the quality and origins of its elites, and (sometimes) the characteristics of its people determine whether that state will be peaceful or belligerent. Thus, there are "good" states and "bad" states, and bad states can become good (and peace-loving) only by turning to liberal democracy, or socialism, or free enterprise, etc. And just as the author quoted the behavioral scientists to demonstrate the fallaciousness of the first-image approach, he selects from Marxism and the international socialist movement in order to explore the implications of the second image. No more vulnerable a straw man could have been selected!

After discussing the orthodox Marxian doctrine in which the destruction of capitalism leads to the "withering away" of states and thus to the elimination of war, Waltz turns to the revisionists, whom he finds

[8] For a sampling of these possibilities, see such interdisciplinary and "general system" journals as *Behavioral Science, General Systems* and, in a less explicit fashion, the *Journal of Conflict Resolution.*

[9] From the reviewer's own experiences in interdisciplinary seminars, conferences, and research projects, and as an editor of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, there seems to be considerable humility and willingness to learn on the part of behavioral scientists concerned with international politics.

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more sophisticated and fascinating. Having witnessed the degree to which World War I led the socialist parties and the proletariat to choose national interests over class interests, Lenin and his European successors felt compelled to seek some modification in their doctrine. For the former, it was sufficient to increase his emphasis on the need for strong leadership which would show the proletariat where its true interest lay, but for Hobson (whom Waltz selects at his prototype revisionist) something more was required. In place of the "withering away" concept, the revisionist accepted the state as a continuing instrument of social organization, but anticipated reform in state behavior once the socialists came to power; socialist governments, recognizing the incompatibility of war with the interests of the working class, would never engage in international military conflict! Thus, the cause of war lies not in the mere existence of states (as for Marx), but in the existence of *capitalist* states.

The implications of this second level of analysis are ironic, and hardly likely to lead to any diminution in the incidence of international violence. On the one hand, such otherwise disparate observers as Harry Truman and Richard Nixon can argue that but for Russian intransigence, the world would now be enjoying the pursuits of peace, and on the other, such strange bedfellows as C. Wright Mills and Nikita Khrushchev can attribute the likelihood of World War III to the "ruling circles" in the United States. Moreover (and Waltz fails to note this), the belief that there are good and bad states not only does nothing to help solve the problem of war, but helps to assure that when war comes, it will be fought in a crusading, ideological, and hyperbolic fashion, terminable only by the devastation and obliteration of one or the other; there is "no substitute for victory" when fighting the infidel!

III. The Third Level: The State System

Finally, the author comes to grips with the assumptions and implications inherent in the third level of analysis. Employing Jean Jacques Rousseau as his "third-image analyst," Waltz concludes with Rousseau that "in anarchy there is no automatic harmony," and that "among autonomous states, war is inevitable" (p. 186). And having suggested that the roots of international conflict lie in both the clash of interests among states and the absence of effective supranational agencies for the regulation of this clash of interests (thus seeming to associate himself with the third-image analysts), he proceeds to examine some of the corollaries of this assumption for state behavior.

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The basic proposition is clear: "everybody's strategy depends on everybody else's,"[10] and any belief in the autonomy of national foreign policy can lead only to disaster. Thus, the balance-of-power doctrine is seen not only as a powerful descriptive device, but as a normative and prescriptive requirement of national survival. "If some states act on this rule [do whatever you must in order to win], or are expected to act on it, other states must adjust their strategies accordingly" (p. 205).

Too much has already been written on the balance-of-power model to belabor Waltz's effort here. His use and understanding of the model are exquisitely clear and sophisticated, and his rejection of the "idealist"[11] position is unerringly devastating. But, like others who understand the balance so well, he refuses to accept all of its logical consequences. For example, he observes in his closing section that "the obvious conclusion of a third-image analysis is that world government is the remedy for world war. The remedy, though it may be unassailable in logic, is unattainable in practice" (p. 238). And Morgenthau: "There can be no permanent international peace without a state coextensive with the confines of the political world. . . . [But] a world community must antedate a world state."[12] In the conviction that the world's people and their states are not ready for supranational institutions, they are joined by almost all of their colleagues in the field; and in this conviction they unwittingly discard the third level of analysis and embrace instead the futile simplicities of the first or second image. This seems to leave us with the feeling that World War III is inevitable, despite the realists' clinging to their slim reed of diplomatic expertise as a way out of this plight. Those who argue thus are probably correct, but one often wonders why we almost invariably spend so much time shrilly maintaining that supranational institutions are impossible, utopian, and idealistic. It is just possible that this intellectual, literary, and verbal effort, if applied to the problem in a more creative and imaginative fashion, might lead us to some way out of the dilemma of perpetual anarchy and its corollary of inevitable war. It seems to this

[10] Quoting John McDonald, *Strategy in Poker, Business and War*, New York, 1950. Waltz makes passing reference to other works on game theory, and occasionally utilizes its concepts with success, but generally fails to appreciate some of its more subtle and promising aspects in the study of international politics. For a stimulating discussion of such potentialities, see Thomas C. Schelling, "The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, II, No. 3 (September 1958), pp. 203-64.

[11] Frank Tannenbaum is the hapless victim here; see especially his "Balance of Power versus the Co-ordinate State," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXVII, No. 2 (June 1952), pp. 173-97.

[12] *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 477 and 485.

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reviewer that here is an assignment worthy—no matter what the odds may be—of our most vigorous intellectual efforts as scholars and as human beings. By dismissing it as an impossibility, we only help to hasten the day when the skies will be filled with nuclear-headed missiles raining destruction and devastation on man and all that he has created.

IV. Conclusion

In summary, it should be pointed out that Waltz ultimately is faced with the same question which confronted Auguste Comte in his search for a unified science of human behavior: how can the individual be at once both a cause and a consequence of society?[13] As Waltz puts it, "All three images are a part of nature. So fundamental are man, the state, and the state system in any attempt to understand international relations that seldom does an analyst, however wedded to one image, entirely overlook the other two" (p. 160). How does he finally interrelate these three levels of analysis? Perhaps his closest approximation to success is found in the final sentence: "The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; [conversely] the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results" (p. 238). True as this may be, and granting that this trichotomization is a somewhat artificial device, we are still confronted with a question of genuine theoretical and policy importance: at which level are we to begin in an effort to discover—and subsequently mitigate—the causes of war?[14]

For this reviewer, the answer must be somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the evidence so eloquently adduced by Waltz is thoroughly persuasive. It is neither the sinfulness of man nor the bellicosity of certain types of states that "cause" war; rather, it is the nature of the state system and the accompanying expectation of violence which it imposes on statesmen. On the other hand, however, one cannot assume that the necessary modifications in that system will automatically occur or that the system itself is inexorably changing in the required direction. Rather, such modifications can be wrought only by the decisions of

[13] Other social scientists, too, are constantly confronted by this paradox. See, for example, Otis Duncan and Leo Schnore, "Cultural, Behavioral, and Ecological Perspectives in the Study of Social Organization," and Peter Rossi's "Comment," both in *American Journal of Sociology*, LXV, No. 2 (September 1959), pp. 132-53.

[14] Two rather fruitful attempts at dealing with this dilemma are Robert C. Angell, "Governments and Peoples as Foci for Peace-oriented Research," *Journal of Social Issues*, XI, No. 1 (1955), pp. 36-41, and Frederick S. Dunn, *War and the Minds of Men*, New York, 1950, ch. 2, "The Changing Focus on International Events."

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men, acting on behalf of states and in their roles as national policy makers. Furthermore, one might well argue that the key variable is not actually the system itself, but the way in which that system is perceived, evaluated, and responded to by the decision makers in the several and separate states. Taking such a phenomenological view, one is compelled to return to Waltz's characterization of the first and second images and ask for further clarification. For example, is the *only* implication of the second image that war occurs because some states employ capitalistic, totalitarian, or other sorts of institutions? Does this level of analysis not also suggest, since states are the actors and primary units of analysis in the state system, that they might offer the most fruitful object of inquiry for the scholar as well as the peace-seeker? And again, does not this phenomenological aspect call into question the notion that the only implication of the first-level approach is that war is rooted in man's sinfulness? Might it not also lead to the conclusion that men—especially those men who formulate state policy—provide not only a useful focus of attention, but also the most vulnerable point of leverage by which the state system might be modified?

It seems to this reviewer that we need to know a great deal more about the modifications that are required in the state system, and by what processes such modifications may most fruitfully be pursued. Given our present lack of such knowledge, neither set of questions is easily answered. Nor is this lack of knowledge purely accidental. Were it not for the taboos which inhibited the study of man in a fashion similar to that employed in the study of matter, the ominous gap between the social and the physical sciences might not be with us today. Observers of stars, minerals, and plants (including apples!) found it socially possible to move out of Comte's first two stages (the theological and the metaphysical) and into the third (positivistic) stage considerably sooner than those whose concern was the observation of human beings—though they, too, had their difficulties. Today, the scientific study of man and his institutions is still resisted in many quarters by a powerful array of pedagogical and ideological taboos; if they are not overcome, this gap may not be closed in time. By his hasty rejection of the usefulness of the behavioral sciences, and his heavy reliance upon the traditional political philosophers, Waltz seems to succumb to, and strengthen, such taboos, thus inhibiting his own search for the answers to the questions posed in *Man, the State, and War*. This is hardly the most efficacious way of closing the gap between the social and the physical sciences, and if it is not closed soon, the repercussions may be ominous not only for the study of man, but for man himself.

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THE TECHNICAL BASIS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

By C. P. KINDLEBERGER*

William Diebold, Jr., *The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1950-1959*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1959, 750 pp. $6.50.

WILLIAM Diebold has followed up his 1952 study of *Trade and Payments in Western Europe* with a big and full book on the European Coal and Steel Community. It covers a wide range of subjects from labor, investment, prices, and harmonization to external trade, and explores at some depth the question whether partial integration of a functional sort is possible among countries with separate sovereignties in other economic areas such as monetary, fiscal, and wage policies. There is much meat here, and students will turn to it often. As an account of what happened, a description of the political forces at work, and a summary of problems, the book is a notable addition to the literature on integration. But Diebold has drawn his conclusions in pragmatic rather than economic terms, and this involves an important danger.

The treaty setting up the Coal and Steel Community, he concludes, has worked (p. 594). Like Abbé Sieyès in the French Revolution, it has survived.[1] A preliminary assessment of the Community at this time cannot render a clear-cut verdict (p. 715). The Community needs not only a coal policy, but also an energy policy (pp. 629, 701). The process begun by Schuman may have no end, nor even a certain direction, but it has changed Europe (p. 717).

In other words, we don't know where we are going, but we are on our way. We do know, moreover, the means of locomotion, if not the route. The Community uses moderation, and palliatives (p. 707). Any realistic policy will have to seek compromises (p. 705). The High Authority works by means of general policies applied through persuasion, compromise, mobilization of interests, and the judicious exercise of authority (p. 693). Flexibility is needed (p. 672).

But it is permissible to ask whether the High Authority's empiricism is an adequate policy in a complex problem, and the question is espe-

* I have benefited from comments on an earlier draft by Richard L. Gordon.

[1] *Bulletin from the European Community*, August-September 1959, p. 9.

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cially pertinent since Diebold had bad luck in his timing. Shortly after the book appeared, and a few days more than nine years after the famous Schuman speech (by Monnet), the High Authority was slapped down by the Council of Ministers. Its Community solution for the coal crisis, which had arisen despite (because of?) the pragmatic approach to coal, was rejected in favor of national action. The French were not prepared to give the High Authority supranational control over French coal production; the Germans thought that the crisis was not grave enough to warrant the heroic measures proposed; the Italian minister held that the cutback of domestic production in other countries was insufficient, and that the reduction of imports from the United States, to which the Italian economy had become accustomed, went too far. As this is written, the basic issues of production, stocks, and trade in coal remain outside the jurisdiction of the High Authority.

As I was reading Diebold's book, packed with information on the actions taken by the ECSC, I was reminded of the second volume on the Alanbrooke diaries by Arthur Bryant which appeared recently and briefly revived the old debate on Eisenhower's performance as the military commander of the allies in the West during World War II. The debate turns on whether Eisenhower should be judged at that stage of his career as the leader of the alliance—the verdict would be that he had performed brilliantly—or as a military leader, on which his score would be palpably lower. The difficulty of rendering an over-all verdict is compounded by the fact that the demands of the alliance frequently conflicted with those of the military campaign. When the enemy's defensive line was broken, as in early September 1944, to divide the gasoline between Bradley and Montgomery supported the alliance, after a fashion, at the expense of the military goal.

The Schuman Plan is subtitled "A Study in Economic Cooperation," and Diebold is an economist and a good one. Moreover, he states that the modality of the Community is economic and that it must therefore be examined in economic as well as political terms (p. 664). But the book does not undertake an economic examination. It is as if a study of SHAEF contented itself with a general description of the military campaigns, and the pressures down upon Eisenhower from Churchill and Marshall, and up from Montgomery and Bradley, without examining in detail the technical aspects of critical command decisions.

Diebold defends this de-emphasis of the technical economic aspects of coal and steel. At a number of places he drops the economic analysis,

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which calls for "a more detailed examination than seems warranted for the purposes of the book" (e.g., pp. 539, 589). He insists that the Community ought to be judged not by its conformity to some ideal model but by the available alternatives (p. 634), and the passage goes on to say that "all these issues need more investigation than I have been able to give." At another point he recognizes the necessity for economic analysis and calls on the High Authority to set out the economics of coal and the facts relevant to them (p. 699).

Since the war has been won, it makes very little difference what Alanbrooke thought of Eisenhower. But one cannot be so academic in the case of *The Schuman Plan*. In January 1960 the Coal and Steel Community remains in a state of suspended animation. To the extent that the flexible, non-analytical policies of the Community—compromising and yielding to pressure—have been responsible for its incapacity to meet the problem of the coal surplus, an economic study of the Community (or, for that matter, a political study of this economic subject) without attention to the economics of coal is *Faust* without Mephistopheles. I believe that the extent is large.

It is perhaps out of place in a journal focusing on politics to deal with such a technical economic problem as the price of coal, and it may even be a violation of the professional code to chide another economist outside our own precincts. But it is useful, in my judgment, to emphasize to political scientists, as well as to politicians, that a strong analytical underpinning is necessary for political analysis of technical matters. This is clearly understood in such esoteric fields as atomic energy, electronics, and outer space. In most formulations of policy the more familiar and lowly questions like the price of wheat or cotton, the cost of winning coal, or the balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism get short shrift. Some years ago I was distressed, on returning from leave, to learn that a group of political scientists at MIT had begun a large-scale investigation of tariff policy in the United States, as a study in political pressures and communication, without ever having heard of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem which relates changes in tariffs and trade to internal income distribution. The theorem in my judgment is crucial to an adequate understanding of the political pressures as well as the economics of tariffs, and without it it is impossible to discern uniformities among the forces for and against the reciprocal trade agreements.

There are, to be sure, occasions when theory becomes doctrine and muddling through is superior as a formula to cleaving to the theoretical

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blueprint. Reality is riddled with contradictions, and it is easy to agree that flat-out capitalism, socialism, 100 per cent money, even—God save the mark!—free trade and democracy, are unworkable in their chemically pure form. The genius of Roosevelt in meeting the uncertainties of the 1930's, and of the British throughout their history, has been that they proceeded as the way lay open. But this is not always desirable. And my quarrel with Diebold—a friendly one—is that he fails to judge the Coal and Steel Community on its economic performance in a case where the economic analysis is vital.

The High Authority inherited a patchwork of national policies on coal, and largely perpetuated it without basic change. One policy was to produce as much coal as possible without regard to price; another imposed price ceilings on coal so as not to penalize the consumer. Along with these were the national systems (both governmental and private) of setting the price at the average of costs between low- and high-cost producers (and, except in Germany, between domestic output and imports) with the resultant necessity to subsidize the latter at the expense of the former.

Price ceilings plus average-cost rather than marginal-cost pricing had several serious effects. In the first place, by subsidizing consumption they magnified the original postwar scarcity of coal. The psychology of shortage permeated official and private thinking on coal and led to policies for expansion of output through investment planning, labor training, long-term contracts for imports, and similar means. Secondly, they ensured that high-cost sources of supply would be kept in production, and low-cost mines handicapped in expansion.

The merits of marginal-cost pricing in an increasing-cost industry such as mining have been expounded in the British coal industry by the minority members of the Ridley Committee and by I. M. D. Little, and for France by Maurice Allais. This literature is not referred to by Diebold. Marginal-cost pricing maximizes efficiency both in consumption and in production. In addition, the marginal-cost curve is much steeper in its upward slope than the curve representing average costs of the industry. The consequence of marginal-cost pricing in this circumstance is not only a higher price but one which changes, in response to changes in demand, over a wider range. Price becomes flexible. But output remains fairly steady. Average-cost pricing, on the other hand, means steady prices and substantial changes in output when demand alters. The coal surplus of the last few years has been the consequence of inability to make these substantial changes in output required by the

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lower prices of competitive fuels—largely oil—and their increased availability.

There are some who think that economic integration means socialist planning—both those who approve, such as André Philip, and those who abominate, like Clarence Randall. The latter's fears were not realized in steel, which came through the first years of the Schuman Plan fairly well because of a constantly rising demand (despite Diebold's objection to this explanation, p. 670). Philip wants planning with economic growth. But this raises the question whether he wants marginal-cost pricing, *à la* Lange-Lerner socialism, with adaptation of prices to changes in demand and supply, or some mish-mash of long-range forecasts of the demand and supply of energy, based on projections of income and income elasticities, technical coefficients, and anticipated discoveries, and new shafts, wells, dams, and pipelines. The latter sort of planning will fail to adjust demand and supply, and lead to the kind of solution which the High Authority proposed for the coal crisis last spring, and which the Council of Ministers rejected. The central question is whether these proposals represented economic integration or political compromise.

The High Authority's solution was that every country should cut back both imports and domestic production, regardless of the relative cost. This may be interpreted as superior to the national solutions of France and Germany, which proposed complete elimination of imports from the United States, substantial cuts in Community coal trade, and the smallest reductions in domestic production. (This is put from the French point of view: Germany, of course, is a net exporter within the Community.) But the High Authority's solution failed to take account of the fact that Belgian coal was the highest cost, and United States imports, delivered in Italy and Rotterdam on long-term charter, the cheapest. To the greatest extent, Italy and the Netherlands would have had to pay for the domestic price stability of Belgium, France, and Germany in the face of cheaper oil.

What then does economic integration mean, if it proceeds along lines of least resistance and continuously takes account of the political realities? It is hard to see that it means anything. Toward the end of his book Diebold suggests that some attention must be paid to costs, and upon his recent investiture, the new president of the High Authority, Signor Malvestiti, remarked that the Community should pay more attention to costs than to prices: "Principles of price formation must be formulated which would enable consumers voluntarily to choose the

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most economic resources."[2] All this, I submit, means the adoption of a theory, an idea—to be explicit, a competitive ideal solution—and scoring the success of economic integration by the extent to which it approaches that idea. Institutional survival—the ready accomplishment of even the lowliest committee, as countless observers like Parkinson have noted—is not enough.

[2] *Bulletin from the European Community*, October-November 1959, p. 9.

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BALANCED GROWTH, DESTABILIZERS, AND THE BIG PUSH

By BERT F. HOSELITZ

Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover, *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-income Countries*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1958, 389 pp. $8.50.

Albert O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (Yale Studies in Economics, No. 10), New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1958, 217 pp. $4.50.

Harvey Leibenstein, *Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1957, 295 pp. $6.75.

Gunnar Myrdal, *Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prosperity*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1957, 167 pp. $3.00.

IN the dozen years since the inauguration of technical assistance programs by international agencies and national governments of advanced countries, repeated attempts have been made to compare the performance of the developed and the underdeveloped economies and to measure, if possible, the impact of these assistance programs on the rate of development of the latter. The invariable result of these studies has been to reveal that, rather than catching up, the underdeveloped countries fall farther and farther behind. This observation, in turn, has led to analysis of the conditions of backwardness and of the ubiquity of "vicious circles of underdevelopment," on the one hand, and to a renewed effort to devise policies or strategies for economic development, on the other. The four books under consideration all deal in some form or other with these problems, and though each also contains a large amount of material not exclusively related to them, they all pay major attention to conditions of economic backwardness and prospects and policies for economic growth.

There is a high degree of unanimity on the problem of economic backwardness. I believe that H. W. Singer first pointed to the vicious circle in which an underdeveloped country finds itself. In fact, he stated that "we are faced with a system not only of vicious circles, but of vicious circles within vicious circles, and of interlocking vicious circles. There is, of course, the dominant vicious circle of low production—no surpluses for economic investment—no tools and equipment—low standard of production. An underdeveloped country is poor be-

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cause it has no industry; and an underdeveloped country has no industry because it is poor."[1]

This evaluation is shared by the authors of the books under review. But if a vicious circle were a closed circle, development of any kind would be impossible, and hence Singer himself, as well as those who agree with his evaluation, admit the possibility of breaking into the circle somewhere. The differences of opinion begin when we ask where various students of the problem see an opening in the vicious circle of underdevelopment, and what measures they propose to use to break the circle successfully.

Here again more recent writers were, to some extent, anticipated by Singer. Continuing his image, he set forth a series of dilemmas which cause underdeveloped countries to fail to escape from the vicious circle of poverty. Among these dilemmas, some of which are outside the economic sphere, two are especially noteworthy. One is the argument that, given the low level of income in underdeveloped countries, the amount of voluntary savings will at best admit for only a very slow rate of growth, whereas what is needed is a discontinuity in the process of capital formation, a breakthrough or "take-off." This is an anticipation of the widely accepted theory of the "big push," which again appears in two guises: (1) in the form of the theory of "balanced growth," and (2) in the form of Leibenstein's theory of "critical minimum effort."

The second dilemma which Singer describes, and which reappears in recent literature—including the books under consideration—is the fact that any growth-promoting policy normally also inaugurates countervailing tendencies, which have the effect of diminishing and possibly even eliminating any gain in income and welfare. In poor countries one of the chief growth-impeding factors is the rapid rise in population, and it is the avowed purpose of the study by Coale and Hoover to examine the relations between different probable rates of population growth in low-income countries (chiefly India) and prospective patterns and rates of economic growth. Similarly, great emphasis is placed upon this factor in Harvey Leibenstein's study, though here a number of other growth-depressing factors are taken account of. And Myrdal's analytical description of "poor lands" may be taken as an implicit and explicit analysis of growth-impeding factors, especially those not in the economic but in the political or socio-cultural sphere.

Though we find a fairly wide area of general agreement among these

[1] Hans W. Singer, "Economic Progress in Underdeveloped Countries," *Social Research*, XVI, No. 1 (March 1949), p. 5.

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authors, we also encounter a number of issues on which disagreement still exists. These appear to turn chiefly around the following points: (1) Do we have to accept the theory of the big push in one of its forms, or can we show that gradual and slow growth may also lead to ultimate economic development? (2) Does the choice of a strategy of economic development depend upon the level of economic performance already attained by a country, and if so, in what way will it differ as between a fairly well-developed country and a more backward one? (3) Assuming we accept the position that in order to reach a point of breakthrough an underdeveloped country must follow the policy of the big push, can we indicate more concretely what the most desirable policy choice will be?

The answer to the first question would throw light upon the contrast in the views of Leibenstein and Hirschman, on the one hand, and Myrdal, on the other; the answer to the second question would illuminate the contrast between India and Mexico stipulated by Coale and Hoover; and the answer to the third question would illuminate more clearly Leibenstein's theory of the critical minimum effort and place it in contrast to Hirschman's theory of growth through permanent imbalance. Although a dialectical procedure of the kind outlined here might bring some issues into sharper focus, I do not intend to present a three- or four-cornered debate, as it were, among the authors of the books under review. I believe, however, that if we let each of them speak for himself, the contrasts will stand out sharply and will lead us to a clearer recognition of the major strategic issues involved in elaborating a policy of induced economic growth.

Among the positions taken, those of Hirschman and Leibenstein are by far the most challenging and original. Though some of the subtleties will have to be neglected, they may briefly be outlined as follows: Leibenstein argues that a backward economy is characteristically in a state of quasi-equilibrium in which some of the variables, e.g., the amount of labor or capital, may expand in absolute size, but in which other variables, particularly per capita income, tend to hover around low values approximately equal to subsistence. This is an alternative description of Singer's original vicious circle, and the problem which Leibenstein poses is the development of a policy which will break this circle. Solution of such a problem is difficult, in view of the dilemma already touched upon by Singer—i.e., every per capita income-raising force brings into play income-depressing forces, and at low income levels the latter may and usually do attain the same magnitude as the former, so that the economy sinks back to its original level of subsistence

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equilibrium. Only an income-raising effect of gigantic proportions will generate a subsequent stream of other changes which will exert a pull in the same (income-raising) rather than in the opposite direction, and an economic policy designed to break the vicious circle must be one in which the impact of the income-raising force is equal to or greater than this critical minimum effort. In other words, a big push is needed which will bring about a rather sudden and substantial rise in income.

Leibenstein's version of the need for a big push differs somewhat from the usual form in which this thesis is presented. It has received its "classic" exposition in Ragnar Nurkse's discussion of the idea of balanced growth, but this same argument in somewhat expanded form can also be found in the policy description of the Center for International Studies at MIT and in other places.[2] This version of the theory of the big push is normally presented by stressing various indivisibilities which are particularly pertinent for the analysis of growth. First are indivisibilities in the production function—in particular, technological indivisibilities in the supply of overhead capital which lead to the temporary appearance of excess capacity. This excess capacity of overhead capital may in some instances have a stimulating effect upon other directly productive investment. But it is clear that the mere creation of excess capacity requires larger investment funds than if overhead capital could be created by small marginal dosages. Secondly, there exists what P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan has called "indivisibility in the supply of savings,"[3] by which is meant basically that in a developing economy the marginal propensity to save out of newly created income must be substantially higher than the average propensity to save, since in the absence of such a discontinuity too large a portion of new income would be consumed, instead of invested. But such a discontinuity in the propensities to save will take place only if the increase in income is sizable. A small marginal accretion to a person's income will scarcely induce him to save a higher proportion of his additional income than he did of his original income; but if the addition to his income is large, he will probably save a larger share of that addition. Hence a noticeable difference in the marginal and average

[2] Ragnar Nurkse, *Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries*, Oxford, 1953, pp. 11-31; Center for International Studies, MIT, *The Objectives of U.S. Economic Assistance Programs* (A study prepared at the request of the Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, U.S. Senate), Washington, D.C., 1957, pp. 70-71.

[3] P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Notes on the Theory of the 'Big Push,'" Center for International Studies, MIT, Economics Development Program, Italy Project, C/57-25, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, p. 14.

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propensities to save will appear only if additions to income are substantial relative to the original amount of income.

Thirdly, there exists an indivisibility in demand, which constitutes the core of the theory of balanced growth. It is based on the proposition that an increase in income created by a given investment project does not necessarily create additional demand for the increased output produced by the new investment. In concrete terms, assume that in a closed underdeveloped economy, unemployed workers are hired by a newly established enterprise to produce dishes and other eating utensils.[4] If the newly earned income of these workers were all spent on dishes, the total new production could be taken off the market. But it is likely that only a small portion of their income will be spent on dishes and a larger proportion will go for food, clothing, and other objects. Thus, on the one hand, scarcely any additional market for dishes would be created, and, on the other, inflationary pressure would be exerted on the markets for food, clothing, etc. If, however, instead of putting up a single factory for manufacturing tableware, employing one hundred workers, one hundred factories of this size were established simultaneously, additional employment would rise by 10,000 persons. And, more importantly, in this case one factory might produce additional clothing, others processed foods, others again additional furniture, and so on. Now all new enterprises could succeed and a market for each be found because the 10,000 newly employed workers would buy each other's products. This leads to the conclusion that because of indivisibilities on the demand side, many successive unrelated small investments are not the equal of a single large one.

The characteristic of these theories of the big push is that they justify virtually any kind of investment, provided it is large enough. Programing of all kinds of development policies may be subsumed under them and the choice of the optimum allocation of investment funds becomes a secondary consideration.[5] In contrast, Leibenstein has de-

[4] The fact should be emphasized that in this example we are dealing with a closed economy. For if we assume an open economy, the consequences described in the text may not arise, since the dishes produced by the new plant may find a market abroad, or even a domestic market, replacing previous imports. It should be noted, however, that this difference between a closed and an open economy is valid only up to a certain point. Though the existence of open economies may reduce the degree of indivisibility on the demand side, it does not eliminate it completely.

[5] One way of stating the policy recommendations flowing out of the theory of the big push is exhibited by the following passage from W. Arthur Lewis' book, *The Theory of Economic Growth*, Homewood, Ill., 1955. Lewis says: "The conclusion of this analysis is not very startling; it is that in development programmes all sectors of the economy should grow simultaneously, so as to keep a proper balance between

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veloped a general formula for allocation of investment which contains a maximizing condition, and which therefore is likely to insure maximum growth if properly applied. Though, like the other proponents of the big push, he rejects the application of the marginal productivity principle, he proposes in its stead that what should be maximized is "the sum of all 'general reinvestment' divided by the size of population at the relevant time points" (p. 267). From a theoretical point of view, this formula is vastly superior to the ordinary theory of the big push in that it includes outlays not only on physical plant, but also on the formation of "human capital," and in that it gives due consideration to secondary effects from population growth called forth by different forms of investment. Its practical disadvantage is the great difficulty with which it can be made operationally usable. In part this is due to our ignorance of rates of return in many fields of investment, especially from the creation of "human capital," but in part also to the great uncertainty of determining population effects of different kinds of investment outlays. If the theorists of the big push would welcome any investment program, provided it is large enough, rigorous application of Leibenstein's formula would either lead to inactivity or expose planning boards to the constant danger of seriously erring in their policy estimates.

In contrast to this approach, Hirschman rejects the theory of balanced growth altogether, and places his trust primarily on the intentional build-up of disequilibria and destabilizers in the economy. Like others, he recognizes that an underdeveloped economy is in a situation of quasi-equilibrium, but unlike them he believes that the force which will move the economy off dead center is not the injection of a large amount of investment, but rather the programed inauguration of a series of disequilibria, relying on the tendencies toward equilibrium to move the system farther along a path of economic growth. The disequilibria serve as a mechanism of inducement and the equilibrating countertendencies provide forward and backward linkages that bridge

industry and agriculture, and between production for home consumption and production for export" (p. 283).

Though Lewis shows that this formula deviates from the practice in Communist countries, where industry is pushed at the expense of agriculture, and from the recommendations of "liberal" economists who would "urge upon the agricultural countries . . . that they should concentrate upon agriculture" (*ibid.*), it gives little guidance to the harassed planner or programing officer in an underdeveloped country. It states, in very general terms, that capital formation is a good thing, that a little more of it is better than a little less—as is usually the case with a good thing—and that it matters little what special pattern of capital formation is selected, provided that one does not go whole hog in a single direction. It may well be that this is the best economists have to offer at present, but if it is, we are in poor straits, indeed.

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the discontinuities created in the system. Hirschman agrees with Leibenstein that one of the most important impediments to growth in backward economies is incapacity to make innovating decisions—Leibenstein would regard this factor as one of the income-depressing features of the system—and the disequilibria are designed to take the place of such decisions. Backward linkages will then be set up, in the sense that an innovation (e.g., in the form of a new investment) will tend to exert pressure on the suppliers of inputs for this new investment to expand production. Forward linkages, which may operate simultaneously, are pressures exerted by the new investment upon other sectors of the economy to absorb its output. It is easy to see that backward pressures are considerably more compelling than forward pressures. Thus Hirschman's strategy for economic growth would strongly support new investment in intermediate industries, for in these the backward linkages are strong and yet considerable room exists for forward linkages to develop.

A large part of Hirschman's discussion is devoted to the examination of disequilibrium situations between the social overhead sector and the sector of directly productive activities. He favors the greatest possible disequilibrium between the two sectors and almost equates the quasi-stability of underdeveloped economies with balance between the two sectors, though on a low level of productivity. Since most of the linkages from the social overhead sector are forward linkages, whereas those from directly productive activities run both forward and backward, an excess of investment in directly productive activities is preferable to excess capacity in the social overhead sector.

In some ways the policies proposed by Hirschman and Leibenstein do not differ very much. Both oppose investment in agriculture as against industry—Leibenstein because he argues that the sum of all general reinvestment is higher in the latter than in the former, and Hirschman because he anticipates that more linkages will develop in new industrial investment than in agriculture. In other ways, their policies differ greatly. A program of balanced growth would be acceptable to Leibenstein—though he would consider it far from ideal—but would be fully rejected by Hirschman. Moreover, although the magnitudes of the destabilizers are not indicated by Hirschman, he would probably be content with smaller injections of new investment at any one time than Leibenstein. One cannot be sure of this, however, for in a discussion on the timing of investment, Leibenstein argues that several successive smaller injections of investment may have the same effect as a single larger one (pp. 254ff.).

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But perhaps the most important difference between Hirschman and Leibenstein is that the former expects an innovation to induce a stream of secondary changes which push the system in the same direction, whereas Leibenstein emphasizes much more the income-depressing or growth-preventing secondary effects. Here, it seems that Hirschman agrees with Myrdal, who also sees development as a process which may start from relatively low-level equilibria and develop into a system of cumulative change, eventually leading to a breakthrough and overcoming in this way the vicious circle of poverty and economic backwardness. It is difficult to resolve this issue on a theoretical level. Its resolution may depend upon a number of factors—for example, on the general level of economic performance of a country, and also on various factors extraneous to the economy and located primarily in the system of values and beliefs of a society.

The various works under review—except the book by Coale and Hoover, which deals with specific countries—tend to overgeneralize and to stipulate one typical pattern of economic development. Though the authors often assert that this pattern differs from that experienced by the European countries, they feel it to be applicable to all presently underdeveloped countries—at least, to those which do not employ Communist strategies for economic growth. Yet it is doubtful whether one single or even one typical developmental pattern can be stipulated. I have suggested, in another place, that even in historical perspective it is useful to distinguish between several patterns of economic growth.[6] I believe that the same is true of the currently underdeveloped countries, and hence that it is quite conceivable that, for reasons which still need to be explored, Hirschman's formula may be more apt in some countries and Leibenstein's in others, and in some third group of countries quite different policies again would be most appropriate.

Though it is likely that the reasons why different countries have different development patterns and hence will require the elaboration of different policies are to be found in certain non-economic (i.e., social, cultural, or political) structures, an important factor that may explain some of the contrasting situations is the general level of a country's economic performance. Hirschman's primary line of reference is Latin America, and it is not improbable that Leibenstein's is Asia. As Oshima has shown recently, the countries of Latin America are in several significant respects economically different from those of Asia.[7] This

[6] Bert F. Hoselitz, "Patterns of Economic Growth," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXI, No. 4 (November 1955), pp. 416-31.

[7] Harry Oshima, "Economic Growth and the 'Critical Minimum Effort,'" *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, VII, No. 4 (July 1959), p. 475.

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fact is also brought out in the comparisons of India and Mexico carried out by Coale and Hoover. It appears likely, for example, that in Latin American countries income-depressing agents have slighter impact than in the poorer and economically more backward countries of Asia. Coale and Hoover express the difference as follows: "Mexico may achieve rising economic welfare for 30 years or even for a half-century without major declines in fertility. . . . Even in the near future Mexican prospects would rise faster and more surely with a lower birth rate. In India the period during which sustained fertility can be tolerated without a resumption of high mortality is shorter. The advantages of a reduced birth rate are comparable, but in India the existence of a breathing spell before high fertility endangers rising incomes is less certain and the length of such a breathing spell is surely much less" (p. 335).

Assume that India's breathing spell is short enough to prevent any income-raising innovation from having a lasting effect, since the income-depressing agent of population growth pulls the economy back to its original low level of performance. In Mexico the breathing spell is thirty years, enough time for fertility patterns to change. Hence in the latter country the immediate effect of an income-enhancing innovation may be a stream of further changes in the same direction, so that the economy will reach a new equilibrium and possibly, if enough successive destabilizers are introduced, will pass into self-sustained growth. This divergence in Indian and Mexican prospects is due basically to different starting points—i.e., the present levels of economic performance in the two countries. Add to this differences in institutions, differences in the distribution of entrepreneurial talent, and a host of other social, political, and cultural differences, and the total development pattern of the two countries may proceed along widely differing paths.

We conclude, therefore, that in the field of development policy, as in the field of development theory, we are still in a "twilight zone." Just as in the study of the history of economic growth of advanced countries it is possible to distinguish different characteristic patterns of economic development, so it appears to be possible to develop a series of typical patterns of economic development *policies* for different underdeveloped countries. We do not yet know the primary criteria by which countries should be classified in order to permit us to recommend a specific pattern for each. It seems certain that one and the same pattern may be applicable to more than one country—that, for example, basically the same prescription will hold for Burma as for Vietnam or

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Cambodia, and perhaps also Nigeria and certain countries in Latin America. A different pattern may hold for Mexico and Turkey, and again another for Java, Egypt, and East Pakistan. What is required is the elaboration of distinctive criteria by which we can recognize the best medicine for any one patient, and in order to do this we must study the several patients more closely and the likely effects of different medicines and mixtures of them.

Clearly a policy prescription like that cited from W. A. Lewis' work is insufficiently concrete, and the same holds for the policies, investment criteria, and strategies proposed by Hirschman, Leibenstein, and Myrdal. To say that investment is a good thing may be true, but is platitudinous, and even to say that, under the conditions in which underdeveloped countries find themselves, the application of strict marginalism is inappropriate does not lead us very far. It may be necessary to point to this fact in order to shake some economists out of their complacent belief that by small marginal adjustments and the free play of the market all will turn out for the best. But we surely must go beyond either stating platitudes or shocking our more ethnocentric colleagues, and must try to achieve more extended insights into the likely results of alternative investment outlays in underdeveloped countries at different levels of economic performance and with different institutional environments.

How limited our knowledge is as yet may be exhibited by the relative neglect of studying returns from investment in "human capital." We do not know, for example, whether it is desirable to recommend a vast elementary educational program for an underdeveloped country. We do not know where to locate the cut-off point for any one country in choosing to invest in the higher education of a certain proportion of its population as against investment in real tangible capital. We do not know at what point certain health and other welfare programs reach a balance as between economic advantages and disadvantages. It is not suggested that these programs will or should be evaluated entirely in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. But such an analysis is surely relevant, even if it may not be the ultimate criterion upon which policy is decided. We still have a lot to learn and a lot of research to do. The authors of the books under review merit our gratitude, for in spite of some shortcomings in regard to questions of investment policy, they have pushed our insights further. These volumes are a valuable base from which our work can and must go on.

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CONTENT ANALYSIS FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

By ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL

Alexander L. George, *Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II* (A RAND Corporation Research Study), Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson and Co., 1959, 287 pp. $6.00.

DURING World War II, the United States government, cut off from normal sources of information about events in enemy territory, undertook to monitor everything that came over the radio waves from Nazi Germany. The job was done by the Federal Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communications Commission. To interpret what was broadcast the FBIS recruited a stellar array of social scientists, among them Hans Speier, Bernard Berelson, Nathan Leites, Edward A. Shils, Goodwin Watson, Frederick Schuman, Theodore Newcombe, Lewis Dexter, Sebastian de Grazia, and Alexander George himself.

Theirs was a problem in content analysis, an area in which a number of them had done academic research in the past. But a wide gap separated the questions that rigorous social science research could answer and the questions that needed answering.

The gap was revealed most sharply by early attempts of the FCC analysts to be quantitative in their analysis of the broadcast texts. A considerable effort was made at first to find stable countable indicators of Nazi intentions. The effort did not succeed and more and more the analysts turned to using the texts for intuitive qualitative interpretations of current events. Such interpretations they did brilliantly and some predictions based on clues in single broadcasts were sensationally accurate.

It is that wartime experience of applied social research which provides the subject matter of Alexander George's book. In it Dr. George does two things with great perceptiveness and great thoroughness. First he analyzes what he calls the "logic of the situation" approach to which the FCC analysts turned, and shows why it was appropriate to the task at hand: a task of diagnosing motives in particular situations, not one of testing generalizations. Then, in the latter part of the book, he matches the inferences made by the FCC staff against information that became available after the end of the war in captured documents.

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These provided an unusual opportunity to check where and why social science research proved to be right or wrong.

Certainly, the most exciting parts of the book are the case studies of intelligence successes. They have all the drama and subtlety of a game of chess. One of the most remarkable stories concerns a British (not FBIS) analysis. The Germans kept broadcasting about forthcoming secret weapons. Strange concrete installations appeared in France pointed at England. But the weapons were so long in coming that some officers began to dismiss them as a hoax. In early November 1943 a British analyst without access to aerial, agent, or other intelligence wrote a report based on the German broadcasts. In it he asserted that "beyond reasonable doubt" Germany did possess a secret weapon. "By the end of May preparations for the use of this weapon were past the experimental stage. Something occurred on or a little before August 19 which substantially postponed D-day. . . . Something occurred between the 3rd and about the 10th of September which further postponed D-day. The schedule for the offensive weapon has lagged in relation to that for a type or types of defensive weapon, and Germany's leaders now expect a diminution in the weight of Allied air attacks to precede German retaliation. It may be *tentatively estimated* that Germany's leaders expect this offensive weapon to come into use not before the middle of January 1944, and not later than the middle of April" (pp. 142-43).

What was the real situation as we now know it? Germany was indeed developing the V-1 and V-2. The analyst's correct conclusion that the secret weapon was not a bluff was predicated on his knowledge that "German propaganda never deliberately misled the German people in questions involving an increase of German power" (p. 143). Thus repeated *home* propaganda on the weapon had to be believed. But how did he arrive at the dates? After August 19, German propaganda about defensive measures against Allied bombardment, which previously had not been linked with discussions of secret offensive weapons, began to appear as part of the same messages. The analyst believed that a delay in plans for use of an offensive secret weapon was a more plausible explanation than a push forward in anti-aircraft defense. In actual fact, unknown to the analyst, the RAF on August 17 had attacked Peenemünde and its secret-weapon experimental station. Then the analyst noted that for a week after September 11 items on retaliation disappeared from domestic broadcasts. On September 7-8 an Allied raid had as its target the launching platforms between Boulogne and Calais. The dating of likely use of the weapon was based

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upon general principles of Goebbels' propaganda doctrine about what constituted a reasonable delay from promise to fulfillment. In November 1943, when the analyst made his prediction, the Germans' own estimate of when their weapon would come into use was February or March, exactly as the analyst said!

There are several things to note about this sensational intelligence performance. The first is that it could be done at all. This and other brilliant cases in Alexander George's book should convince skeptics that much is indeed available to be learned from close content analysis. Correct prognoses were made, for example, that the Germans would not launch a 1943 summer offensive on the Eastern Front and that they were preparing to withdraw that fall. One gains the impression that the FBIS analysts were even better than they themselves knew. Their insights were often hedged about with doubts which hindsight shows to have been unnecessary.

Where speech is free, a great deal is revealed by changes in symbolism and, remarkably enough, much is also revealed when speech is tightly censored and controlled. The successes of the FBIS show how the propaganda co-ordination of a modern totalitarian nation, while it is designed to mislead, cannot help but convey information to those who understand the system. Political goals which the regime would like to hide determine what appears in the mass media. Propaganda is inescapably related to real policies. The assertions made may often be false, but they cannot be a meaningless flow of words divorced from the decisions of the policy-makers. Buried in the ritualized turns of phrases is a set of messages available to those who go through the scholastic exercise of decoding. That is just as true of Soviet propaganda as it was of Nazi. It may be hard for free-speaking Americans to believe what subtlety of calculation may go into a political message. A tour de force of exegesis such as Nathan Leites' analysis of the relative rank of Politburo members on the basis of the Stalin seventieth-birthday speeches[1] or Myron Rush's study of the rise of Khrushchev[2] leaves many of our public officials almost as skeptical as if they were reading proofs that Bacon was Shakespeare. But under wartime pressures the FBIS was allowed to try that kind of detective job on Nazi propaganda, though even then its conclusions were not much heeded by policy-makers. Today no such systematic attempt is made to keep ourselves informed on the covert information contained in the overt fulminations

[1] Nathan Leites, Elsa Bernaut, and Raymond L. Garthoff, "Politburo Images of Stalin," *World Politics*, III, No. 3 (April 1951), pp. 317-39.
[2] Myron Rush, *The Rise of Khrushchev*, Washington, D.C., 1958.

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of the Soviets. Alexander George's book will perhaps help demonstrate that there is a way of doing effective content analysis for intelligence purposes on even the most secretive system of communications.

A second point to note, and one which the book underlines, is that success in that kind of content analysis requires a deep and varied knowledge of the country, the ideology, and the people being studied. Such content analysis is detective work in which any slight clue in a text may provide an insight to a reader whose mind is well prepared. Content analysis for intelligence purposes cannot effectively proceed by a routinized process, whether of statistical tabulation or any other kind of observation.

A scientific experimenter testing hypotheses proceeds in a very different way. He desires that any human being who follows his instructions for observing or measuring should come out with the same descriptive statements about the variables being studied. That is not what an intelligence operative does. He is more like a scientist at the stage of creativity than like one at the stage of testing. He has his mind open for any suggestion which events can give to him. The better stocked and alert the mind, the better the guesses are apt to be. When he succeeds in fitting the available pieces together in a way that seems to give insight, he has achieved the basis of an intelligence report. He seldom has the time or opportunity to construct a follow-up set of test observations. His insight becomes an intelligence estimate directly, subject, of course, to later repudiation. But for the moment he treats the facts he is interpreting as if they were a unique instance and his construct regarding them as the best available guess.

A third point in Alexander George's book which is illustrated by the case studies of successful analysis is that propaganda is a purposeful strategic activity, the analysis of which must take account of strategy. Something which Dr. George calls the "direct" method of content analysis would assume that one could infer the existence of a certain situation if one found certain symbols prevailing in it—e.g., that where a side is suffering deprivation, it will increase its accusations of immorality against the other side, regardless of any purposes served thereby. The "indirect" method, which Alexander George holds to be superior, goes through a more elaborate series of steps of inference. The content of the propaganda is examined to draw inferences about what propaganda strategy is being used rather than about the ultimate facts. Knowledge of what propaganda strategy has been chosen may in turn reveal what policies the elite is attempting to carry out. That in

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turn may suggest the elite's expectations about developments, which in turn may suggest what the current facts facing the elite may be.

It is a little hard to believe that any sophisticated intelligence analyst would indulge in what Alexander George calls the direct method. The cases he cites seem not to be examples of such. But insofar as it is always more likely that one will do something right if one is self-conscious about what one is doing, Alexander George's injunction to remember that propaganda is a game of shifting strategies is clearly useful. The very fact that a certain propaganda strategy had been used a couple of times by the Nazis prior to invasion made the analyst guess on a later occasion that it would be avoided in an invasion preparation. Scientists seek specifically those behavioral patterns which are regular (although there is such a thing as the scientific analysis of strategy; in it one subsumes changing tactics under broader laws). The intelligence analyst is as interested in shifting as in stable phenomena.

A final topic with which Alexander George deals well is that usually alluded to as "qualitative" versus "quantitative" methods. George, however, is more sophisticated in his discussion of this matter than most writers. He knows that words like "many" or "increasingly" refer to numbers, even if crudely. He also knows that zero and one are numbers. He does not call an analysis qualitative just because the counts are not precise or because it turns solely on the presence or absence of a certain statement. Some inferences do depend on "frequency" indicators—e.g., the frequency with which a particular leader or theater of war is alluded to in the news. Other inferences can be made from the fact that a sufficiently responsible source permits a certain statement to appear even once, and further repetitions add nothing to the inference. Obviously, in the latter case counting beyond one is silly.

However, an even more fundamental issue with regard to counting arises when the intelligence analyst is dealing with shifting verbal strategies. A count implies that one is interested in a series of instances of the same thing. If that is not so, then a routinized counting procedure will yield little of interest. As Alexander George points out, the craving for quantification has more than once led people to set up counts without fully considering whether the phenomenon being counted was a stable indicator of what needed to be known.

What does all of this suggest about the present state of content analysis? To many readers, George's excellent book will undoubtedly convey a message that is not there and probably is not intended—i.e., that the whole enterprise of quantitative content analysis, as repre-

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sented by the work of Harold Lasswell and his successors, is an ill-considered exercise. This is a conclusion which, though wrong, is not rare. Indeed, "frequency" content analysis after an initial vogue seems to be in a phase of disenchantment. Almost none of the persons who were active producers of such content analyses a decade or two ago are so now. Lasswell, Leites, Berelson, Lerner, and this reviewer are all doing other things.

But the impression of the demise of quantitative content analysis is not a valid one. A rather interesting transformation of the field of scientific content analysis is now taking place. The attempt to count *simple frequencies* is being widely abandoned. The notion that the frequency of use of any particular symbol or symbols increases or decreases with changes in relevant social conditions turns out to be an oversimple one, not only for intelligence operations, but also for most scientific research purposes. Few uses of language are that unstructured. Correlations between words and events usually involve many intervening variables. Increases in international tensions, for example, are not adequately indexed by changes in the frequency of any particular word or statement. A war may be referred to as a "police action" and the use of the word "war" thus not increase significantly with the incidence of military action; or the word may refer to the relation of the sexes and have nothing to do with international affairs.

Awareness of these complexities is not new, but quantitative ways of coping with them are. The most significant development is the shift from counting mere frequencies to counting contingencies. By "contingency analysis" we mean that one measures the probability of a particular symbol appearing in an environment in which other particular symbols also appear. It is a way of measuring conditional instead of simple probabilities of symbols.

Measuring contingencies is more loyal to the structure of language than is measuring straight frequencies. Words follow other words, and they condition each other. References to "war," for example, almost necessarily imply increased references to "peace." One uses these words in tandem. Contingency analysis examines the degree of statistical association of such related words. The prevailing state of feeling might be measured not so much by the absolute frequency in the appearance of a word like "war" or "victory," but by the extent to which, along with "war," there are references to "castastrophe" on the one hand, and to "victory" on the other.

The development of contingency methods brings content analysis not only closer to developments in linguistics, but also to other develop-

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ments which have been influenced by information theory. The beginnings of information theory stemmed from studies of conditional probabilities in language codes, and ideas of information theory have in turn suggested new approaches to the study of texts, among them "cloze" procedure, by which some words are masked and readers are asked to guess them from the context.

A number of scholars have independently moved toward methods of symbol analysis which take account of contexts. The ideas are in the air. The present reviewer has just edited a book on *Trends in Content Analysis*[3] containing contributions from a number of scholars, including Alexander George. It was striking how many of the contributors were independently moving toward a focus on contingency. It also became clear that the tradition of content analysis is neither dead nor dying. It is moving in new directions. Psychologists, psycholinguists, and students of journalism are perhaps taking the lead that was once held by political scientists. The work in psycholinguistics may enable us to solve some of the more basic problems in the measurement of language. Political scientists may then be able to move back into content analysis with far better tools than in the past.

But it should not be assumed that the mere possession of improved tools will invalidate Alexander George's stricture against allowing gimmicks of data-processing to interfere with the insights of the politically alert analyst in intelligence operations. His case will retain its full validity, for it rests not on any traditionalist deprecation of counting techniques, but rather on an understanding of the differences in problem and purpose between content analysis for intelligence and content analysis as an observational device for social science research. Indeed, content analysis is moving in two very different directions; the paths are increasingly diverging. On the one hand, Alexander George in the present volume has set up a doctrine which no future intelligence analyst can afford to disregard for doing highly intuitive non-frequency intelligence analysis. It is a doctrine not without rigor; it is carefully expressed, soundly based, minutely analyzed. There is little doubt that the present book will become a classic guide for intelligence analysts and that it will help check misplaced scientism and ill-considered quantification when what is wanted is insight, breadth of knowledge, and rigorous strategic reasoning. George's book, however, is appearing at the very moment when, both mathematically and procedurally, scientific content analysis research is becoming in-

[3] Urbana, Ill., 1959.

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creasingly complex. Those researchers who are engaged in quantitative and formal communications research, far from challenging the criticisms which Alexander George makes of the more naive kinds of frequency analysis which have been used in the past, tend to agree with him, but for their purpose their response to the criticisms is to develop more elaborate formal models than ever.

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